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Glossary of Notation 
A matrix of unknown parameters in chapter 3 
a, b fixed coefficients in household technology in chapter 4 
a, b parameters in inverse pareto distribution in chapter 6 
a, b parameters of time profile for individual in chapter 7 
c characteristics 
d, e adjustment costs in chapter 4 
b0 observed sample statistic in chapter 6 
i social rate of discount and market rate of interest 
k number of advertising messages received in chapter 3 
L loss function in chapter 8 
M income 
m random variable with standard normal distribution 
P prices 
r known degree of precision of log normal random variable 
s quantity of good complementary to x and y in chapter 4 
T, t time periods 
T final time period in environment 
EU discounted sum of expected utility 
U utility per pe riod 
V ifidirect utility function 
K vector of observations 
x quantity of new good 
y quantity of old good 
z unknown parameter 
unknown parameter in chapter 3 
a, B parameters of utility function in chapter 5 
Y coefficient of adjustment in adaptive learning process 
C random variable, representing product quality 
C observed level of product quality 
V parameter supplied by the firm 
VO mean of subjective beliefs 
0 consumer's degree of confidence 
Ir 
implicit prices in chapter 2 
IT 
discrete probabilities in chapter 3 
P 
deception element of an advertising message in chapter 3 
Ti 
difference between expected and actual product quality in chapter T 
x elasticity of demand in chapter 7 
Sumipary 
This thesis incorporates a role for advertising in 
a neoclassical model of consumer behaviour in an environment 
with imperfect information, Advertising is seen as providing 
an initial set of parameters in the consumeiis subjective beliefs. 
The thesis considers the role of learning through experience over 
time, as an alternative source of information. The ability to 
learn is shown to affect consumer behaviour under a number of 
assumptions about the state of the environment. The models 
under consideration are complex, and analytical solutions are 
difficult to disentangle. For this reason the thesis makes use 
of numerical analysis to provide qolutions for the specific 
parameter values assumed. The desire of a consumer to gain 
information is shown to generate a pattern of purchases of a new 
good which accords with the empirical evidence, Over time, we 
find that the initial advertising statement declines in importance 
as a component of current beliefs, as the consumer places greater 
reliance on his own experience* We contrast different learning 
mechanisms in an attempt to find the most efficient process for 
gaining complete information, and conclude that no one learning 
process is always dominant, but depends on the parameters in the 
environment. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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This thesis is concerned with examining consumer behaviour 
over a number of time periods, when the consumer is able to learn 
over time about unknown elements in the enviroment. The aim of 
the thesis is to incorporate advertising into a neoclassical 
model of consumer behaviour and consider the effect of advertising 
statements on the demand for a product. 
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that consumers have 
perfect knowledge of all available goods and prices, enabling them 
to compuýe easily their optimal demands and supplies. Once we 
remove the assumption of complete knowledge we enrich the structure 
of the model by introducing an additional tier of choices into the 
consumerts decision problem. Before he can decide which goods to 
buy, he must first of all acquire information about the available 
products, such as to their existence, functions, quality, location 
and price. The consumer must determine both the quantity and 
quality of the information required. The demand for information 
is a derived demand, since it allows the consumer to make -Ln - 
informed decision about the demand for a final product. The 
quality of the information will depend upon its source. Information 
may be obtained from a number of sources. A consumer could walk 
the streets, observing prices and testing individual products. He 
may read about goods in factual magazines or receive details from 
consumer watchdog organisations. Ile may find out about product 
ch, mracteristics on the bazis of his own experience? from purchasing 
the good in the past. Other consumers may tell him about particular 
attributes of goods that they have sampled, enhancing the reputation 
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of some goods. He will be subjected to advertising statements 
on television, on billboards and in newspapers, all purporting 
to give information about the respective product. The consumer 
will select various bits of information, some of which he pays for 
directly and others which are free, and use them to compose a set 
of beliefs about the unknown elements in his environment. In 
this thesis we suppose that the consumer has two sources of 
information: advertising messages and his own exporience. 
Initially, by definition, his experience set is null, and his 
information set consists entirely of advertising messages and his 
views about the accuracy of these statements. Over time however 
the consumer acquires knowledge by sampling various products, and 
we are interested in investigating this process* 
The thesis can be divided into two sections? in the next two 
chapters we outline our understanding of the advertising process 
from the viewpoint of the consumer. We then use this definition 
in the remaining chapters to analyse the effect of advertising. 
and learning on consumer behaviour 
Chapter 2 attempts to distinguish between the various meanings 
of advertising with a view to establishing the importance of the 
information content of an advertising message as the crucial aspect 
of the effect of advertising on consumer behaviour. 
Firstly we look at 14axshall's distinction between constructive 
and combative advertising, since this classification started the 
debate on the difference between information and persuasive 
- 
advertising. We then consider the importance of product 
differentiation on providing a role for informative messages, 
and briefly summaxise the psychological aspect of how an informative 
statement can be presented before a consumer. Product differentiation 
means that each good has individual attributes, which may be real 
or perceived. These attributes need to be identified by the consumer, 
and it is argued that advertising fulfils this identification role. 
We go on to examine the owe of advertising which creates new 
wants, and the difficulties that this makes for welfare comparisons. 
These problems can be overcome by redefining the welfare yardstick. 
Here it is shown that we can compare changes in an 
informative message with changes in product price, in terms of 
income and substitution effects. This analogy is used to solve 
a problem which is raised in Chapter 5- 
Chapter 3 defines the meaning of advertising which will be 
used throughout the rest of the thesis. Advertising is defined 
as being an information generating mechanism which can be compared 
with other mechanisms, such as search. We point out where 
imperfect information may occur in a consumeris decision problem, 
and the value of advertising under these circumstances. The 
value of perfect information and of advertising is highlighted by 
two examploo. Ile then suggest a way that advertising can be 
incorporated into a consumeiýis beliefs about his environment. 
The crucial characteristic about advertising is that it is 
information given by the producer of the good, who has- an incentive 
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to exaggerate its positive attributes. However, the ability of 
the producer to distort the trixth depends upon the efficiency of 
the consumer in accumulating complete, unbiased knowledge. 
In Chapters 4,5 and 61 we move on to the analytics of 
consumer behaviour in a two-period world* We consider the problem 
facing a consumer when he has a choice between a new good with 
unknown characteristics and an old, safe reliable good. The 
consumers initial beliefs about the new good are given by an 
advertisipg message. The consumer is able to gain further 
unbiased informatipn by purchasing the good and observing the results 
for use in the second period. We are interested in how much of the 
new good the consumer purchases, and how this optimal quantity 
changes as the parameters in the problem change, such as the 
initial advertising message and the consumers degree of confidence 
in the truthfulness of this message. 
An underlying assumption in all the models considered is that 
the environment is stochastic. Product characteristics are 
regarded as random variables* Now -this may seem an unreasonable 
assumption since it is likely that with mass production, products 
will be standardized, so that two units of the same good will be 
identical. However, the consumer is concerned with the perception 
of a goodfs qualities. And the same good consumed in -the morning 
or in the evening may have a different effect on utility. Thus, 
the environment is randomised, not on the production side but 
due to the time, place and conditions under which the consumption 
of the good occurs. Although this model generalises to the case 
where product quality is itself a random variable. 
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In order to build models of consumer behaviour that contain 
the dimensions of both uncertainty and time, the structure of 
these models will be, by nature, complicated, Analytical 
solutions to optimal behaviour patterns and compaxative statio 
exercises will be difficult to define. One way round this problem 
of a trade-off between realism and complexity, is to consider 
numerical analysis of the solutions, This practice is followed 
throughout the thesis: the answers to various questions are 
given for particular values of the parameters in the problem. 
Thus we lose some generality in our results, but at least the 
results exist for specific conditions. 
In Chapter 4, the underlying random variable has a normal 
distribution, and the consumers initial beliefs about the advertising 
message axe also normal, In Chapter 5, the underlying distribution 
is log-normal, though the prior is still normal. In Chapter 6, 
we revert baci to a ay=etri6 distribution to describe the -r4ýpdom 
variable, but the prior beliefs are assumed to have an inverse 
Pareto distribution. By comparing the results of these chapters, 
we will be able to say something about the effect of these 
distributions on consumer behaviour. Similarly, for simplicity, 
Chapters 4-and 6 assume that the consumer has a linear utility function. 
In order to compare the effect of risk aversion on the problem, in 
Chapter 5 the consumer is assumed to be risk averse; his preferences 
are represented by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function* 
In Chapter 7, we extend the model in Chapter 4 to a many-period 
framework. This enables us to chart the demand for the new good 
over time, as information accumulates. Again we --ee how this 
pattern of Purchases changooas the parameters in the problem change. 
We are especially interested in the speed of adjustment tp the 
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final equilibrium. That is, how long does it take the consumer 
to acquire sufficient information as to make an informed decision? 
The model generates an aggregate time profile of purchases similar 
to the standard difflasion curve identified in the literature. 
Farther we state a testable hypothesis about the demand elasticities 
along the life-cycle of the product. 
Chapter 8 attempts to compare the value of the learning from 
Bayesian sampling with other, less complex processes, The 
conclusions of the thesis are drawn together in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 2 
On the Importance of Distinguishing 
Between Informative and Persuasive Advertising 
-9- 
Constructive and Combative Advertising 
Initially Alfred Marshall made a distinction between constructive 
advertising which "includes all measures designed to draw the attention 
of people to opportunities for buying or selling, of which they may be 
willing to avail themselves" 
(1) 
and combative advertising, which 11obtrudes 
itself in the incessant iteration of the name of a product, coupled perhaps 
with the claim that it is of excellent quality". 
(2) 
The contrast between these definitions is that constructive advertising 
is undertaken by the producer to inform the consumer of the existence of 
a product; it is the initial message which once observed means that the 
consumer can make an informed decision, Combative advertising are those 
same messages repeated continually which serve no useful purpose and 
involve social waste since "the lavish advertiser must deduct his expenses 
from the gross profits of his additional sales; while the rivals whom he 
ousts lose their gross profits". 
(3) 
Marshall is regarding the wastefulness of advertising from the position 
of a consumer who has both seen the advertising statement and remembered 
it. The problem facing the producer is to ensure that a message is seen 
by as large a percentage of the population as possible. This will 
undoubtedly mean that the same message will be sent out more than once at 
different times of the day, in different locations and through different 
media. The greater the quantity of the same message released, the greater 
the probability that any one consumer will see it. Diminishing returns 
with respect to the number of messages may set in; that is the rate at 
which the proportion of the population that have seen the message increases, 
falls with the number of messages. rLhe optimal number of advertising 
Text cut off in original 
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messages for a profit maximising producer will be given by equating the 
cost of an additional message with the expected increase in returns from an 
additional proportion of the population seeing the advertising statement. 
A consequence of this policy is that it may well be the owe that some of 
the population see the same message more than once. 
Similarly, it may be necessary for a producer to reiterate an advertisinfl 
statement because consumerst memories are not perfect, and information 
acquired in the past depreciates at a rate of forgetfulness which varies 
between consumers, 
Marshall illustrates his distinction between constructive and combative 
advertisements: "For instance a good frontage on a leading thoroughfare; 
adequate space for the convenience of employees and for customers; lifts 
and moving staircases, eto., are all constructive so. long as they do not 
exceed the requirements of business But eager rivalry often causes 
them to be carried to an excess, which involves social waste". 
I 
The dividing line is drawn by Ithe requirements of business" which 
is vague, but perhaps relates to the equilibrium conditions suggested earlier 
For Marshall, the distinction between constructive and combative 
advertising is the quantity of messages. Up to some point advertising 
statements are constructive, but past this point continual repetition of 
the same statement becomes combative, 
The wastefulness of combative advertising is that it simply redistribute 
goods between producers, a point also made by A. C. Pigou. with respect to 
- 11 - 
competitive advertising; "competitive advertising fis -7 
directed to 
the sole purpose of transferring the demand for a given commodity from one 
source of supply to another". 
(5) 
The wastefulness arises because producers are advertising the same 
good. Marshall and Pigou are writing against a background of competitive 
markets and homogeneous products. Once consumers have been made aware of 
the existance of an industry product, then competitive conditions dictate 
that the price will be the same for all firms in the industry. Advertising 
by firms in this situation should inform the consumers of the location 
of the product, and be sufficient to prevent the inception of localised' 
monopolies. 
Real and Perceived Differences in Product 9-uality 
The development of the theory of monopolistic competition introduced 
the idea of an industry consisting of heterogeneous goods, Once it is 
recognised that different firms in the same industry produce different 
goods, then'it can no longer be argued that advertising wastefully 
redistributes sales between producers. An advertising mpssage is the means 
by which a producer informs the consumer about the quality and uses of his 
particular differentiated product. In terms of the characteristic approach 
to utility theory, consumers are assumed to gain utility from consuming 
characteristics, which are produced by goods. These characteristics come 
packaged in varying proportions in various goods. If individuals are 
not identical then we can expect that their preferences over characteristics 
- 12 '- 
will differ. One individual will have a preference for a characteristic 
which is available in one particular good, another individual will have 
a set of preferences which. can best be satisfied by a good with a different 
amount of characterstics. 
Product differentiation is not necessarily wasteful since it supplies 
consumers with a ýreater choice of characteristics than if there was only 
one homogeneous industry good. Advertising messages supply consumers with 
information about the quantities and proportions of the characteristics in 
these differentiated goods. Advertising is the means by which actual 
product differences can be imparted to consumers, "Product differentiation 
is propogated by differences in the design or physical quality of competing 
products, by efforts of sellers to distinguish their. products through 
packagind, branding and the offering of auxiliary services to buyers , and 
by advertising the sales-promotional efforts designed to win the allegiance 
and custom of the potential buyer. These latter efforts may turn in, part 
on informing the consumer of the distinctive physical properties of the 
individual products, and also in part on "convincing" him of their 
desirability, presige or superior qualitylle 
(6) 
The wastefulness of product differentiation occurs because the 
proliferation of products means that economies of scale can not be reaped 
from mass production, Lancaster (1975) argues that this productive 
inefficiency must be offset against -the gain in variety from having 
a multitude of goods, 
13 - 
Even if two goods are objectively very similar such that'the loss in 
productive efficiency is greater than the gain from variety, then we still can 
not say that advertising their similar characteristics is wasteful since 
an Joyce (1963) notes advertising adds "psychological values to the product", 
(71 
Moving onto the more psychological aspects of advertising, we have so 
far argued that an advertising message is a piece of information sent from 
the producer to the consumer, The producer must ensure that the consumer 
comprehends the message; to achieve this the message must gain the 
consumer's attention and the producer must estimate how the consumer will 
perceive the message once read. 
"Advertisements can in general only work by being seen or heard by 
consumers and operating on their minds, a process which in some way 
influences one aspect of their behaviour - the physical operation of 
purchasing". 
(8) 
This more psychological approach to advertising could be regarded 
as persuasive, that is, the information must be presented in a persuasive 
way in order that it can enter the consumer's decision problem. Given 
that the consumer is operating in a noisy environment the information must 
attract his attention and be presented persuasively, According to Hicks 
"The attention of the consumer has to be attracted and his attention 
aroused. In order to perform its social function advertising has to be 
attractive and (let us not be afraid to say) persuasive. "(9) 
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The Creation of New Wants and the Manifestation of Latent Wants 
Up till now advertising has been regarded as providing consumers with 
information about unknown product characteristics, and how that information 
is presented. Bat as well as providing information about products, 
advertising can also be used to provide information to consumers about their 
own utility functions. If consumerst preferences are fixed, then advertising 
can be used to pr8vide information either about parameters whose existence is 
known to consumer but whose value is unknown; or about parameters which 
are lying dormant in the consumer's utility function* 
If preferences vary over time, then advertising may be responsible 
for these new preferences, The dividing line between advertising 
providing information about something that already e#sts and the creation 
of new parameters and hence new wants is very fine. If preferences do 
vary, then it becomes very difficult to judge whether welfare has changed 
for the better or worse, ' If advertising allow the manifestation of latent 
wants, then the welfare yardstick remains the same, but if advertising 
creates new wants then we have two standards of judgement: the new and old 
set of preferences. 
Marshall recognised that wants may change over time: "although it is 
man's wants in the earliest stages of his development that give rise to his 
activities, yet afterwards each new step upwards is to be regarded as the 
development of new activities giving rise to now wants, rather than new 
wants giving rise to new activities". 
(10) 
- 15 -I 
In the early stages of man's development his desire for food caused the 
hunter to travel* At a later stage, the invention of the airplane oaxised 
a new desire for travel by air - flying for its own sake, The introduction 
of a new good created a new want. The philosophical problem is to decide 
whether the desire for flying was a new want, or if it had also been 
present in stone-, age man but had been lying dormant for centuries. 
Similarly Pigou argues: "some advertisements serves to develop an 
entirely new set of wants on the part of consumers, the satisfaction of 
which involves a real addition to social well-being". 
(") 
Pigou is going 
one stage further than Marshall, claiming that not only do advertisements 
manufacture new wants but that this increases consumer welfare. Iht this 
argument is not valid since we can not compare the consumerts welfare 
before and after the change: interpersonal comparisons or intrapersonal 
comparisons at different points in time are not always possible. 
Marshall is making a much weaker statement: that the design of new 
products may stimulate new wants; though Marshall does not 'believe 
advertising can affect wants that the consumer can control: "Of course 
no amount of expenditure on advertising will enable anything, which the 
consumer can test fairly for themselves by experience (this condition 
excludes medicine which claim to be appropriate to subtle diseases etc. ), 
to get a permanent hold on people unless it is fairly good relative to its 
price". 
(12) 
Thas a consumerts ability to learn from experience ensures 
that exaggerated advertising claims can be expurgated, 
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Although Marshall recognised the importance of advertising in 
creating new wants, he seemed to believe that the purpose of advertising 
was to "educate" consumers with respect to an undiscovered parameter in 
the utility function. "For the main constructive acts axe often confined 
to discovering the existence of a latent wantl and educating the public 
with regard to it", 
(13) 
This educative role, was challenged by Braithwaite (1928) in 
a seminal article which dealt with the economic consequences of advertising. 
Braithwaite distinguished between Itruel selling costs, "which merely conveys 
information*as to available supply"Vand advertising costs which "are 
incurred either by producer or middleman with a view to increasing the --ale 
of a commodity". 
04) 
Braithwaite argues that advertising is not educative 
because it does not present an unbiased set of information before the 
consumer: , fit. 7 might be true , *. * 
fthat 
_7advertisements were 
indeed 
educative ... if it put before the consumer such detailed and truthful 
information as would assist him in making a more correct judigement of 
commodities ....... Advertisements are not written to help people make 
a reasoned choice of commodities, they are written with the object of 
inducing them to bay particular things, and they naturally exaggerate the 
uses and merits not only of the commodity but of a particular make of the 
commodity. Moreover, the vast majority of advertisements do not confine 
themselves to pointing out the uses of commodities; they make their appeal 
not to the reason, but to the emotions, of the consumer. Suggestion, 
reiteration, attractive illustration - these are all devices to induce him 
to buy an article without making comparisons and calculations., They 
certainly'-do not assist his judgement as to the relative satisfactions to 
- 17 - 
be obtained from the different commodities or as to the relative satisfactions 
to be obtained from commodities and leisure ....... Consequently there 
appears no gounds for saying that advertisement costs, which persuade the 
consumer to adopt this new set of judgements are conferring an educative 
service". 
05) 
Thus Braithwaite introduoed the notion that advertising may "persuade" 
consumers to alter their preferences and provided an explicit account of 
how this might take effect: "Advertising expenditure an thus defined aims 
at increasing sales by affecting the mind of the consumer, By various 
appeals it induces him to change his subjective valuation of the commodity. 
Thus the marginal utility of the commodity is increased and the demand 
curve raised. Consumers are persuaded to buy more of it at the same price, 
the same quantity at a higher price, or even in some cases more of it 
at a higher price". 
(16) 
Tintner (1952) and Basman (1956) provide a more formal treatment of 
how a change in a parameter in the utility function will affect the. &-mand 
for a conmodity. 
Difficulties of Welfare Comparisons 
The problem with advertising which shifts preferences is that it becomes 
impossible to make welfare comparisons with respect to the situation before 
and after the advertising message has been seen. 
- la - 
Neoclassical consumer theory conceives of a consumer with a preference 
ordering defined over all possible bundles of goods, yielding a set of 
indifference curves which can be assigned arbitrary values$ termed utility, 
which must have higher values for higher indifference curves, that is 
utility is only defined ordinally, Consumers construct their preference 
ordering on the basis of the information they have before them. The 
consumer then maximises utility, as if it has a numerical value subject 
to a budget constraint and arrives at an optimum allocation between goods 
such that the marginal utility of a good relative to its price be equal 
for all goods. 
Each indifference curve represents a level of utility, and hence is 
a measure of -the consumerts well-being. Changes in the parameters in the 
budget constraint will move the consumer onto another, of the same set of 
indifference curves* The consumers standard of judgement remains fixed, 
by assuming a consumer prefers more of the good to less, we are able 
to state unambiguously whether welfare has risen or fallen, This is 
in contrast to the situation where the consumer changes his preference 
ordering. In this case the reference point used to make welfare comparisons 
has changed. Welfare is only defined in terms of a. particular preference 
ordering. 
Thus, if I have a preference for my house to be painted red, I can 
evaluate the effect on my welfare of a change in my income or a change in 
the price of red paint. However, if my tastes change such that I now 
prefer my house painted blue, can I say whether I am better off before or 
after the change in tastes? 
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Dixit and Norman (1978) attempt to answer this question, by making 
two welfare calculations, they evaluate a consumers decision in terms of pre 
and post-advertising tastes. Thus they evaluate the utility from having 
my house painted blue as compared with having my house painted red in terms 
of my preadvertising preferences and then evaluate the same decisions in 
terms of my post advertising tastes, Dixit and Norman use this apparatus 
to look at the question of social welfare including the effects on monopoly 
profits of an increase in advertising. 
Fisher and MdGowan (1979) note that the real comparison should be the 
utility from a red house evaluated at pre-advertising preferences and the 
utility from a blue house evaluated at post-advertising tastes, Dixit and 
Norman assume that a small amount of advertising will only have a small 
effect on a consumers decisions and hence only a small effect on tastes; and 
in effect they ignore making this comparison on the basis of its negligible 
value, 
We can illustrate the distinction between advertising that provides 
information about an unknown parameter in the consumeiýfs decision problem 
and advertising that shifts preferences. 
Consider a consumer who has a given set of preferences between two 
goods x1 and 'ý21 from which he is able to construct a set of indifference 
curves. However the consumer does not know with certainty the price 
of one of the goods, say xl,, He has an expectation of the 'price 
E(pj) = 
771, and constructs the budget constraint on the basib'of this 
estimate: 
am ply"l + p2X2 
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The slope of the budget line, which is essentially a subjective 
budget constraint, since it is what the consumer believes the budget 
pp 
x line to be, is -1 
M 
=1 
0 
x2 
P2 
Chan, ges in relative prices will yield a series of tangency positions 
between the budget line and the indifference curves, from which the consumer 
derives his demand curve, The demand curve for -the second good is derived 
assuming a particular price expectation for good 1. 
P2 
But suppose the actual price of Cood 1 is p, which is more expensive 
than the consumer believes: p, > 71 ; then if we make the reasonable 
assumption that D2(. ) is monotonically non-decreasing in the price of the 
first good then the true demand curve for the second good will be shifted to 
the right, Since if x1 is a substitute for x2, a rise in the price of xj, 
will reduce the demand for x1 and increase the demand for x2 at each P20 
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p 
I -ý, ) 
x2 
In fact for some goods, such as necessities, an increase in their 
price may shift the demand curve for a non-necessity such as x2 to the left, 
since the income effect of the higher price outweighs the substitution effect. 
D2 (P2 1 pl) is the true demand surve and reflects the consumerts true 
evaluation of the good x 2' Whereas 
172 (p 
21 
71 ) is the perceived demand 
curve which the consumer bases his purchazing decision on, 
E 
P2 
p 
0x2 X2 
22 
At price p0, the consumer demands x0 of the second good, *since point 22 
A is a point on his perceived demand curve, His consumer surplus which is 
a measure of his welfare is given by the area p0 AIM. In purchasing x0 22 
at price p0, the consumer is not on his actual demand curve. The consumer 2 
can increase his welfare by increasing his consumption of x2, until his 
marginal evaluation of the good is equal to its price at point C Consumer 
surplus becomes p0 CE The consumer can increase his welfare by the 2 
shaded area AABC j if he is informed of the true value of p,. This type of 
advertising which informs the consumer of the value of a parameter in his 
deoision problem unambiguously inorea, ses his welfare. 
Contrast this with advertising that changes tastes. Here the 
advertising message affects the preferences of the consumer, and this can 
be represented by the set of indifference curves shifting around. 
3 
2 
, 33 
22 
x 
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Initially the consumer has indifference curves 1111 
21 
13. Following. 
an advertising campaign by the producer of the second good, the consumer's 
11 22 33 
preferences change to III, I 
This time it is assumed the consumer knows with certainty the prices 
of the two goods. 
With the original set of indifference curves, the consumer can vary 
the price of x2 to again obtain a demand curve for x2* The initial demand 
curve D1 will be fairly close to the 
. 
origin reflec ing the consumervs_ 
preferences for xj* 
Following the advertising campaign the demand curve shifts out, to D 2' 
If the consumer is initially at point A, then his consumer surplus 
is given by AP0 AE,, 2 
P2 
E 
0 P2 
xx2 e- 
- 24 - 
Following the advertising campaign the consumer moves to point C, and 
reaps consumer surplus of Ap 
0 CF. 2 
Obviously the consumer surplus is larger in the latter case but is 
the consumer better off? 
For instance, with a given budget constraint if the consumer is 
demanding more of x2, he must be demanding less of xle Of course with 
informative advertising, an increase in the demand for x. would have meant 
a fall in the demand for xj, but this would not have resulted in a fall 
in welfare, since the consumer would not have been on the true demand curve 
for x1 in the original situation. 
Pi 
0 Pi 
xl 
Initially, with the price expectation for x2 of 7, the consumer 
purchasd%o at price po, but at 1G I the marginal valuation of the good is 11 
less than its price; if the consumer moves to point Hj his consumer 
surplus does not change. 
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But in the cas-e of a shift in preferences, consumer surplus will only 
increase at the expense of a fall in the consumer surplus of some other good. 
It could be argued that if all goods advertised, then the demand for all 
goods would be increased : however this would only be at the expense of 
leisure. This is essentially, Galbraithts argument in the New Industrial 
State. He argues that in primitive societies, man had a threshbld level 
of consumption, and would work to achieve this threshold and then spend 
his remaining time on leisure. In modern day capitalist economies this 
threshold is manipulated upwards by the creation of wants engineered by 
advertising in order to generate a greater propensity to work from the 
consumer., 
Although ! Galbraith is credited with this view, Braithwaite had made 
the same point sometime earlier, "We may, however, imagine the case in which 
all commodities are advertised so successfully that all subjective valuations 
are increased. Obviously they cannot all be increased with regard to each 
other or with regard to money, for this would have no m eaning. But-they 
might all be increased with regard to leisure - that is to say, the balance 
between the marginal disutility of effort and the marginal utility of 
commodities might be so altered that people would be induced to put forth 
rather more effort in order to obtain more commodities ....... 
Z'A-7dvertisemen 
by continually bringing to people's notice the uses and merits of a number 
of commodities, has so increased their wants that the balance between the 
disutility of effort and the utility of goods has been altered. "(17) 
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A Special. Utility nination 
If advertising does change tastes then we are unable to say whether 
this is good or bad thing. We are not able to state a positive opinion 
either way. However this does not mean that the analysis ends there. 
We can side-step the problem by supposing that utility depends upon 
something that does not change over time. We go back to Lancasterts 
idea of characteristics. Utility is a function of characteristics: consumers 
have a preference ordering over characteristics which enables them to 
construct a set of indifference curves between bundles of characteristics. 
This preference ordering is not allowed to change over time. These 
characteristics are produced by consuming goods, the relationship between 
characteristics and goods is not always known and is allowed to change 
over time. 
The purpose of advertising is to inform consumers about the relationship 
between a good and its characteristics at a point in timeo 
We write utility as a function of characteristics 
02 ) (2.1) 
where c1 and c2 are the characteristics; and further, the consumption 
technology is specified by 
IPX 1 
(2.2) 
c2x2 
Substituting(2.2)into (2.1) 
(vxj 
IX2) (2.3) 
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Equation(2.3)states utility as a function of goods and the consumption 
technology matrix represented by p, We suppose that the value 
of U is provided for the consumer by the firm: the firm tells the 
consumer the value of the elements in the consumption technology matrix. 
It is assumed that the consumer accepts this value as the true value. 
The consumer maximises(2.1)subjeolb to a budget constraint 
IT IV, M 
P, 
where ?r and ir 2ý P2 I the ?ri are implicit 
prices for the characteristics. We can easily obtain demand equations 
for the characteristics as functions of their implicit prices. 
Thus in the absence of an advertising message the consumer guesses 
at the value of the elements in the consumption technology matrix. In 
fact, the consumer may have a subjective density func tion describing the 
possible values of these elements, but let us imagine the consumer makes 
a "spot" estimate. For this value of the element, by varying the value 
of p, we obtain the perceived demend curve for the consumer; given t he 
actual value of p, , the consumer locates himself on his perceived demand 
curve, and we calculate his consumer surplus. 
We compare this level of consumer surplus with the consumer surplus 
which results from locating on a demand curve after the advertising message 
has been observed. Both of these levels of consumer surplus can then be 
compared with the level that obtains from the true value of V. We can 
thus compare the differences in welfare from making a decision with no 
advertising assistance and with the help of advertising messages. 
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For this restricted form of the utility function we will now show 
how a change in the parameter V, which is determined by an advertising 
message, will affect the demand for the good. 
The consumer maximises(2.3)subject to a budget constraint 
plxl + p2X2 ý' 
First order conditions yield: 
lp + U, p0 
(2-4) 
'P2 + U2 0 
where I is the shadow price of the constraint. 
Differentiating the first order conditions and the budget constraint 
PU 1 U2 
with respect to V substituting p, X and P2 p, and 2 
arranging in matrix form: 
0 11 U 1 U 2 d 0 
U1 11 
2U 
11 U 12 
dx 1 -(U 1+ Px U 
dV 
U2 U 
21 U 22 dx2 xIU 21 d li 
If JUI is the determinant of the matrix, then by Cramer's rule: 
dx 1 
(U lix u0u2 X1U21 0 U2 
Uli ul u2u 22 
jul 
JIU i 11u12 
dx 1'1 
uu ji xuu li xu (2.5) 21 11 21 1U2U21 
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which is equivalent to the result obtained by Tintner (1952) 
fequation (9)_7 for a two good model with the utility function specified 
in(2.3). The advantage of this form of the utility function is that 
marginal utility is not affected by the change in v, 
This same result can be obtained in a less direct but more useful 
formulation, by specifying the budget constraint in terms of characteristics 
and a set of implicit prices. That is, we look at the effect of a change 
in the advertising parameter on the demand for characteristics (in the same 
way as we look at the effect of a change in price on the demand for a good). 
We then go on to examine the effect of a change in the demand for 
a characteristic on the demand for goods. 
The consumer maximises(2.1)subjec-t to 
w1c1 P22 "- 
where 7r is the implicit price for characteristic 1. 
Pi 
Differentiating the first order conditions w. r. t. V, and arranging in 
matrix form 
0uu1 ciX u10 2 
u1u 11 u 12 
do 1u1 
dU 11 
u2u 21 u 22 
do 20 
d Vt 
_j 
do 1u1c1u1u 12 ul 110 U2 
1 
(2.6) 
d1i - 11 ID IIu2u 
22 
11 IDI u2u 22 
where IDI is the determinant of -the matrix 
30 
and if c12 "1 
Then 
do 1- pdx 
+x d ti dtt 
and substituting equation'(2.6) 
(2-7) 
0 *0 
dx 11,. {- lix u2u+ lIxi uuu+Uu2 lax IDI 
ý 
dp -a2 ID 111 22 12 12 12-1 
But a2 IDI lul 
oes 
dx 11 {U u2+ 11XI uu2_ ux uuuI dIt TU7 12 11 2112 21 
and(2.8)is the same result as 
(2.8) 
The advantage of this less direct route is that we are able to look 
at equation(2.6)in terms of income and substitution effects 
cl 
m 
Irl 
02) 
m P2 02 
Irl Irl 
P2 02 
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By changing the parameter ji, we change the implicit price 11, , and 
consequently the slope of the budget constraint. 
Consider the implicit price effect. Differentiate the first order 
conditions w. r. t. v1 
0uu 2 -dir, 
u1u 11 u 12 
do 1 
dir 1 
uuu do 0 2 21 22 2 
L- L- 
d7r2 
do 1c1x 
air-, 7T 
1 12 
1+x2 
(2.9' 
u2u 22 
IDI u2u 221 
where the first term in(2.9)is the income effect and the second term is the 
substitution effect. 
Making the substitution X- 
IIU 1 
we may write(2.9)as Pi 
do IIU 01U1U 121 Ilul 10 U2 (2.1b) 
d7r Pi IDI U2U 22 
Pi IDI U2U 22 
We can compare(2.10)with (2.6). 
do do dw dc 
1 Pi 
dp d7r dP Ti -r 2 1 Ij 
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Multiplying(2.10)through by - 
Ll- 
we obtain (2.6). 2 
Thus from(2-7), we may write 
dx x dc 1 
dV 
L1 
VI 
2 dir 
P1 
The effect of an increase in Va message informing the consumer that 
the amount of c, per unit of x1 has increased - on the demand for x, 
is made up of two separate effects, Firstly, an increase in U will 
increase the demand for cl , and the. impact of the increased demand 
for 
characteristics will be tempered by the amount of cl provided by one unit 
of xi The second effect occurs because some of the increased desire 
for o will be satisfied by the amount of x1 already consumed, since an 
increase in p means -that the consumer can now purchase the same quantity 
of the characteristic by buying less of the good, or at least, believes he 
can do this. Thus the change in the demand for the good caused by an 
increase in the advertised level of product quality may be positive or negative 
The results we have obtained concerning the possibility of welfare 
comparisons and looking at the effect of an advertising message on the demand 
for a good apply to a specific utility function. Howeverl the analysis can 
be made more general: whatever the form of the original utility function 
it is only necessary to redefine it in terms of variables that do not change 
over time, and switch the impact of advertising from the utility surface 
to an implicit price line, 
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Pi 
Maltiplying(2.10)throu, gh by - we obtain (2.6). 2 
Thus from (2-7), we may write 
dx de x 
d 11 
7- dir , 
(2.11) 
The effect of an increase in a message informing the consumer that 
the amount of c, per unit of x has increased - on the demand for x, j 
is made up of two separate effects. Firstly, an increase in V will 
increase the demand for c, , and the. impact of the increased demand for 
characteristics will be tempered by the amount of c, provided by one unit 
of xi The second effect occurs because some of the increased desire 
for c will be satisfied by the mount of x1 already consumedl since an 
increase in V means that the consumer can now purchase the same quantity 
of the characteristic by buying less of the good, or at least, believes he 
can do this. Thus the change in the demand for the Good caused by an 
increase in the advertised level of product quality may be positive or negative 
The results we have obtained concerning the possibility of welfare 
comparisons and looking at the effect of an advertising message on the demand 
for a good apply to a specific utility function. However, the analysis can 
be made more general: whatever the form of the original utility function 
it is only necessary to redefine it in terms of variables that do not change 
over time, and switch the impact of advertising from the utility surface 
to an implicit price line. 
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Conclusions 
The importance of distinguishing between informative and persuasive 
advertising will vary depending upon the definitions given to these two 
types of advertising, We have argued that all advertising is informative; 
an advertising message is a statement with an information content, which 
may need to be presented in a persuasive way. 
As Michan (1969) comments "the terms information and persuasion, even 
in their purest forms, are not necessarily opposed in meaning" 
(18) 
0 
If a piece of information is to reach the consumer, to allow him to make 
an informed decision it is necessary that the information be presented 
persuasively, similarly "the persuasive potential of an advertisement 0090 
may well be increased with the amount of information provided". 
(19) 
For Mishan the critical issue is not whether advertising is informative or 
persuasive but whether the information presented is impartial or biased. 
Mishan maintains that advertising messages will consist of biased messages, 
which may include information which is not factually correct. These biased 
messages may also be presented in such a way as to prevent objective 
evaluation since the messages are deliberately vague and can not be 
substantiated. We have argued that the welfare effects )f this type of 
advertising can be calculated, Advertising messages may also provide 
information about parameters in the utility function, If the utility 
function can be transformed to one in which the advertising statements 
affect the implicit prices of the redefined variables and not the utility 
function, then again we can make meaningful welfare comparisons. 
Advertising which provides information about new characteristics can not 
be coped with, One way out of this impasse is to simply suppose that there 
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1 
are no such thines as new characteristics. Utility is a function of 
a finite number of Imo-em sensations which can be achieved by a large number 
of goods, some of which are as yet undiscovered. Of course it may be felt 
that this assumption is unrealistic, In which case an alternative solution 
is to accept that advertising which provides information about new tastes 
can not be judged in terms of welfare improvements. We simply acknowledge 
alvays 
that positive economics can not/say whether this kind of advertising is 
a good or bad thing. 
Some writers have challenged the usefulness of making a distinction 
between informative and persuasive advertising. Fulop (1981) summarises 
the 'Austriant viewpoint 
"The artificial distinction drawn between informative and persuasive 
advertising is bazed on a misunderstanding of the nature i purpose and rationale 
of advertising which is wider than conveying information -to the consumer 
about products which are already in existence (new products; continually 
changing consumers - baby products; new uses of an established product; 
changes in the prodact itself).,. 
(20) 
In the concluding chapter of their book, Chiplin and Sturgess argue 
"While we consider that the dichotomy between informative and 
persuasive advertising has no operational significance, it remains true 
that advertising can be a substantial influence in shaping consumer 
preferences. Economists have no clear criteria for assessing the consequences 
of advertising in a world of changing tastes, " 
(21) 
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Bat the fact that we cannot moko wolfare comparisons when tastes change 
but we can make welfare comparisons when advertising provides information, 
truthful or not, means that the distinction is operationally significantl 
For a real world example of the policy difficulties distinguishing 
between informative and persuasive advertising, consider the case. of 
professional opticians who are not allowed to advertise the price of their 
product at present. Without advertising consumers operate with imperfect 
information, and a consequence of this is that opticians are able to charge 
different prices for, the same good at different locations. Unless consumers 
engage in costly search, they will pay the first price encountered. it. 
is argued -that advertising would end this practice, of localised monopolies, 
since if the public were made aware of the prices being charged, the 
competitive process would ensure one industry price which just covered 
average costs and normal profits, 
However, although we can see tha; t this type of advertising will 
increase consumer welfare, once advertising is allowed there is no reason 
to believe that it will only entail advertising about price, It is also 
likely that opticians will either-individually or collusively broadcast the 
virtues of wearing spectacles and attempt to increase the demand for their 
good by informing'consumers about the! tunrealisedt benefits of spectacles, in 
a persuasive way, That is, they attempt to change tastes. From a policy 
point of view we may advise that advertising about prices which will assist 
the competitive process will be a good thing; but if advertising shifts 
preferences we are unable to make a positive statement, 
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To conclude, we have argued that the important aspect of advertising 
is the information it imparts, since the consumer will act upon receiving 
this information whether it is true or false, We have seen that for 
particular types of utility functions we can make positive statements about 
welfare improvements. We have examined the effect of an advertising message 
which states that product quality has improved, on the demand for that 
product. 
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Chapter 
Advertising Under Imperfect Information 
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1. Introduction and the Notion of Ignorance 
Neoclassical economics is all about choice. Producers choose which goods 
to produce and what factors to use; consumers choose which goods to buy and 
how much of a factor to supply. An assumption behind these decision processes 
is that the economic agents know what they are doing. Consumers are assumed 
to have sufficient knowledge to be able to construct transitive preference 
orderings of all the goods available, know the quality of each good, in so much 
as quality variations are allowed, and be able-to rank their preference 
orderings. 
A way of incorporating quality differences between goods is to make use of 
Lancaster's characteristic approach to demand analysis. Utility is a function 
of characteristics and characteristics are related to goods through the 
consumption technology matrix. 
u (C) 
Ax 
where c is a vector of characteristics, x is a vector of goods and A is the 
consumption technology matrix which transforms the goods into characteristics. 
This less traditional approach is still based on the assumption that people 
have complete information and in fact introduces an additional tier of knowledge 
Consumers now have to know about the effect of characteristics on utility, and 
the relationship between goods and characteristics. 
It is important to distinguish at thp outset between exogenous and 
endogenous tastes. Tastes may be innate, inherent from birth or they may be 
determined within the environment in which the consumer operates. The view 
taken here is that having utility depend directly upon characteristics rather 
than goods means that we can suppose the consumer is aware of the basic 
characteristics that yield him utility. New products are only. a rearrangement 
of existing characteristics. Totally new characteristics are not allowed to 
enter the consumer's objective function at a later date. 
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The generalisation that economic agents live in a world of complete 
knowledge is made up of a number of separate assumptions concerning particular 
aspects of the environment. Firstly, in taking a decision an agent is aware 
of the opportunity costs in terms of the set of alternative actions forgone; 
secondly, the agent knows the consequences of any action he takes; and finally 
the agentcan actually identify the objective function he is attempting to 
maximise. 
If all the above assumptions hold then it can be said that the world has 
perfect information. But if only some or none of the above bold then the world 
is far from perfect and in order to make decisions agents must act with less 
than complete knowledge or make a positive effort to gain additional information. 
The process of gaining information is unlikely to be costless and different 
methods of generating information will have differing costs depending upon the 
type of information being sought. The type of information being sought will 
depend upon the type of information that is absent in the agents decision 
chapter. 
problem. This is concerned with establishing advertising as an example 
of an information generating technique that is available to an agent, and 
examining the relationship between advertising and the nature of the information 
imperfection. 
A neoclassical agent maximises an objective function by choice of his 
decision variables. Four types of ignorance can be identified: (a) ignorance 
of the objective function; (b) ignorance of the elements in the set of 
feasible decisions; (c) ignorance of the effect a decision will have on the 
objective function; and (d) in the presence of a stochastic variable, ignorance 
of the objective probability distribution. The agent may face one or more 
types of ignorance. As an illustration of the first three, consider a consumer 
who firstly does not know the values of the parameters in his utility function, 
that is, he-is unsure as to what he is attempting to maximise. Secondly he is 
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unawa. re of the range of substitute goods, and finally he does not know 
the quality of the product, and in purchasing a good does not know the 
utility that will result from it. 
Turning to the fourth type of ignorance, instead of the hitherto 
implicit assumption that the world is deterministic, let a stochastic 
variation be incýorporated, then agents are assumed to have distribution 
functions over the uncertainty, and the parameters of these distribution 
functions may be unknown. For example, if the pay-off from a good is 
stochastic, say the utility from an umbrella depends upon the weather, 
then the consumer may not know the probability of a particular state of 
weather occurring, which is necessary to calculate the expected utility 
from an umbrella. 
We have listed the occasions when imperfect knowledge arises in 
the consumerts decision-problem of choosing a bundle of goods to maximise 
utility. As the nature of the imperfection varies, the way that the 
consumer overcomes his ignorance and its cost will also vary. Given 
that the consumer is in possession of only imperfect information, he 
has a choice: he can go ahead and make a decision on the basis of the 
limited amount of information available or he can incur a cost, obtain 
additional information and then make his decision. The initial decision 
to obtain further information or not, will depend on the costs relative 
to the benefits. 
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In the next section of this 
chapter 
we consider the expected value 
of both perfect and imperfect information. In Section 3 we illustrate 
the expected and actual values of perfect information with an example* 
In Section 4, we introduce the role of advertising and extend the example 
from the previous section. We develop a model of how advertising 
messages are incorporated in a consumer's beliefs, and contrast advertising 
with other sources of information. Section 5 is concerned with the 
arguments about the information content of advertising statements. The 
final section summarises the main points. 
2. Value of Information 
Imperfect information can be modelled by assuming that the unknoim 
parameter, wherever it occurs, is a random variable to the consumer, and 
as such has an associated subjective distribution function. 'Gould (1974) 
shows that the value of perfect information is non-negative. 
If z is an unknown parameter and x is the decision variable, 
the decision maker receives a pay-off of U(z, x) if z obtains when 
he has chosen x, 
Suppose all the information available is represented by the 
distribution function F(z) , then the consumer chooses x to maximise 
EU(Z I x): 
EU U(z, x) dF(z) 
Vz 
Let x* be the value of x which maximises this expression. 
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Alternatively, suppose the consumer could pay a fee and observe 
the unknown parameter before making a decision. In this case the 
consumer will know the value of z before choosing x, and will choose 
x to maximis eU (z , x) Let the value of this xI be x Before z 
receiving the information the consumer expects a pay-off of 
U (z x*) dF (z ) f9Z (3.2) 
Marschak (1954) gives as an example a gambler who PaYs 50P to bet 
on whether a coin comes up heads or tails; if he gets it right he wins 
Z1, Obviously his expected gain is zero. This can be contrasted 
with a situation where a gambler pays someone to observe whether the 
coin has come up heads or tails before the bet is placed. The gamblbr 
-would-pay up to 
1 49 for this information, since his expected gain is 50P- i\ý5 
By definition U(z, x*) ý: U(z, x) Vx and since F(z) is non-decreasing z 
in z 
U(z, x*) dF(Z) 2: (z , x) dF 
(Z) fZf U 
006 u(z, X*) ciF(z) 2: max U(z, x) cIF(z) = fZx1 
f 
U(z, x*) dF(z) 
Thus the value of perfect information is non-negative 
U(Zt Xz) CIF(Z) -U (Z 7 Z*) dF 
(Z ): 0 (3.3) 
since it is the expected value of utility if the random variable is 
known less the expected value of utility if the parameter is unknown. 
If the expected value of perfect information is greater than its costst 
we can expect that the consumer would choose to obtain further information. 
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It can be seen that the imperfectly informed consumer has a choice 
between making a decision based on the subjective distribution function of 
the unknown parameter, or incur a cost and obtain perfect information before 
continuing with the decision process. The act of a consumer paying for and 
obtaining extra information can be termed search, whereas a consumer who 
chooses not to search, makes a random sample. 
Nelson (1970) draws a distinction between search goods and experience 
goods. The quality of search goods can be ascertained prior to purchase, but 
the quality of experience goods can(only e determninedý`after the good has been 
bought. For example, a dress can be examined before purchase and is a search 
good; a can of tuna fish must be bought before it can be opened and tested. To 
an extent it can be visualised that all goods can be searched prior to purchase, 
but in the case of some goods the costs of search are prohibitive, and these 
goods are labelled experience goods. Thus in reality, there is a spectrum of 
goods, ranging between the two extremes of search and experience and the 
location ofthe good along the spectrum will depend upon the cost to the consumer 
of ascertaining its quality. 
The distinction between search and experience goods fits neatly into the 
notion of the expected value of information. Suppose the unknown parameter, ZO 
represents product quality. When the expected value of information about the 
quality of a good is greater than its search cost, which may in some cases be 
zero, then the good is a search good. If the cost of search is greater than 
the expected value of information then the good is an experience good. In the 
case of an experience good it does not pay the consumer to find out about produc 
quality before purchasing the good, and he will make a decision solely on the 
basis of the subjective distribution function. 
Uncertainty about product quality can be extended to a more general 
treatment by making use of Lancaster's approach, where any characteristic can 
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be obtained through more than one good, and different goods contain charact- 
eristics in differing proportions. The relationship is described by the 
consumption technology matrix, and uncertainty about product quality can, be 
represented by assuming that the elements in the A-matrix are unknown. So 
the consumer will have subjective distributions over each of the unknown 
parameters in the A-matrix. We have considered the expected value of 
information in relation to product quality, but can this same concept be 
applied to the other types of ignorance: ignorance of parameters in utility 
function and ignorance of substitute goods? It is easy to incorporate imperfect 
knowledge of the utility function into the framework, by letting C be any 
parameter in the utility function, not just product quality. Reference to 
equations(3.1)and(3.2)show that this more general case has already been allowed 
for. In this case the consumer is able to pay a search cost in order to find 
out the effect a characteristic will have on utility. 
The third type of ignorance: ignorance of competing products can be fitted 
into the model by supposing that the consumer, gets -as 'if the 
elements in the consumption technology matrix are zero. 
Suppose that the consumer gains utility from a vector of characteristics 
with elements ci (i=l,..., n) and there is a vector of goods available with 
elements xi (j=l,..., m). However the consumer only knows of the existance of 
k goods, where k<m. Then the consumption technology matrix consists of the 
following elements 
z 11 
ý21 
A 
Lz n1 
Z 12 .. *. Z lk 
ý22 ZU 
Z 
n2 
Z 
nk 
lk+l *'...... Z. lm 
2k+l 
Z 
nk+l nm 
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The consumer assigns subjective estimates to these unknown parameters. 
For goods which the consumer is unaware of, he-acts as though he believes 
the parameter is zero. Thus ignorance about competing products is really a 
special case of ignorance of product quality. The fact that a consumer does 
not know that a particular good exists is the same as assuming that the 
consumer knows it exists but does not-know its function, or believes it has 
no function. Imagine that a consumer goes to-buy a jar of jam, and alongside 
all the known brands there is a new jar labelled in a language the consumer 
does not understand. Does the new jar contain jam or not? The coefficient in 
the technology matrix between the jar of the new good and the characteristic 
jam is either zero or one. Either the jar contains jam or it does not. The 
consumer will have a distribution function over the probability that the new 
jar is a pot of jam, and will make a decision to buy the new product or not 
according to these probabilities. 
Ignorance of competing products becomes a special case of i,. -. norance of 
product quality. A consumer has a utility function over a vector of charact- 
eristics, achieved by purchasing a certain amount of a certain number of an 
entire vector of all possible goods. The relationship between goods and 
characteristics is through the technology matrix composed of elements which 
are unknown to the consumer and may take on zero or positive values. 
Equations(3.1)and(3.2)are general statements of expected utility when 
the consumer faces a vector of unknown parameters representing different types 
of imperfect information. Equation(3.3)gives the expected value of 
information for all these types of ignorance. Having said that, it can be 
seen that a new type of information has appeared. In order to calculate 
expected utilities the consumer is assumed to know the parameters in the 
subjective distribution function. There is no 
reason to-believe that the consumer does know*these parameters. This problem 
can be surmounted by supposing that if the consumer has no idea about the shape 
of the distribution then it can be approximated by a uniform distribution, 
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The consumer is now in a position of total ignorance, he faces an 
unknown parameter in the utility function, over which he has a diffuse 
subjective probability distribution. Actually this situation is not the 
worst possible for the consumer. Gould asks the question: what is the 
nature of the distribution function when the expected value of information, 
equation(393)lis maximised? He shows that the maximum value of information 
does not necessarily increase as the number of possible outcomes increases 
nor does it necessarily involve equiprobable outcomes, i. e. it does not 
have to be a uniform distributiont 
Now suppose a message is made available to the consumer, which 
could be an advertising statement, giving the consumer information about 
the unknown parameter. Then this statement has value. Ik the 
advertising message was known to provide perfect information then its 
expected value would be given by(3.3). However the consumer cannot be 
sure that the message reflects the true value of the parameter, but the 
consumer's subjective beliefs will be influenced by the advertising 
message, The conditional subjective distribution of z, given the 
statement VI is represented by'G(zip), and following the advertising 
message the consumer maximises: 
max fU (z , x) dG 
(z 
x 
(3-4) 
However, the advertising message has still to be observed; the 
consumer will- weight expression (3-4)by the probabilit -y of any value of 
U occurring. If xV is the value of x which maximises(3-4), then 
before receiving the advertising message the consumer expects a pay-off of: 
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f [f 
U(z , X*) c! G 
(z 1V1 cli (v) (3-5) 
where J (p) is the consumer's subjective distribution of the 
possible values that the advertising message might take. 
We can write the expected value of imperfect information as: 
U(ZI x*) dG (zlp di (p) -f U(Z, x*) dF (z) (3.6) 
But the Theorem of Total Probabilities tells us that: 
cIG (z I ji) U '( 1j) = dF (z ) (3-7) 
Thus consistance requires that the consutner's conditional beliefs 
about the unImown parameter given the advertising message, G(zjP), his 
beliefs about the possible values that the advertising message might 
take, J (P), and his unconditional prior beliefs about z, F (z) 
are related by the constraint in (3-7). 0 
Substituting(3-7)int 
U (Z 7 x*) 
v U(Zt 
o(3.6), we may write 
dG (z Ili) dJ ( 11) -ffU (z dG (z Ili) U (p) 
x* U(zl x* )l dG (z Ip U (3-8) 11 
j] 
Bat by definitionf(U(z, x U(z, x* )} dG(zjp) 2: 0 since x* was picked to maximise. it 
f 
UCZ, X) dGCzjji) 
IV 0 
So the expected value of imperfect information is non-negative. 
2 
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The actual value of information is an ex post value and depends, 
on the content of the information. It is the difference between utility 
after the message has been observed and a decision taken and the utility 
thatýwould have resulted from taking a decision which maximised expected 
utility, when information was absent. If the information is made 
available at a cost then the actual value will be net of any search 
cost. In the case of advertising the cost of the message is already 
included in the price of the product as advertising and the goods are 
joint products. According to Telser (1966) the economies from this 
joint production mean that "the total resources engaged in the supply 
of advertising messages would be less than if the advertising messages- 
were sold separately from the physioal goods',. 
3 Advertising may be 
* 
a more efficient method of generating information than other techniques. 
The ex post value of information indicates by how much utility is 
higher because consumers took a fully informed decision as opposed to 
the utility from a decision taken in ignorance. The distinction between 
the expected value of information and the actual value can be brought 
out by an example* 
An example 
Consider a consumer who has trudged through the desert to the super- 
market at the oasis only to find that none of the commodities on the 
shelves are labelled. He is faced with a mass of homogeneously packed 
goods, unable to tell the difference between cartons of chalk and cheese* 
Not surprisingly after the long trek he is thirsty and required a drink, 
but which package should he choose? In his dehydrated state he is 
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unlikely to gain utility from any good which does not contain some kind 
of drink. His utility over characteristics can be expressed as 
a function of drink alone: u= f(c) = rc where c is the characteristic 
drink. The consumer brings with him an amount of money, M, and is able 
to narrow the choice of goods yielding utility down to two, x1 and X2 
But he is not sure which good contains drink and which does not. if 
he purchases x of the first good, he receive da pay-off of a1x 
where a, is an unknown parameter which can take on the values 0 or 19 
Let (1 - H) be the probability that a1 takes on the value of 1 if 
the consumer purchazes x2 of the second good, he receives a2 X2 and 
if the events are mutually exclusive, n is the probability that 
a2=1. The consumer maximises expected utility: 
Eu = (1 - 11) xl + 11 xl 12 
S. t. x1+pX2ýmc 
where p is the relative price of good 2 to good 1. 
First order conditions yield: 
2 
2+ li 2 
(3-9) 
2 
P(1-TI) 
2+n2 
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Substituting back into the expected utility function gives the value of the 
maximised expected utility: 
Eu M, ) E(l _ 11) 
2p+ 12]1 (3-10) 
If instead the consumer had been told which package contained which good, he 
could have spent his entire income on the package containing drink. In this 
case his expected utility before receiving the information is: 
Eu* (1 110 + ]I( 
M 
P 
A EPI + p 
The expected value of information is Eu* - Eu 
(M)I 
[pi 
(l - n) + Ti 
[(l _ ]1)2 p+ 11231 
P 
Proposition To show equation(3-12)is non-negative. 
Proof (3.12)is non-negative if 
122' 
P2 11) p+ Ti )2 
Square both sides 
p (i - 11) 
2+n2+ 2p -in (i - n) > (i - n) 
2p+ 
I 
i. e. if 2p2 II(l - II), >0 
Q, E. D, 
. rhe actual value of 
information depends tipon the realised values of the unknown 
parameters. If a, =I and cc 2ý0, then a consumer who maximised expected 
utility would -have purchased a mixture of the two goods as shown by equation(3-i 
This would yield a utility level in this case of: 
m p(i - H) 
2 
P(i - H) 
2+n2 
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as opposed to a utility of M' if the consumer had known that a 1. The 
actual value of information is 
p (3-13) 
M 
P(l H) 
2+n2 
If a0 and a2 ý- 1, then maximising expected utility yields an actual utilit- 
of 2 
pp (l 
2+ 
11 
2 
MI 
as opposed to an utility of p) 
if the consumer had known that a21. The 
actual value of information in this case is 
M2>0 
p 11) 
2+H2 3-14) 
In both cases, the actual value of information is non-negative. An 
accurate advertising statement which informs the consumer about Cý 
and . has an actual value given by equation(3*13)or(3-14)o These 12 
expressions show the extra utility gained from consumers making a fully 
informed decision as opposed to the utility gained from a decision taken 
in an ignorant state, 
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The Role of Advertising 
Now suppose the consumer is able to observe an advertising message 
V before making a decision. But advertising is not straightforward 
information, it has a peculiar nature in that it is provided by the 
person who wishes to sell the product* For example if a2=1 and 
Ct 1=0, then the producer of the first good who knows that the consumer 
only gets utility from drink, and will not purohase good 1 if he knows 
it is not a drink, has an incentive to advertise that a, = 1. The 
consumer must decide whether an advertisement is telling the truth or not, 
The consumer is aware that an 'advertiser may not provide accurýte 
information and based on his beliefs about the truthfulness of the 
message will discount the advertising statement to some degree. We 
suppose that the consumer does not accept the advertising message as 
perfect information, but does use it to update his beliefs about the 
unknown parameter. Thp consumer holds his beliefs about a 1, and a2 
conditional upon the possible values of p Let the possible values 
for V be either (0,1) Then the consumer has four conditional 
probabilities: 
Pr [a 1=i1 11 -iI Rr a013 
Pr [a I=11 11 =oI Pr a0oI 
Let ji be supplied by the producer of X, , then it seemo reasonable 
to suppose that if this producer does not advertise, i, e, tl =01 it is 
certainly because his good does not contain the characteristic desired 
by our thirsty consumer. 
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Thus Pr [a, =1 
I U=01=0 and Pr-Eal =0 
I ij=01=1 (3-15) 
On the other hand the fact that the producer has advertised, 
i. e. 11= 1, does not ensure that his good contains the characteristic, 
and the consumerts beliefs given the advertising message are as follows: 
Pr I a, =oIv= 11 =Hv 
The consumer will use these conditional beliefs described in 
equations (3.15)and(3.16)to maximise expected utility 
II- 
EU = (i x12+ 11 
VIX2 
2 if 
Eu = 3cýý if 
opt* XI+ PX2 "ý 14 
(3.16) 
Substituting back the optimal values of x1 and x2 into the 
expected utility functions, gives the value of the maximised expected 
utility. 
Eu M2p+ 11 2 
p li 
M ELJ = (: "71) p 
if 11 =1 (3.17) 
if v= 
To calculate the expected utility before observing the value of 
Ii involves weighting the expressions in(3-17)and(3-18)by the probability 
of V taking on either value. Let Pr Ev - 11 -w and 
Pr Ev -01-1- 
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Then the expected utility of the consumer before observing the 
advertising message is 
Aý .11 
Eu ** = (11), .1 (1 - 11 
2p+ 11 2 32 W+ (M 
2 (3-19) 
p 11) 11 p)0- W) 
As was noted earlier the conditional beliefs about a, the prior 
beliefs about P and the prior beliefs about a are related by the 
constraint in(3.7). For our example with discrete variablesthis 
constraint reduces to 
(1 - n) = Pr 
-1 
Pr [a il Pr [v 
= o. (1 - w)+ (1 - ii ) 03 11 
... (1 - ii) = (1-n) 
ii 
(3-20) 
and II-Pr [cý=Il Pr [ cc 1=0iI Pr 
i0 
1. (i - (a) 
000 li 
= WTI + (1 -W) (3.21 ) 
Thus in the absence of an advertising message the consumer would 
MaximiSe expected utility using his prior beliefs H making the 
substitution(ý. 20)and(3.21)into(3.10)twe obtain 
I 
Eu M2W2P+ W) 12 (3.22) p 
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The expected value of imperfect information is given by the 
difference between Eu ** in ecraation(3-19)and Ea in (3.22). 
2] 
V 
-RV)2 p+ nV2 W+ (1-W) 
2W2p 
+[ 11 W+ (1-W) p 
> (3.23 So T<0 as 
222222 
p+w+ (1-W) + 2w(l-W) {('-nli) p+ 11 
>2w2p+ DI w+ < 
as 
2p+ 
11 
21 
> 
v< 
and (1-11 )2p ? -- 0 as 11 -. 5 1 
so v z: 0 
and the expected value of imperfect information is non-negative. 
Now consider the actual value of imperfect information. We are 
concerned with comparing the utility received from making a decision 
based upon the advertising message, after the unknown variable has been 
realised, with the utility from making a decision on the basis of 
prior beliefs alone, 
Suppose that c4 =1 and cý =0, and further that U- le 
That is the good x1 contains the required characteristic, and the 
producer of x1 advertised this fact, 
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Then if the consumer had not observed the advertising message, 
and made the decisions in(3.9)lhe would consequently have realised 
a utility level of 
2 
a-Li 
--, 
Tr- 
PO-II) 
2+ 
n2 
If instead the consumer had seen the advertising message V=1, he 
would maximise 
Eu 22 
Soto X1 + PX2 2ý M 
which yields the optimum demands 
m nu 
2 
7'2 
P(1-1111) 
2n2 
and xm2 
P(1-11,, )2+ n 11 
Following this policy will yield a utility level, in the case of 
of 
2+ 
(3-24) 
(3.25) 
(3.26) 
Thus the actual value of imperfect information, when ji =I and a, 
is given by(3.26)minus(3-24). 
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vA .L 
(1-11 2 
m2 
22 
-Z 
-. 
n(l_D2 
PO-li) 
2+n2 (3.27) 
11 =1 
Cli =I 
Thus(3.27), >, 0 as (1-II >c I-II 
(1 - It 11 
)is the posterior probability that a, =1, and (1 is 
the prior. Thus if the posterior puts greater weight on the belief 
that a1=1, and'in fact aI=1 then the actual value of the 
advertising message is positive. 
Now suppose that a1=0 and a2=1. Firstly let V=11 
that is the producer of x1 is falsely claiming that his good contains 
the required characteristic. Then again we can evaluate the increase 
in utility from the advertising message. If the consumer had made the 
decision in(3-9)he would realise a utility level of 
2 
2 
(3. i8) 
lp 
PO-n) + n? -1 
I. 
If instead he had observed the advertising message and made the 
decisions in(3.25)he would have realised a utility level of 
MV 
-- (3.29) 22 
P(1-]T + 11 11 
The expected value of imperfect information is given by (3-29) 
minus (3 . 28)0 
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Aw 11 
22 
m TI 
VA 2 2' 2 n2 
(3-30) 
P(1-11 + 11 P(1-10 + 
0 
Bat (3.30) >0 as n> ]I Bat for(3-27)> 0 we required < 11 < 
1-nil > 1-11 -* lip <n Thus if (3.27) >0 then(3.30) < 09 
So if the ddvertising message results in the consumer adopting 
a new set of beliefs that have been directed by the advertising message; 
and if the advertising message is truthful, this will have a positive 
effect on actual utility. If the message is false it will have 
a negative effect, 
This e=mple has considered a simple consumption technology and 
an equa-lly simple advertising technology. The consumer ended up 
purchasing one good or the other and the advertising statement was 
either correct or incorrect. In the more general case the consumer- 
will purchase a number of goods, with a number of goods providing the 
desired characteristics in various proportions and combinations. The 
advertising message tells the consumer about the combination of 
characteristics in the advertised good, But do advertisements fulfil 
this role? 
Advertising is no substitute for true information, or more 
correctly is a poor substitute for accurate information which is obtained 
by paying a search cost and then examining the good, Of dourse 
advertising has the advantage that it has zero cost which makes it 
a better substitute, but it is still an imperfect form of information.. 
- 6o - 
Firms axe forced to tell the truth in an advertising message because of 
the presence of an anti-deception mechanism; in an environment with 
more than a single period, the possibility of repeat purchase by the 
consumer, means that the firm will not find it profitable to lie; 
since consumers who purchase the good on the basis of a deceptive 
advertisement will not purchase the good in future. 
The effectiveness of this mechanism depends upon a number of 
implicit assumptions concerning both producer and consumer behaviour. 
Firstly, it is assumed that the consumer is able to quantify the quality 
of the purchased good and compare ýt with some norm or its advertised 
value. This may be difficult; for example how does a consumer assess 
the quality of a good which guarantees to increase the probability of 
longer life. Secondly, the consumer needs to have perfect memory recall 
over past advertising messages, from which he constructs a black list of 
goods to avoid in the future. This leads on to the third assumption 
concerning the asymetry of demand with respect to the falsely advertised 
goods. For the mechanism to function, the consumer is required to 
positively discriminate against the advertised goods. This is a step 
further than simply supposing that the consumer learns to discount the 
information from an advertising message. The consumer develops an 
aversion to buying the good of the deceptive advertiser, possibly due 
to a chagrin effect, whereby the consumer reflects his annoyance at being 
duped and refuses to purchase that good in the future, This assumption 
implies irrational behaviour on the part of the consumer; since in the 
case of a high quality good whose high qualities had been exaggerated 
by an advertiser, the consumer would chose a good of lower quality in 
the future. Fourthly, the firm must have compared the present value 
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of a truthful strategy which yields a stream of future profits, with 
the return from a single period; since a deceptive statement may produce 
high sales in the first period, but if individuals communicate about 
its defects will produce nothing afterwards. 
Klein and Leffler (1981) consider the problem of assuring contractual 
performance. They note that it may be profitable for a firm to produce 
a low quality good and sell it at a high quality price, in terms of 
a once-and-for-all. sale being greater than a perpetual stream of sales* 
However they argue that there will exist a price premium such that the 
profits from honest production are greater than from dishonest. This, 
price premium is made into an equilibrium price by the existence of * 
non-salvageable assets which have a capitalised value equal to the discounted 
sum of future profits. They argue that investment in brand advertising 
acts as a non-salvageable asset. Thus'high quality is assured by the level 
of brand advertising* 
Finally, it is assumed that the world is deterministic. if 
instead the world is stochasticl then verifying an advertising statement 
is much more difficult. Suppose the relationship between goods and 
characteristics is of the form 
Cm Zx+ c 
where c is a random variable mid z is the unImo-wa paxameter. Further 
suppose the consumer is not allowed to observe the realised value of 
e directly, On purchasing an amount of the good, the consumer only 
observes the quantity of the characteristic produced, Thus although 
z has an unknown fizmd value, the consumer can never be certain of its 
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0 
value as actual utility always depends upon the realisation of the 
random component. Thus an advertising statement about the value of 
z can never be verified. 
If these assumptions do not hold, the producer is able tobake 
a statement about his product that is untrue; though, this is perhaps 
a rather extremd option. It seems unlikely that the producer will 
make completely false claims about his product, but more realistically 
will be able to distort the perceived qualities of the good and present 
the information in a favourable light. The deviation of the actual 
advertising statement from the true statement will depend upon the 
extent of the failure of the anti-deception mechanism, For some types 
of goods it will be easier to make a deceptive message and escape 
detection. Experience goods are more likely to be accompanied by 
incorrect messages than search goods because of the nature of the products. 
The quality of experience goods can only be ascertained after purchase 
which allows the producer to make statements than can not be verified 
until after consumption has taken place. Taking account of the nature 
of advertising the basic premise of this chapter is that the purpose of 
an advertising statement is to provide information about the parameters 
in the consumer's decision problem. That is, the advertising message 
provides the consumer with a set of prior beliefs about the unknown 
variable. The consumer uses this information to update his initial 
subjective distribution. The producer makes a statement about the 
unknown parameter in the utility function, but the consumer does not 
accept this as gospel but uses the information to construct only his 
subjective distribution of the unknown parameter. If the consumer 
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believes that the advertising statement is truthful then the subjective 
distribution is just a point estimate of the actual unknown paxameter. 
If the consumer is more sceptical, then he believes that the actual 
value of the unknown parameter is only located in the vicinity of the 
advertiserts message, 
We now state more formally how a series of advertising statements 
can be incorporated into a consumerts beliefs. We suppose the consumer 
updates his current beliefs according to Bayesian rules* His posterior 
beliefs are formed from his prior beliefs and any additional information. 
Suppose the consumer observes a series of advertising messages 
purporting to inform him about the value of a parameter 
z The consumer is assumed to know that each message is a transformation 
of a random variable 
Vi z+p (3-31) 
where pi v N(ev so ji, I N(z + 01 The consumer knows 
that each advertising message has two separable components: the true 
value of the -unknown parameter z and, a random-component which reflects 
both the random noise in the environment and also a deception element, 
Noise occurs because of problems of communication between producer and 
consumer. The deception element is a deliberate attempt by the producer 
to exa, -gerate the properties of his product. The consumer holds beliefs 
about Pi I which are assumed to be normal with known mean and degree 
of precision E. The values of these parameters are essentially 
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endogenousp since they are concerned with the accuracy of the 
advertising messýZe which is conditioned by previous attempts at 
deceipt. e represents the amount, on average, which the consumer 
believes the advertising message will overstate product quality, and 
C reflects the strength of those beliefs. However we will suppose that 
both 0 and & are given initially* 
The series of advertising messages allows the consumer to infer 
the true value of the unknown parameter. In fact a sufficient 
statistic for this inference is the sample mean. 
v=2E+ P- i) 
(3-32) 
If there are k advertising messages then N(z + 
k& 
We assume that the consumer holds prior beliefs about z which 
axe normal with mean v and precision We might expect that as 0 
these beliefs have been formed on the basis of very limited information 
that 0 will be very small. The consumer constructs his posterior 
x 
beliefs according to Bayes rule, yielding a normal distribution with 
-2- 4 
and variance CF where 
V00 + kC 
0+ ký 
(3.33) 
^2 
and a 0+ k& 
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These updated beliefs will be used as -the parameters in the consumer's 
decision problem in'(3-4)- 
The mean and varixice stated in equation(3.33)result from the 
assumptions of normality with regard to the likelihood function and 
the prior. In a more general case, these two functions could be 
described by any distribution, whichever best captures the characteristics 
of ignorance with respect to the prior, and the deception element with 
respect to the series of advertising messages. Though in defence of 
the distributions chosen here it can be-seen that even if the series of 
advertising messages gives the same value, the variance of the posterior 
in (33) gets reduced the more messages the consumer observes. 
We can now distinguish between two types of information: unbiased 
information which the consumer obtains from searching, and information 
from advertising which may be distorted. The role of advertising as 
an information generating technique can be incorporated into the consumerts 
decision problem in the following way. It is postulated that the 
consumer faces a two stage sequential decision process, Initially the 
consumer is in ignorance and holds diffuse beliefs about an unknown 
parameter in the utility function. In the first stage, information is 
provided by advertising, which allows the consumer to update his diffuse 
distribution. The consumer now holds new beliefs about the unknown 
variable which are concentrated axound a point as guided by the 
advertising message which may or may not be correct. The consumer can 
choose to make an allocation decision on the basis of this incomplete 
information set or can choose to move into the second stage and obtain 
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further informalion through searching. In. the case of experience 
goods, we would expect the consumer to make a decision to purchase or 
not at the end of the first stage, In the case of search goods, where 
the costs of search are low the consumer would probably move into the 
second stage before deciding upon the quantity to buy. 
If the utility function is stochastic, the consumer has another 
type of information available as an alternative to search, and that is 
information due to sampling. When the consumer purchases a quantity 
of a good, he is taking a random sample, and gains information about the 
underlying distribution from the sample chosen. Grossman, Kihlstrom 
and Mirman (1977) show that a consumer who is aware of this informatibn 
due to sampling, will choose a larger sample than otherwise because of 
the additional information. The theory of search when price is 
unknown has been well documented. The original treatment was given 
by Stigler (1961). He considered the optimal number of observations 
an individual should make in trying to find the lowest price from 
a variety of stores. The individual was assumed to have a probability 
distribution over the possible range of prices. This strategy has 
been termed fixed-sample-size strategy (by Maxming and Morgan, 1982) 
and when observations are observer sequentially it has been shown by 
McCall and DeGroot to be an inferior strategy to sequential search. 
(by McCall (1970) and DeGroot (1970)) Under sequential search the 
individual holds a reservation price, and continues to search until 
he finds a price less than or equal -to the reservation price. 
Kohn and Shavell (1974) distinguish between adaptive and static search. 
Under static search, the individual holds rigid beliefs so that his 
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reservation price remains constant over the search period. - Under 
adaptive search the consumer updates his beliefs on the basis of past 
observations and his reservation price changes in the light of his 
experience. 
The problem with these papers from the viewpoint of quality 
uncertainty, is that they consider a one--off purchasing decision. ' The 
consumer searches for the lowest price and then purchases the good, 
with the implicit assumption that any further purchases will take place 
at that price. If product quality is a random variable, then having 
observed one unit of the good does not guarantee subsequent knowledge.. 
In the next period the consumer will be faced with a new problem, 
except that he knows what gave him the highest level of quality last 
time. Under these circumstances sampling may prove a more effective. 
and certainly cheaper form of search strategy. 
Consider the problem facing the consumer at the start of the 
second stage. He has an unImown parameter z in his utility fLmction: 
U(X, Z). The subjective distribution function is F(z) and density 
function f(z) This density function is normal with parameters 
^2 
and a, given by (3.33). The consumerts decision problem is to 
choose an x v&ich maximises expected utility 
MI . 
-1 2 max U(X, Z)f 
(7, IV CY ) dz (3.34) 
xz 
Again, the consumer could compute the expected value of (perfect) 
information, by working out the expected utility of a fully informed 
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decision, and compare with the costs of information. We could perhaps 
guess that the expected value of information will be less as the consumers 
degree of confidence gets larger. Though, to repeat an earlier point 
made by, Gould, the maximum value of information does not necessarily 
involve equiprobable outcomes, The implication being that advertising 
statements which concentrate beliefs about the unknown parameter around 
a point increase the expected value of perfect information, which makes 
it more likely that a consumer will engage in information search. 
- How does this affect the distinction betweeýnsPectiolnd experience 
goods? For search goods the costs oýnsPect'oae low so even if the 
expected value of information is low, the consumer may still engage in 
search. Any false claims by an advertising statement could be quickly 
invalidated. The advertiser is aware of this possibility so we may 
inspection 
expect for goods that advertising statements reflect-the true 
values of the unknown parameters. For experience goods the costs of search 
are high and skilled advertisers may be able to affect the subjective 
distribution function in such a way as to minimise the expected value of 
information so that the consumer is less likely to engage in artive 
search, It should be noted that'Gould's conclusions do not imply that 
equiprobable outcomes minimise the expected value of information nor 
single point estimates maximise it. If the consumer is less likely 
to engage in search then the producer has more degrees of freedom to 
twist the information in his favour, 
- 69 - 
5. The Informative Content of Advertising Messages 
The literature has been concerned with the distinction between 
informative advertising and persuasive advertising. The importance 
of this distinction is in its effect on the elasticities of demand. 
If advertising is informative (Nelson, (1974), and Ferguson, (1974)), 
then advertising messages tell consumers about alternative products 
that are available, elasticity of demand is a function of known 
substitutes so that the more substitutes that the consumer is made 
aware of, the more elastic is his demand curve for a particular product, 
Persuasive advertising (Galbraith, (1967)) attempts to mould 
consumer preferences. If successful it will create bra-ad loyalties 
which will reduce demand elasticities. Brand loyalty can be defined 
as an inelastic demand for a particular product. Ferguson claims 
"Advertising makes demand curves more elastic by providing consumers 
with information about brand qualities". 
5 
Although the demand curve 
for a good will be more elastic the more substitutes are available 
or the more substitutes that are known to be available, the demand 
curve for the good that is being advertised will become more inelastic. 
Even if advertising is providing information about quality uncertainty, 
by affecting unknown paxameters in the consumer's utility function, 
Bazmaa (1956) shows that the marginal utility of the good will be 
increased as these parameters vary, which is regarded as persuasive 
advertising. An additional problem of stating that the purpose of 
advertising is solely to inform consumers of available substitutes in 
the same industry, is that advertising is assumed to have no effect on 
the industry demand curve. The industry demand curve is determined by 
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the locus of equilibrium positions for the consumers between changes 
in prices of the industry product relative to the products of other 
industries. The fact that a new brand of product has become 
available will only alter intra-industry demand. The share'of the 
industry demand curve facing each individual firm may be affected; 
specifically after the introduction of a new product it will shift 
backwards which ceterus parabus will make it more elastic, This 
increase in elasticity is due to the same industry output being 
divided between more firms. Consequently this type of information 
does not explain why monopolists advertise. If advertising only 
provides information about competing brands a monopolist has no 
incentive to advertise. 
Dixit and Norman (1978) impose a parameter on the utility 
function, and assume it is an increasing function of the level of. advert- 
ising. They analyse the effects of changes in the parameter on 
welfare. By supposing that it is the level of advertising which 
determines the value of the parameter, Dixit and Norman consider the 
effect of a small change in the level of advertising on the utility 
function. The result is a small shift in the demand curve, As the 
shift in the demand curve is only slight, the increase in consumer 
surplus can be ignored, which means there is no net welfare increase 
from advertising. However, if the value of the parameter depends 
upon the information contained in the advertising statement and not 
just upon the quantity of advertising, then a small change in the 
level of advertising may bring about a large shift in the demand curve, 
and in this case the increase in consumer surplus cannot be ignored 
and will represent the increase in welfare from an advertising message, 
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They provide no rationale for the inclusion of the parameter affected 
by advertising. According to Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979) "specifying 
advertising in the utility function is not an acceptable way to proceed, 
It offers no understandin g of the role of advertising in the consumerts 
decision process. If all the characteristics of a commodity were 
readily measurable and could be validated, then they would be known to 
the consumer, In this case why should advertising increase the 
6 
consumer's marginal utility for the good? vt One view of advertising 
is that the content of an advertising message is not so important 
as the quantity of message. Nelson (1974) originally, and more recently 
Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that advertising only provides indirect 
information, 
Nelson (1974) extends ideas developed in an earlier paper 
(Nelson, 1970), The distinction between search and experience goods 
is a necessary prerequisite for his subsequent conclusions. Given 
that consumers are ignorant of a productfs qualitiesl advertising 
provides information, but the nature of the information depends upon 
whether -the product is a search or experience good. Advertising provides 
direct information for search goods but only indirect information for 
experience goods. What is -the distinction between direct and indirect 
information and how do they relate to search and experience goods? 
Nelson explains that because search goods can be examined prior to 
purchase, the purpose of advertising is to entice consumers'to sample 
the product. In examining the good they will be able to verify the 
advertising statement. If the firm has made exaggerated claims about 
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its product quality 'the consumer can choose not to buy the product and 
will remember to ignore any future advertisements from this particular 
firm. The firm loses its credibility, and the loss of credibility 
acts as an anti-deception mechanism in ensuring that no false claims 
are made about product quality. Therefore advertising of search 
goods will provide direct, accurate information. Nelson contrasts 
this situation with experience goods where as advertising statement 
can not be verified prior to purchase. In this case "Advertising 
provides no direct information ... 
(By direct information I mean 
information contained in the advertising statement. ) After Pepto 
Bismol has been correctly identified as a stomach remedy, the statement 
that Pepto Bismol is most soothing is without information content. 
Its producers have an incentive to say so even if it were the least 
soothing of stomach remedies *,, 
7 
But although advertising statements of experience goods do not 
have any information content, they are a form of indirect information 
since consumers learn that the more a firm advertises the higher the 
quality of the product. The reason why more advertising implies a 
better buy is demonstrated by a number of scenarios. The argument is 
basically that firms with a high quality product have an incentive to 
advertise. Again the anti-deception mechanism is the fact that 
consumers will at some stage in the future repeat their purchases, 
This is what Nelson terms "consumer power in the product market". 
8 
Thus Nelson distinguishes between two types of advertising, 
advertising of search goods which contains direct information, and 
advertising of experience goods which is indirect and contains little 
"hard" information, and whose function is mainly to enhance the 
reputability of a brand. 
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Similarly Klein and Leffler show that consumers recognise that , 
the quantity of advertising messages are a non-salvageable investment by 
the firm. Firms who cheat, that is, produce low quality products 
and claim they are of high quality, sacrifice this sunken investment. 
Thus large amounts of advertising are guarantees of high quality. 
However, even if large advertising expenditures are a sufficient 
condition for not cheating, they are unlikely to be a necessary 
condition since some small honest firms may be unable to raise the 
finance to engage in expensive advertising campaigns, Of course in 
this case the situation may degenerate into all small firms producing 
low quality goo ds I which is analagous to Akerlof Is market for lemons 
(1970)- Even if large levels of brand advertising are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for "honest" production, how do consumers judge 
between two rival advertisers? The knowledge of a "fair" price is not 
sufficient for the consumer to maximise his expected utility. To some 
extent the consumer must observe the direct information inherent in an 
advertising statement. 
Similarly the objection to Nelsonts analysis is that advertising 
statements of experience goods have little information content. is is 
one thing to argue, as the above quote suggests, that consumers realise 
that producers have an incentive to make wild claims about their products, 
but that does not imply that consumers consequently discount advertising 
messages entirely, In the absence of any other information, these 
messages will be the only facts that consumers can base their decisions 
on, and to argue that they will have no effect on consumer behaviour is 
unconvincing. Nelson himself in one of his tests found "six brands 
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claiming that they were the largest brands for their respective 
product classes", 
9 But this is a statement with information content: 
the brands are saying that in being the largest brands, "surely so 
many people who buy our product cannot be wrong? " Of course this is 
not a parti cularly hard piece of information in the sense that it 
informs consumers how good the brand is, but that, as already noted, 
is not the advertisers' concern. The firm is concerned with selling 
its product. It may be aware that it cannot make false statements 
about product quality becaase of what Nelson terms "consumer power". 
In this case the firm can try to wriggle around the problem by giving 
information that is not quantifiable and is difficult to ascertain, ' 
The advertisers art is to make statements that will improve the image* 
of the product but are sufficiently elusive to remove the possibility 
of any comeback. The information of these messages will be presented 
in a highly persuasive way. 
Some of Nelsonts findings can be interpreted in different waysý, 
For example, Nelson finds that producers of experience goods advertise 
more than producers of search goods which supports his hypothesis that 
advertising of experience goods increases sales through increasing the 
reputation of the seller. However, this same evidence could be 
interpreted as showing that experience goods advertising needs to be 
more intense than advertising for search goods, since perhaps consumers 
are more sceptical of them. 
Similarly Nelson finds a higher concentration of search goods 
adyertising in newspapers as evidence that the direct information content 
of search goods advertising means that consumers may need to refer back 
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to the information source. However the same evidence would satisfy 
the hypothesis that firms advertising experience goods which may involve 
an element of deceit, need to "flash" their advertisements on television 
screens, so that consumers have difficulty apportioning the blame for 
purchasing a good which was not up to the standard they had believed. 
6. Conclusions 
In thiýchapterwe have attempted to place advertising in the role 
of an information generating mechanism, Imperfect information is 
represented by supposing that one or more parameters in the consumer's 
function are unknown. Advertising provides the consumer with 
information to enable him to construct a subjective distribution 
function to describe the possible values of the unknown parameter. 
Thus the advertising message has value, and the value is equal to the 
increase in consumer surplus that results from the consumer. making 
a fully informed decision as opposed to a decision make in ignorancel 
which will probably mean that the consumer is not equating the actual 
marginal evaluation of the good with its price. 
However, advertising may not give accurate information since it is 
provided by the person selling the good. Advertising as information 
can be contrasted with the unbiased information which is generated by 
random sampling or search. The failure of repeat purchase as an anti- 
deception mechanism due to imperfections in the enviroyLTnentl means that 
advertising messages may contain an element of deception. Thus 
advertising may or may not have a positive value, but its value can again 
be calculated by evaluating the utility that arises from a random sample 
and the utility from the consumption of a good based on an advertising 
message, 
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Whatever the actual value of advertising, the consumer will basq 
his decision to seek further information or not, on the expected value 
of information. We have argued that advertising results in the consumer 
moving from an initial diffuse subjective distribution describing the 
unknown parameter to a modal one. If the advertising message is 
untruthful or exaggerated, it will be in the producerts interest to 
present the information in such a way az to minimise the expected value 
of further information, so that the consumer will make a decision 
solely on the basis of the advertising statement, 
How will advertising affect consumer demand? We wish to stress - 
the distinction between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
advertising. The former refers to the amount of advertising or the 
number of advertising messages, the latter to the nature of the 
advertising statement. When we speak of an increase in advertising 
it is normally taken to mean an increase in the number of advertising 
messages* But while it is likely that an increase in the number of 
messages will increase either the proportion of the population who see 
the statement, or the probability that any one individual will see it; 
from the point of view of an individual who has already viewed the 
message, more of the same is unlikely to have any effects Though to 
repeat an earlier point, repetition of the same statement may affect 
the consumer's beliefs about the content of the message as given by 
equation (3.34). 
However, if the change in advertising refers to a change in the 
advertising statement, then we would expect this to have an effect on 
consumer demand, If advertising affects the subjective value of 
a parameter in the utility fanction, and if this increazes the marginal 
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utility of the good then the demand curve must become more inelastic., 
It does not matter whether the advertising statement is "informative" 
or "persuasive", in either case the demand curve for that good will 
have a lower elasticity. Of course, the effect of this statement on 
the differentiated products of other producers may make their demand 
curves more elastic. Conversely, we would expect that other unknown 
parameters in the utility function of the consumer will be affected by 
rivals' advertising messages which will make the demand for the good in 
question more elastic. 
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Chapter 
Learning 
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1. Tntroduction 
This chapter consider the importance of a consumerts ability to 
learn in an environment with imperfect information. It illustrates 
how in a two period allocation problem with uncertainty in each period, 
the consumer's decisions are influenced by the knowledge that he is 
able to learn about the uncertainty. The time periods are linked 
through the learning process of the consumer. 
The problem to be analysed is that faced by a consumer deciding 
whether or not to purchase a new good whose quality is unknown. The 
consumer's initial beliefs about product quality have been provided 
by a series of advertising statements. Because of the two period 
environment, the consumer is able to experiment with the new good in 
the first period, and verify the advertising messages, before making 
a final decision in the second period. Given this-opportunity for 
learning, how will the consumer's decisions be affected in the first 
period? 
% 
We can distinguish two types of learning: the acqaisition of 
knowledge and the acquisition of skills. The former implies that the 
consumer initially has imperfect knowledge, whereas the second definition 
implies some kind of investmcnt procedure, whereby learning is a current 
imput into the stock of ability. This second definition has been 
coined I'learning-by-doing", and was suggested by Arrow (1962). He 
imposed the assumption of a learning time trend on an economic growth 
model such that investment in the latest technology yields greater 
productivity, since the latest technology reflects the cumulated skills 
of ppevious technologies. This type of learning is also suggested as 
a source of economies of scale, 
I 
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Here, we are concerned with the first definition of learning, which 
could be called learn ing-by-s amp ling rather than learning-by-doing. 
The effect of introducing a learning mechanism is that the consumer is 
able to accumulate knowledge about the quality of the new product, and 
in the long run we can envisage this learning as complete when the 
consumer has acquired perfect-information. Thus the importance of 
introducing learning into a model of consumer behaviour is in its 
short run effects as the consumer adjusts towards his long run equilibrium 
position, 
In line with this view of learning, we firstly consider the 
optimal decisions for the consumer in a two period environment. In 
the final period it is assumed that the consumer has acquired all the 
information it is ever likely to, but in the first period, representing 
consumer 
the short run, the . 
has less than complete information and must 
decide whether to gain information or pursue single period utility 
maximisation, 
By assuming that there is an element of uncertainty in the 
environment, which can be represented by a distribution function, we 
can incorporate information into the model by supposing that a parameter 
in the environment is unknown. In a deterministic world, any imperfect 
knowledge could be overcome by observing the unknown parameter. This 
is of course an interesting problem and the search theory literature is 
concerned with answering it. However, our assumption of a stochastic 
world means that an observation does not necessarily imply knowledge 
of the unknown parameter. For example, an observation on the quality 
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N 
of an umbrella depends upon the sevority of the weather, which is 
a random variable: observing the response of the umbrella to a bout 
of mild weather does not give complete information of the quality of 
that umbrella. Defining learning as the acquisition of information 
with respect to the parameters in the distribution function, means 
that the learning process can be modelled using the statistical 
techniques of Bayesian analysis. 
Kohn and Shavell (1974) consider the problem of sequential 
decision making. They define the problem when the distribution 
function has known parameters as static. There is no possibility 
for learning in the static case. Any other type of sequential 
decision making is adaptive. Bayesian learning about an unknown parameter 
of the distribution function is an example of the adaptive case.. We 
shall be concerned with examining the consumer's decision problem under 
both static and adaptive distributions. 
In two illuminating articles in 1974, Kihlstrom uses Bayes' rule 
to solve the consumer problem of maximising utility in a single period 
when product quality is a random variable with an unknown distribution, 
The consumer is allowed to purchase a sample of the good, and in 
experiencing the sample gains information about product quality which 
enables him to update his subjective distribution function, 
Grossman, Kihlrtrom and Mirman (1977), provide a more general 
approach to adaptive sequential decision problems. They explicitly 
I 
recognise the two period nature of the problem: sampling occurs in the 
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first period, before a final decision is made in the second., The 
solution is found by dynamic programming, using the technique of backward 
induction. The consumer maximises utility in -the second and final 
period for every possible realisation of the random variable from the 
first period. These optimal values are then weighted by the 
probability that the random variable will take on any particular value. 
The consumer then maximises the discounted sum of expected utilities in 
the first period, which includes an indirect utility function for the 
second period. 
This chapter attempts to use the general framework proposed by 
Qi-ossman et al. and apply it to a linear utility function, We find 
that the Grossman et al. results hold, provided the budget constraint 
is exhausted in each period. When we consider a flexible 
budget constraint there is a possibility that the earlier results will 
be reversed. We look at various comparative static eip-rcises and 
also examine the implications of sampling on the efficiency of the 
household technology when the consumer is learning about a new good 
which has an associated demand for a complementary product. 
2. 
- 
The general model 
A consumer gains utility in each time period from, two 
characteristics ct and c ot 
The former is produced by consuming 
a good x, but also depends upon the realisation of a random variable, 
c and a parameter z, which is fi-med through time, but whose value 
is unknown by the consumer. 
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ot ot (XtT 01 
The other characteristic is produced directly by consuming 
a good y: cot = yt . *The consumer has a strictly concave 
utility function which is invariant over time. However the 
utility in any period will depend upon the characteristics 
consumed in that period: 
ut= u(Ytl C. t(Xtl Zi st» 
(4.2) 
The consumer faces a budget constraint in each period 
yt + pxt (4-3) 
where p is the relative price of good x, since the 
price of y has been normalised to le 
Ct is a sequence of independently and identically distributed 
random variables with a density function f The consumer holds. Ct 
beliefs about the possible values of z represented by a subjective 
t density function fz 
The time superscript shows that fz changes over time, 
whereas it is assumed that the distribution of the Ct remains 
fixed over time, 
When -the consumer purchases a quantity of the goods x and t 
yt, he will be subjected to the realisation of the random variable 
and. observes the subsequent quantity of the characteristic a. 
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The consumer is not allowed to observe the random variable 
directly since this would enable him to compute z immediately. 
The ý6onsumerfs experience is s=arised by a vector; 
ý't = ý't('tl It) (4-4) 
Observing this, vector of statistics, which are defined as being 
sufficient 
1 
in the sense thattheyoontain sufficient information 
to make an inference about the true value of z, allows the 
consumer to update his initial beliefs on the basis of his 
experience, If the consumer follows Bayesian rules, then he 
updates the subjective density function of the unknown 
parameter according to: 
ft(ft-1 I wtt-j) (4-5) zz 
That is, current beliefs depend upon last periods beliefs 
and the experience from the last period. Bat from (4- 4), the 
experience in t-I depends upon xt_l . Thus the time periods 
are linked through the learning process of the consumer. Not 
only does the purchase of Xt contribute directly -to current 
utility, through the quantity of characteristic c, but the 
purchase of xt provides information to the consumer which he uses 
to update his subjective density function in period t+1. 
A consumer making a decision in period t, recognises that 
the decision will affect utility in the next period. The consumer 
thereforq_makes a decision in the current period to maximise the 
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expected value of the discounted sum of utility over two periods 
2 
max EU 1=11 t-I EU t 
(4.6) 
t=1 
(1+i) 
This problem can be solved by dynamic programming. The 
consumer solves his optimal plan over two periods by considering 
the problem in the final period first of all, and then working 
backwards. 
Consider the problem in the final period. Since period 2 is 
the final period, there is no future and the decision that the 
consumer makes will only affect utility in the final period; it 
will have no further effects. Thus the consumer maximises expected 
utility as r. single period problem, conditional upon the previous 
value of x: , and the realisation of the statistic w in the 
previous period. Let V2 be the maximum value function in the 
final period, then 
v2= max u(-Y,, 0, (x2,7, c 2)) 
'Y2 , x2 z 
re 2 
Sete 14 = 3r2 + px, 
(4-7) 
221 
where, from (4-4) fz = fý(fýj wl(xl, ol(el, z, xl))) which is 
termed the posterior distribution of z. Bat looking from the 
first period el , has yet to be realised, so ty, are a, -vector or random 
variables witio"Ansity function f Thus the consumer will w1 
carry out the maximisation procedure implied in (4-7) for every 
U(y2? C2(X27 7" £2» f F- 
fZ ds 2 dz 
possible realisation, of the random variable w, Having obtained 
the optiMal decision variables he will weight the subsequent 
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indirect utility by the probability that any'particular valucP of the 
1 is will obtain: 
EV 
f 
.... -, 
v 
-1 
.0006 VW 
f1 a-Iii 
- -9 09006 Wl- 7 
(4-8) 
The final period expected indirect utility function can be 
written as EV2 (xl), showing its dependence on the decision 
variable in -the previous period. 
The consumer having solved the final period problem moves 
back one period and solves the following problem in the first 
period. 
max EU Eu +11- 1 +, 
EV 2(xl) 
(4-9) 
X1,71 
sets M=Y, + pxl 
where i is the social rate of discount, and Eu is given by: 
f I. 
V 1 
Eu u(yj? cj(xj? O? Cj)) fr 
1fz 
dc 1 dz 
In the first period, the consumer uses his prior distribution 
of zi zI as 
the expectations operator over the unknovin parameter. 
We argued in Chapter 3 that this prior distribution is constructed 
from information given in advertising messages 
"Analysis of the advertising process begins by 
assuming that consumers have initially a stock of 
knowledge about goods and services of which part 
comes via advertising messages. " 
Telser (1966, P-462) 
Advertising furnishes the consumer with the paratmeters in the 
prior distribution of the u131mo-wm variable. It should be noted 
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that this prior distribution is still present, after the learning 
process has occurred, in equation (4-7), though we shall see that 
its weighting has changed. 
The Model with a Linear Utility Rinction 
The utility function is written as: 
'Yt + 't (4-10) 
The characteristic c is produced by consuming x units of 
a new good, but the quality of each unit is a random variable 
C. Xt 
cI- (4-11) t Cit 
i=1 
For example if the consumer purchases 1-lb of apples then 
C 
it represents the quality of each apple. If it + 
where c it are a sequence of independent and identically 
distributed random variables, then we may write 
Eut -yt+ E(c), xt (4-12) 
The other good yt can be thought of as either a good 
which is not subject to random elements or that it has a similar 
structure to x but the expected value of the random variable 
in this caze is unity. 
The problem for the consumer can be stated in a two period 
dynamic programming framework. The consumer maximises EU, 
where 
EU i Y1 + I(C). X, + EV (4.1 1+i 2 
S. t. Mi ý-- Y1 + P11 
and EV 2 max Y2 + E( c) *7x2 
x2, Y, 
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The distribution of each is normal with mean z and 
unit variance, but the value of z>0 is unknown to the consumer, 
since x is a new good which has not been ýcsted before. The 
consumer holds subjective beliefs about the distribution of z 
initially these beliefs axe described by a prior normal distribution 
with mean 11 0 and 
degree of precision The degree of 
precision is the inverse of the variance, it reflects the consumer's 
confidence in the value of V0 being the true meaa: the more 
confident is the consumer that V0 is the true mean, so the higher 
is ý, and the higher is ý the lower is the variance, 
We suppose that the value of V0 has been given to the consumer 
by an advertising message. In this case ý reflects the consumer's 
degree of confidence in the accuracy of the advertising message. 
We argued in Chapter 3 that the distribution used in the 
subsequent decision problem would be given by a weighted average of 
the consumerts initial diffuse beliefs and his experience of a series 
of advertising messages. Thus the posterior from this updating 
procedure becomes the prior in the problem considered in this chapter, 
Further not e, that by specifying the advertising message as lio I we 
are ignoring the previous updating process from diffuse beliefs and 
advertising, and in effect claiming that advertising is vury heavily 
weighted in the prior distribution. In fact this is perhaps not 
an unrealistic assumption, since in the case of genuine initial 
ignorance all information can only come through advertising statements, 
In the final period the subjective beliefs concerning o are 
described by posterior normal distribution. This posterior 
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distribution is constructed from the prior and the consumer's 
experience in the first period* 
The consumer purchases a quantity of the now good x1 in the 
first period, and consequently observes the realisation of a sequence 
of random variables. He then forms a likelihood function from -this 
sample of realised values; that is, the consumer asks himself from 
which particular distribution is it likely that this observed sample 
originated. Armed with this experience the consumer modifies his 
initial beliefs using Bayes" rule: - 
Posterior distribution - Prior distribution x Likelihood Function 
The consumer obtains an updated set of subjective beliefs for ' 
use in the second period, represented by the posterior distribution. 
In fact the consumer may not observe the sample of realised 
values, bat observe the average level of product quality where 
1x1- 
CTX Cj (4-14). 
j=1 
and ci as above has mean z and unit variance; so will 
also be a normal random variable with mean z and variance 
and will lie in the range (--, + -). 7 will be a I'sufficient 
statistic" to provide infon. ýation on -the true mean of c, and 
can be used instead of the likelihood function to compute the 
posterior distribution of z. 
The posterior will also be a normal distribution with mean 
and variance given below3 
110ý + exi 
IT +x 
(4-15) 
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+ xi 
(4-16) 
The mean of the posterior distribution, is simply a weighted 
average of the initial beliefs po I provided by the advertising 
message and the sample mean c 
In the first period, in solving equation (4-13) the consumer 
will use the expectations operator based on the prior distribution 
over the unknown parameter, f(z In the final period he I Vo I 
1ý 
2- 
will use the posterior distribution f(zjjr-, aL). But looking 
CC 
from the first period before a decision has yet been made, the 
random variables have not yet been realised, and the sample is 
still unobserved; so *E is itselfý a random variable which will 
need to be integrated out. The marginal distribution of ý is 
11 
also nomal ,f 
(71 po'T +7 
The consumer now solves the problem in (4-13), where the 
posterior expectation of z is given by (4-15)- 
The solution to the model 
In -the final period, there is no future, so there is no 
utility to be gained from further information. The consumer with 
a linear utility function will purchase either the new good or the 
old good. The consumer maximises expected utility in the second 
period for all values of 7, as in equation (4-7)- Making the 
substitution implied by the budget constraint 
Y2 'm2- PX2 
max Eu 2=M- PX2 + E(c) x. 
x2 
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where E(c) =z and E(z) = U7 F. O*C. yield 
Ci», 2 
dx2 c; 
m 
So ifp :9 
lio + 
e+ 
(4-19) 
20 if p> 
The optimal value of x2 depends upon the realised value of 
M2 
C For sufficiently high values of x=-; for low 2p 
values of e: x2 = 0' The level of utility in the second 
period depends upon the choice of the two goods. Substituting 
for the optimal values of the decision variables, we obtain the 
indirect utility function V2 
M2 M2 
If p :5 IT x2=p V2 p 
If p> 117 X2ý0V2M2 
These optimal values of x27 Y2 depend upon 7, through equation 
(4-15), which is itself a random variable when viewed from the 
first period, so the consumer computes a maximum value function for 
every possible value of e, and then weights the resulting indirect 
utility functions by the probability of observing a particular 
03 
M2 
IJO 0+ Cx 1 C* EV =f (-C + -1) d-c +N2f (T d7c (4.20) 2P+x1 X1 
0 CO 
110 +e xi 
where e satisfies p 
Equation (4.20) can be substituted into equation (4-13) to obtain 
the first period objective function in which the only decision 
variable is x, , and the effect of x1 on the second period 
expected indirect utility function is explicitly recognised. 
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Consumer max EU M+ E(c)x +1 EV2 (4.21) 
\11- 
pxl 1 1+i 
where E(c) =z and E(z) = vo 
5 
First order conditions yield: 
dFU I 
dx p+v0+0=0 
(4.22) 
dEV 2 
where a=. - 1+i dx 1 
We wish to show that the opportunity for learning will cause the 
consumer to purchase more of the new good in the first period than 
otherwise. Firstly it is necessary to show that EV 2 is 
increasing in x, * 
Proposition 4.1 EV 2 is a non-decrewing function of x, 
ProoL: The distribution of the random variable in equation (4-20) 
can be transformed into a standard normal distribution. 
Define a new random variable mm+ 
M=C- Vo 
/" -11 
7+7, 
I Then + Z*x +x12 
ý+ x (o 1+ Xl)2 
1 
and m* 22 (P +x (4-23) 
Substituting these values in equation (4.20): 
EV 2 
'1) m 
: r(ml*)dm (4.24) 2p 110 +(0-,, : r(m 10,1)dm + 142 
Jm* 
- 
(ý +x 1) - 
f.. 
- 
m* contains x1 as an argument, but using Leibnizt rule for 
differentiating around an integral by evaluating the integral at m*: 
- 94- 
Mf (M*) 
am* Mf (M*) dM* 0 d-ýj 2 dx 1 
dEV M 
0*0 2210 4-) 
2 
mf(m)dm >0 (4.25) dx 2p 
+ 
-X3/ x 
1 
j3j2 1 
M* 
Purchasing the new good in the first period increases 
expected utility in the second. This comes about because the 
larger is xj , the larger is the sample upon which the sample 
mean is based, The larger is x, the more confident is the 
consumer that the sample mean is the true mean. 
We can now state Theorem 1 which is the initial result of 
this chapter, and compares the size of the optimal purchase of 
the new good in the first period when the distribution function is 
adaptive, and learning is allowed, with the optimal purchase under 
a static distribution when there is no opportunity for learning. 
Theorem 4-1 If the objective function is given by equation (4-21), 
and if x0 is the value of the decision variable 1 
which maximises the objective in the non-adaptive 
case and x1 is the optimal decision rule in the 
adaptive case, then X* Z: 
0 
i ý11- - 
This result is the same as that obtained by'Cb: ýossman et al., 
(Theorem 21 P-538)- 
Proof: Under a non-adaptive distribution, the time periods are 
independent. The consumer does not update his distribution 
function, the initial density function is used by the consumer in 
all subsequent periods. 
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In both the adaptive and non-adaptive-cases, the consumer 
starts with the same prior density function. 'The non-adapt ive 
case reduces to a series of single period optimisation problems: 
In a single period problem, F. O. C, ts for maximum utility are: 
dEu 1 
dx 1=-p+ 
vo (4.26) 
If p< 110 p 
If pX0 
(4-27) 
The form of the utility function means that in a single period 
problem the two goods are perfect substitutes for each other. 
A set of indifference curves will be a series of downward sloping 
straight lines. The consumer spends his entire income on either 
the new good or the old good, depending on the quality relative 
to the price. 
Yi 
highest attainable 
dy, 
indifference curve: dx 0 
EU 1 
dy, 
budget line. dx 1-p<V0 
xl 
p 
Diagram 4-1 
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In the adaptiveý case, there is an additional positive term 0 
cefe (4.22) with (4.25)- There are three conditional demand 
schemes: 
m 
If p :ý 110 X, =p 
and x0= 1p 
M1 
If p but p- vo 0x- with complementary p 
slackness 
0 but X, 
(iii) If p>V, but 'p - 110 > x, 0 0 
0 
x10 
0 
Thus x X, , and it is condition 
(ii) that ensures the 
ineclaality sign. 
2. E. D. 
In a single period model, or if the consumerts outlook was 
myopic and did not recognise its ability to learn about its uncertain 
environment, if the product price was greater than the expected 
value of the product quality, the consumer would purchase none of 
the new good. The additional positive term on the right-hand 
side of equation (4.22) meanj that it is more likely that the 
consumer will purchase the new good in the adaptive case. 
0. 
The reason that x1 ;tx1 is that in the adaptive case not 
only does the consumer obtain utility directly from consuming the 
good, but also gains information about the quality of the new good, 
information which will be used in the next period. Information 
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and the new product are complementary goods , if the consumer 
ignores this complementarity his expected utility will be lower. 
From equal-ion (4.24) it can be seen that EV 2 depends upon 
x, , so that there is the possibility of an internal solution. 
It may well prove optimal for the firm to mix the two goods in 
the first period, whereas in a myopic model, this would never 
be true. In either case in the final period when there is no 
use for further informaýtion, the consumer will purchase either 
one good or the other. 
The shape of the EU I function is stated as propositions 
4.2 and 4.3. 
Proposition 4.2: The expected utility function FU 1 is convex 
in x1 at low values of x, , and concave at 
high values. 
Proposition 4-3: If Vo <p then 
(i) EU 1 is everywhere a decreasing function 
of xi 
or (ii) EU 1 has a maximiser x, , in the interval 
(01 
ý1- 
) p 
or (iii). EU 1 is decreasing in x1 at x 02 
but increasing at -1 1-p 
if v0Z. - p then 
(iv) LU 1 is an increasing function of x, . 
These propositions can be illustrated diagrammatically: 
Eu 1 
(iii)FU 
1 
11 J. 0 
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m1 
p 
EU v+0 110 
(iv) EU 1 
Diagram 4-2 
The most interesting case is where the interior solution 
is defined. The optimal policy for the consumer is then to mix 
the consumption of the two goods in the first period. Whether 
the model yields an internal solution or not depends upon the 
values of the five parameters: p, M17 M 2t V0 and 
In order to simulate possible combinations-of these 
parameters, (4.24) can be arranged in a more ameniable form. 
Note that 
M* 
f(m) dm f(m) dm 
*M 
xl 
p 
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Substituting into equation (4.24), and rearranging 
00 Aý co 
mx2 
EV m+ :z. (v - P) f(mlO, l)dm + 
L2 
(111 mf (m 1. )dm 2ý2p0p T') (X, + Ov 
j M* M* 
Bat mf(mioll)dm =1. e 72ir 
m* 
Substituting into equation (4.21), and assuming the rate of 
discount is zero: 2 
f(M)c 
m -LM! 
i 
FU =M Im + 
!21)1e2 
1+. M2 + 
(%- P)xl + (11 0- P) (Xl+o )'Ar27 
M* 
(4'. 28) 
This function can be evaluated for specific values of the parameters. 
5. Comparative Statics 
Proposition 4-4: A consumer who maximises equation (4 . 21) will have 
a higher expected utility the more risky is the 
initial prior distribution of the unknovm parameter. 
Risky being defined as a high initial variance 
which is the inverse of the degree of precision. 
That is, increased variance increases expected utility. The 
reason for this result is that the more uncertain consumers are 
about their environment, the greater the expected utility of 
information. (See Rothschild, 1974a, p. 691). The effect of 
a reduction in ý, on the diagrams above, will be to pivot the 
EU function upwards around the point where x0; since at 
x0 does not enter the expected utility function. 
100 - 
X 0-; -2 Figure 4.1 
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EU 1 
2> 
Diagrame 4.3 and Table 1 illustrate proposition 4-4. As 
0 falls, expected utility increases* 
Table 1 
p m1 m2 x1 
EU at 
x11 
W 0-5 0-49 10 10 1.0 19 27-48723 
(ii) 0-5 0-49 10 10 0.1 11 43.94726 
(iii) 0-5 0-49 10 10 0.01 6 99.28255 
(iv) 0-5 0-49 10 10 0.001 4 272.0773 
(V) 0-5 0-49 10 10 0.00001 0 2545-01 
(vi) 1.2 1.19 10 10 0.01 4 - 
53-02855 
Figures 1 and 2, plot the values of expected utility as the 
purchase of the new good increases for the parameter values in 
(ii) and (iii). 
The computer program used to generate these results is given 
in the Appendix to Chapter 
The reason that a decrease in ý increases expected utility, 
is due to the form of the expected utility function in (4.20). 
A decrease in ý increases the variance. Following a mean preserving 
spread, illustrated in diagram 4.4, the density function with the 
higher variance has an increased probability of higher values of ri. 
This is not correspondingly compensated by an increased probability of 
lower values, -since the existence, of the cut-off point e guarantees 
a minimum level of utility M. Thus expected utility increases 
Diagram 4.3 M1 
p 
Text cut off in original 
- 
4-4 
Of interest is the situation where V0<p and for 
a sufficiently high value of we would observe diagram 4.2i. 
Then as 0 decreased, the curve would move upwards into a shape 
similar to diagram 4.2ii and finally to diagram 4-2iii- When 
the peak of the EU function is ecfaal to the EU function at 
x 0, then the consumer is indifferent between x0 and 
xX 
EU 11 
Diagram 4-5 
x*M 
P 
DiWam 4- 5implies that for a small change in the optimal 
Policy for the consumer is suddenly to switch from purchasing none 
of the new good to xj, The consumer will not gradually increase 
its purchases of the new good w the degree of precision falls, 
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but will move straight away to the optimal sample size: if it 
is optimal for the consumer to sample, it is optimal. to sample 
optimallyl 
It is worthwhile contrasting the difference between an increase 
in x1 and ý on the objective function, EUl, EV 2 is 
increasing in xl , but decreasing in ý, even though an increase 
in either parameter reduces the variance of the random variable 
in the second period. Proposition 4-4 shows that the higher is 
the initial variance the higher is expected utility, since the 
greater is the greater the returns from information. x is 1 
the information component, not only, does an increase in x1 reduce 
the variance of the random variable in the next period, but puts 
a greater weight on the consumerts experience relative to its 
initial beliefs, as seen in equation 
Looking at Table 1 it ca. -i be seen that although an increase , 
in the initial subjective variance increases expected utility, the 
increase in the variance results in a smaller optimal value of xl,, 
Proposition 4-5: If x2> (p - Vo) 
2 
ýEx 
2+ 3ft + 2ý 
21+ 2ft 
then x1 is monotonically increasing in 
This is illustrated in where 110* = 0.491 P= 0-5y M 80 
and 0 is reduced from an initial value of 0,1 to 0-095- 
Consequently the optimal value of x1 falls from 32 to 31 units. 
Now conSider the effect of a change in the mean of the unknown 
variable on the demand for the new good* 
Proposition 4.6: x* is monotonically non-decreas-ing in Vo 
-. 104- 
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If the expected quality of the new good is higher, the 
consumer will demand more of x1 both because it is a better buy 
and because he requires more information about it. 
Proposition 4-7: X, is monotonically non-decreasing in M2 
The richer is the consumer in the second period the more 
information he will demand now. This proposition implies that 
"information" is a normal good, in that an increase in income 
results in an increase in the demand for information. 
Proposition 4-8: x* is monotonically non-increasing in p 1 
The consumer purchases less of the new good if its price 
rises, because the good itself is more expensive and consequently 
the price of information has risen resulting in less demand. 
Figure/', 4., Plots case (vi) in Table Both p and Po 
are increased with p -. 110 remaining the same. The result is 
a fall in expected utility and a fall in the optimal value of X, 
From Table 1 we are able to make some generalisations about 
the restrictions on the parameter values necessaxy to generate 
an internal solution, 
P must be greater than Vo p but P- po must be small. 
If po >p then we have the case of diagram 4*2iv and 
EU 1 is everywhere increasing in x, e Similarly if 
P is much larger than P we have the case of diagram 4.2i 0 
The absolute values of p and 110 are not important, but 
their relative values aree 
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The value of should be less than unity, for the values 
of -the other parameters in Table 1. If is too large, 
the expected utility function has the shape in 4.2i. 
If 0 is too small, then since we are only dealing with 
integer values , the optimal value of x1 is zero. 
Flexible RaL-_et Constraint 
In this section we introduce a new budget constraint which 
is specified as 
Y2 + PX2 ! -ý ('+') E ý' - (yl + 'ýýXl) 1 (4.29) 
The consumer is given a sum of money M at the beginning of 
the first period and he is allowed to spread this income over the 
two periods, any money not spent in the first period is invested 
at the market rate of interest which on account of perfect capital 
markets is assumed equal to the discount rate* The consumer must 
have spent all of his income by the end of 
! he second period. 
The consumer faces a new objective function 
max EU i= Yl + "Oll + -, -+i EV2 
(4-30) 
X11yl 
co 
where E -(Y1 +Pxl) f(7)d7e + 
(1+i) M-(yl+pxl) f(7)d-e (4-31) V2 ('+i)[M 
Trans formirig the distribution of into a standaxd normal 
distribution 4--lol becomes 
M* I- 
xm 
f(m)dM + f(m)dml EV2 = (1+i)[14-(Yl+ Px 1) + p 
Jm* 
0 (ý+x 
1)2 
-;, 
(4 - 32) 
where as previously m* is definedby equation 
(4-23). 
The consumer now has two decision variables in the 
first 
period: x1 and yj . He does not 
have to spend all of his budget 
by the end of the first period; in fact the less he spends 
in the 
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first period the more he will have left to spend when he is more 
certain of the distribution of product quality. It can be shown, 
rather surprisingly, that in this case the consumer will. not 
purchase any of the old good in the first period. 
Proposition 4-9: If the expected utility function is given by 
(4-30) then y*1 = 0. 
This proposition does not mean that the consumer will never 
purchase the old good, only that he will not purchase it in the 
first period: it will not be optimal to mix the two goods, which 
can be contrasted with proposition 4.3ii. On the other hand, 
proposition 4-9 does not mean that the consumer will always sample, 
it may also be the case that x1=0, in which case in the 
second period the consumer will spend his entire budget on the old 
good, which is essentially a one period solution, i, e. - Y2 ýM 
If the consumer decides to purchase the old goodl then he will 
choose that good for ever, since by purchasing the old good he can 
gain no new information about the quality of the new good which 
may persuade him to switch to the new good. 
6 
In a sense, time has become the consumer's decision variable; 
since he is living in a world of perfect markets, the consumer is 
able to experiment with the new good for as long as is optimal and 
then make a decision between the new and old goods. 
It can also be shown that it will never be optimal for the 
consumer to spend his entire budget sampling. 
4 
- los -I 
Proposition 4-10: If the consumerts objective function is given 
m by (4-30) then x<F 
This proposition states that it will never be optimal for the 
consumer to spend his entire budget sampling, since he will have 
no money left to benefit from the information he has gained, 
I 
The shape of the EU 1 function is drawn in diagrams 
4.6 
and 4.7 . 
Diagram 4.6 
1 
EU ,I%cp 
Diagram 4.7 
1 Fu i. 110 ,p 
IM 
I-1- ip p 
In diagram 4.7 when p>pI it will always be optimal for 0 
the consumer to sample. In diagram 4.6 when <PIx*>0 PO I 
depends upon the relative values of the parmeters. 
Equations (4-30) and (4-32) can be rearranged into a form 
which can be calculated on a computer in the Same way as equation 
(4.28) was derived. 
In this case we obtain M* 
. (M-Pxl). X121e 
EU M+ (v. -P)xl +, {(Vo-p, 
) f(m)dm +()-I 
-1 * 
i-: *:: p 
M* 
(Xj+ý)2-- 2 7r 
(4-33) 
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Tables 2,3 and 4, and ficures 5 and 6, show the results of 
I 
evaluating EU 1 and the optimal value of x, , for various values 
of the parameters. A-s can be seen from Tables 2 and 3, in line 
with proposition 4-4, a reduction in the degree of precision 
increases the level of expected utility; also proposition 4-5 
carries over to the flexible budget case: a reduction in ý reduces 
the optimal value of x, Figure 5 illustrates Table 3. 
By comparing Table 2 with Table 3, we- can see that proposition 
4.7 holds: an increase in income increases the value of x, 
Table 4 and Figure 6, illustrate the case of V0>p, which 
with the previous non-flexible budget constraint resultedýin 
a corner solution with the consumer purchazing all of the new good. 
In this case, as proposition 4-10 stated, the consumer will never 
spend all of his income sampling. 
Table 4 shows that although the consumer will purchase more 
of the new good as V increases, it is still true that X* <M 01F0, 
Table 2 
p m 0 x EU 1 at 
x1.1 
0-49 0.5 20 10.0 8 21.2866 
0.49 0-5 20 2.0 5 26.1487 
0-49 0-5 20 1.0 4 32.1688 
(iv) 0.49 0*5 20 0.5 3 37-7613 
Table 
(V) 0.49 0.5 8o 50.0 33 8o. 6079 
(vi) 0.49 0.5 8o 25.0 28 81-7634 
(Vii) 0.49 0.5 80 5.0 16 90-7933 
(Viii) 0.49 0.5 so 1.0 8 124-0526 
110 
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Table 4 t EU at 
VO p x1 x 
(ix) 1.0 0.5 80 0.5 7 200.2562 
(x) 2.0 0.5 80 0o5 11 328.3757 
(xi) 5-0 0-5 80 0-5 21 800.0021 
(xii) 10.0 0-5 80 0-5 38 1600.0000 
When the difference between-quality and price is very large, 
such is in line (xii), the expected value of information is low, - 
and in fact the maximum value function for a single period utility 
function M 1600.0. Thus the consumer is virtually 
indifferent as to the quantity of x consumed, But the tiny 1 
oxpected value of information means that an internal solution is 
def ined. 
We shall now state and prove a theorem that uses the flexible 
budget constraint to contradict Theorem 4.1. 
Theorem 4.2: If x0 is the value of x which maximises the 
expected Value of future utility in the non- 
adaptive case, and x1 is the optimal value in 
adaptive case; then if the rate of time preference 
is greater than the market rate of interest by 
a small amount T where 
M* 
<x2M 0<T f(m)dm, 
and if p. > p(l + ; 
'i ) 
then 
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Proof: We supýose that in the non-adaptive case the consumer 
uses his prior density function in each period. Firstly consider 
the situation where the rate of time preference is the same as the 
market rate of interest, and suppose ljo >p. Men a consumer 
with a non-adaptive distribution in the final period will maximise 
0 EU 2= max 
{ (1+i)l M (yl + pxl) - px 2+ Ilo X2 
X2 
F. O. C. 
dEU 0 
dx, p+ 11 0 
By wsumption p<v, so 
(1+i) E m-( 
I 
Y, + pxl)l 
0 -X2 =p 
So EV 0CM- 
(y, + pxl)l (1+i) 
(4-34) 
2 ý-- Ilb -p 
Then we may write consumer's objective function as. 
max EU 01 EV 0 1ýY, + "o-1 - 171 2 
(4-35) 
Yipli 
set* M Z: Y, + px 
FoO. C. 's yield: 
dEUO1 vo 
-=1-<0 -11 y1=0 (4-36) dy, p 
dx 11. = 
vo - 110 =0 (4-37) 
Since the expected quality of the new good is greater than its 
relative price, the consumer will only purchase the new good. Bat 
equation (4-37) shows that how the consumer divides his purchases of 
the new good over the two periods is indeterminate. 
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The optimal solution can be made determinate by specifying 
a difference between the consumerts rate of time preference and 
the market rate of interest. Let the latter remain at i, but 
the former becomes i+T. This anomoly is taken to represent 
an anomoly in the capital market. Then (4-36) becomes: 
dEU 0 11+i 110 
0 d7l +i+p 
since by assumption V0>P (I 7, ý 
*) 
, 
so 
the consumer still purchases none of the old good. Equation (4-37) 
becomes: 
dEU 0 1= 
11 
1+>0 
ax 
1o-1+ i+T 0 
so the consumer spends his entire budget on the new good in the 
first period 0m x1=p 
*M 
We know from proposition 4-10, that x, <5, but is-this conclusion 
altered by the introduction of a rate of time preference (i. FT)? 
Making use of A12 , we have 
2 
m* 
dEU, 
il+, 
i i+i 
0m f(m)dm dx x 'i V. -P+ 2 1+i+T 1-Pj (Oxi)l 
, -- "0* 1+i+T + 1+i+T * 
So 
dEU 
m dx x ==-- 11p 
if 
1+i 
110 
*M 
x<- 1p 
M* 
xm f 
so 
[110 
-P+ f (m) dm 
M* 
-P+(., 
l) mf (M)dm 
00 (o+xi)'- 
q. E. D. 
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Provided 4 is small enough it will not affect the concluoione 
of proposition 4-10- The consumorts preferences dictate that with 
a non-adaptive distribution, he should spend his entire income on 
the new good in the first period. With the adaptive distribution, 
the fact that the consumer has income for use in the second period 
means that it will never be optimal to spend his entire income 
sampling. 
Suppose that in order to encourage the consumer to purchase the 
new goodl as a marketing devicep the firm sets the price in the first 
period lower than the price in the second, and it is assumed that 
the consumer recognises this price differential exists. 
The consumer's objective becomes: 
f1111 
max EU, =-- pox, +-E 1+i V2 
so-to M ý: pjxj 
00 M* 
t't xm 
where EV 2= 
(1+0 [M-P, Xll{i. ]JO +( 7) f (m)dm + f(m)dm P2 (ý+X ilý 
r 
M* - Q* 
(4.39) 
and M*= (p2-p 2 (4-40) 
0) xl),!, 
(xi 
Then we can state the following propositions 
Proposition 4-11: If the consumer's objective function is given 
by (4-38), where P, < p. and p, < lio, then 
for sufficiently high values of m* 
x*=m 1 
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The prospCct of an increase in price in the second period, 
coupled with an expectation that product quality is higher than 
the current price p, , means that the consumer will not bother 
making use of information acquisition but will spend his entire 
budget on the new good in the first period. This proposition 
can be contrasted with Proposition 4-10- 
Proposition 4-12: x* is monotonically increasing or decreasing 1 
in p2 as 
> 
(M-plxl). 3/p 
c p, F(m*) +p2=-(m 
(ý+XJ)2 x 
f( 
+ N-VIX1).. 
(A 
'/2 
.f 
2x( oxjo 
Whether the effect is positive or negative depends upon 
whether the new good is expected to be of high or low quality. 
For example if V0> 2p 2 and 11 0>p, 
F(m*) then it can be 
seen from A14, that 
dx 1 
>0 This is because if high quality dp 2 
is expected, then the consumer expects to purchase the new good 
after sampling, thus a rise in price in the second period causes 
the consumer to purchase more of the new good in the first period, 
The rise in p2 induces inter-temporal substitution, with the 
consumer purchasing more of the new good now instead of purchasing 
it at a higher price next period. 
dx 
If U0<p, F(m*) and v0< 2p 21 then it can be seen that dp 2<0. 
If the quality is expected to be low, then the consumer is unlikely 
'to purchase the new good at any stage. A rise in price in either of 
the periods will consequently have a normal negative effect. 
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The (3cmand for comjýlementary 6oods with adjustmcnt costs 
So far, utility has been specified a. 9 a fmiction of two . oods 
x and y Dat now suppose we introduce a third good s 
price p which is complomentary'to the first two goods and must 
be consumed in conjunction with goods x and y. Utility in 
any period t can be written 
-'t + I; t 't 
where m ; -> Yt + px +ps 
(sx + By) (4-41) tttt 
and sy 2t ayt t 
x 
(4-42) 
st 2t bxt 
I 
sy is the amount of good s which must be consumed in fixed t 
proportion a, with good ysx is the amount of good s which t 
must be consumed in fixed proportion b with good. x, and 
s= SY +8x We suppose that a>b that is the new good ttt 
needs less of good s to complement it than does tM old good. 
This is to give some credence to the new good being a technical 
improvement. 
The problem is complicated by the existence of adjustment 
costs, with respect to changes in the purchases of good s between 
periods. It is assumed that the household technology is constructed 
for a particular size of good s .7 Any change in the quantity of 
s consumed means -that the consumer must adjust the household 
technology. If the consumer purchases one extra unit of s "l the 
adjustment cost is d, and if he purchases one less he incurs 
a cost of e. 
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An example of this type of technology would be the relationship 
between type of washing powder and size of washing machine. 
Suppose a new type of washing powder is developed, which needs 
a much smaller quantity of water, and hence smaller machine, to 
wash clothes in. If the consumer wishes to change the technology, 
he must buy a smaller washing machine. 
If s and s are the quantities of good s purchased in 12 
periods one and two, then if s1>s21 the adjustment cost is 
e(s 1- S 2); if s. > s, , the total adjustment cost is 
d CS2- si). 
Furthermore we suppose that the household technology 
relationships in(4-42)are binding in the final period, since in the 
final period the consumer is in long run equilibrium, then 
substituting for y2 in the budget constraint 
2a2- 
(p + bpß)x 2] + 
bx2 (4-43) 
1+aps 
So the adjustment costs become: 
daM (p + bps) +bx if s>B (4-44i 
1+aps 
[2 q2 
sl 21 
and e(sas2- (p + bpB) X2] - bx 21 if s1>B2 
(4-45) 
1 +ap 
[M 
Then in the second period the consumer faces the following 
objective 
max EU 2=2-f 
P-+--I? 
ý 
11-2 + AC (4-46) 
1c 2 1+ap8 
(1 + apB) 
where AC are the adjustment costs specified in equations (4-44) and 
(4-45) 
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F. O. C, 
dELJ 2 Ima 
+e -2- . 
(p + bpa) - b] dx2 -- 
(12- 
-+- if sI>62 
+ aps) r 
[; 
+apB 
(447) 
[a 
+dS. (p + bpo) - b] if s2>s1 
+ Dl 
Then if >p+ 
bp s+e (p + bps) 
- b] the 
+ aps + aps 
expected quality of the new product is greater than its price, and 
the associated price of the complementary good and the adjustment 
costs implicit in reducing the capacity of -the household technology 
to cope with a smaller value of the complementary good s. 
If 
(p + bps) 
*-d 
[a 
(p + bp! j 
- b] , then the expected (1 + aps) (1 + aps) 
quality is so low that it is less than the Price of the new good 
and the adjustment cost of increasing the household technology to 
a level which is implied by consuming only the old good. 
if -d 
[a 
- b]< 117 <+ 
bps 
+e 
[a 
- 
1+ aps (1 + aps) + apr' (1 + apo) 
then the consumer maintains his consumption levels of the two goods 
x and y constant between the two pe3ziods, since the expected 
quality of the new good x, is not great enough to justify the cost 
of switching to the new goodl but neither is the expected quality 
low enough to justify the costs of returning to the old good. 
Then the indirect utijity function for the second period can be 
written: 
120 
EV 22-d2S. f 
(T)d7c 
ap 1+apo 
-00 
1 
1', 2 
x1 jixl] f(E) äc (4-48) 
1+aps (1 + aps) "L 
00 M2 bM 2 
fil --ef(, 
ýd7 
c p+bps p+bps 
7*2 
0 
where c*= d 
[a 
- b] JLXý- -- (1+apo) 1+apo x1 
and -E* -I+e 
[a 
- 
(p+bpo) 
_ b] 
ý+Xl 
- 
vo 0 
2- 1 +ap9 (1+ap 
s)x1x1 
If the consumer starts the first period with a household technology 
designed for the old goody then s in the previous period waz given 
M 
by a 0 The consumer's problem at the beginning of the 
1+ap 
first period can be written 
0 
max 
s x 
EU 1 s) s) (1+a (1 s 
S, 1+ EV 2 x1+ Pox, -e 
I 
1+a 
1I 1 p +ap p 
Soto S1ý: ay, + bx 1 
e+df (-c)d7c*- ef (-c)d7c >o (4-49) ds 1 
IC* 
-00 2 
So s1 should be taken to its highest possible value: 
a1- (p+bpE3)xl 
1+aps 
I 
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Thus the consumer may decide to sample with the new good but will 
purchase more s1 than it needs in the first period. Table 5 
and Figures 7i and 7ii show a range of parameter values for which 
the optimal x1 is an interior solution. It can be seen that 
increasing both the adjustment costs reduces the demand for x, 
Since the consumer is purchasing some of the new good, then given 
the technology relationships in 4-42, the consumer must be 
Table 5 
IJO pma. b PS dexI 
1.99 6. o 0.01 325 1.5 ' 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 8 
1.99 6. o 0.01 325 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 9 
purchasing more than the necessary minimum quantity of s, There 
e3dsts spare capacity, which is inefficient. It ocours because of 
the adjustment costs: the consumer is not sure that he will end up 
purchasing the new good, so therefore he maintains the old level of 
s in the first period, in case he decides to go back to the old 
methods in the second. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter vie have introduced the way that learning affects 
behaviour. It was shown that the ability to learn will increase the 
quantity demanded of the good that the consumer is able to learn about* 
With the initial model investigated, the decision of the consumer to 
sample depends upon the parameter values. The introduction of 
a flexible budget constraint made the existence of the solution less 
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dependent on the specific parameter values. 
The consumer's initial beliefs are, in part, provided by an advertising 
message, Because the consumer recognises that these messages do not 
furnish accurate information, his beliefs are weighted by the consumer's 
degree of confidence in the truthfulness of the advertising message, and 
his experience. The main results in this chapter have been that the - 
opportunity to gain unbiased information, causes the consumer to purchase 
more of the new good than if he believed with complete confidence, the 
truthfulness of advertising messages, 
We have carried out various comparative exercises on the demand for 
the new good. Increases in expected quality, price and income all have 
the expected signs, However the effect of an increase in the degree of 
confidence is not so clearly seen. Whether an increase in causes 
a rise or fall in x1 depends upon the value of the parameters, implying 
there is some kind of 'optimal' degree of confidence. It will be seen 
that this result has implications for the multi period analysis in Chapter 7- 
lie finally looked at the implications of sampling on the efficiency 
of the household technology, and we showed for some parameter values that 
the model generated a short-term inefficient solution, 
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Notes 
1. For a more formal defirrition of a "sufficient" statistic, see 
DeGroot (1970) P-155- 
2. The variance of the random variable C, could also be unknown; 
DeGroot (1970) considers the case. Iht this would only complicate 
the problem, which is sufficiently rich enough to allow the 
assumption of a constant variance, with the mean being the only 
unknown parameter. 
See Appendix Al * 
See Appendix A29 
Although the mean of e in equations (4-17) and (4.21) is zI 
the unconditional distribution is different in each case. The 
distribution of e N(z, 1) is a conditional distribution since 
it depends upon the value taken by z. To find the unconditional 
distribution, we need to employ the method used in Appendix A2. 
This is done in A3. 
This can be compared with Rothschild (1974) with reference to the 
Two Armed Bandit Problem 
"If the machine whose pay-off probability is known is ever 
played, it will be played for evermore", p. 191. 
7e The concept of a household technology was suggested by Muth (1966). 
8. There is a problem in that the 
'e" 
I are 
discrete observations yet we 
require x to be a continuous variable. According to Cyert, DeGroot t 
and Holt (1978), "we replace the notion of a finite number of discrete 
projects with the notion of a*total investment which is continuously 
divisible into projects of arbitrary size P 713. Even if the ci are 
split into extremely small amounts, each unit will still be a random 
variable with a known variance. 
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Apl2ondices 
Al Derivation of posterior mean and variance 
See DeGroot (1970) and Theil (197'8). 
C1 00000 Cx is a random sample, where each of the c1 are 
independently and identically distributed random variables with 
unknown mean x and unit variance, f(clz, l) . The prior 
distribution of z is normal with mean Po and precision 
f (z I I'(, 11). 0 
Bayes theorem states: 1 
f(zlcll 000 cx) = 
f(zlij 
o', T) 
L(cl, ... c Xlz) 
f L(cl, a, * clz) f(zlp -1 ` 
vz 
olý)Uz 
where L(cl, .. ex 
Jz) is the likelihood function for the random 
sample c,, osee cx o It is the joint density function of the -, 
random variable from a normal distribution with mean z and unit 
varianceo It is the probability density of obtaining the sample- 
given the value of the parameter z We may write out the 
likelihoodfunction: 
L(E, 
easo E Xiz) 
f (el lz 2 1). f (C 21z, 1) 
(r: 
 
1Z 
22 X£, - Z) '(c27 Z) y-) 
7 2ir Z2-ir r2 -7r 
2 
( l(27r)x -21(, Ei - Z) 
1 
and f (Z 7 exp 2 
(Z - po) 
- 122-6 - 
We may write Bayest theorem as: 
x 
,p 
(ri 21- f(Z JE, 
ooo Ex expf (Z-ji ) ;. _z)2 -ý 
-r! 
(J2 ir) 
Y' 2 
i=l 
Taking logs, the proportionality constant represented by a becomes 
an additive constant, with respect to the unknown parameter z. 
. *. log f(ZIE, ... r:.. 
) =-ý- (Z-* )2- e2 VO 7 
x 
I (ei--G) 2+ constant 
j=l 
x 
and i (c -0) =11 (ei_Z) + 
(7. -0 )] 
x212 
I (ci--c) + x(7-0) + 2(7--7, ) 
j=l 
xx2 
But (ci--c) =0, and (ci--c) is a constant with respect to z; so, 
22 
lo c) =-! -{ý(z-v ) +x(7-z) + constant ge f(zlcl x20 
22)+( -r2 75 2) And e (z-v 
0) +4 
(Z -211 0Z+ 11 0 -27ez +z 
40 
2+ 
xe 2z 
(ýllo + XF + 
(71 
e+xe +x 
Completing the square 
(4y-) 
[-ýLlo 2 2+ 2 
2] 
11 47x)l 00 c + (44 : ýc 
. 
('O', 
O++'ýx 
+x +x 
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Bat the final expression is again constant w. r. t, z. 
4v +cx) 
2 
-I+ constant loge f(zlel "' ex) =-2 {(ý+x)[ Ox 
Taking anti-logs: 
Op +cx 
f (z I el c exp {- -1 (ý + x) x21- i4x 
which is of the form of a normal distribution with the mean IIIC- 
2 
and variance a7 specified in equation (4-15) and (4-16). 
A2 Derivation of marg-inal clistribution of 7. 
Conditional distribution of 7 is N (z -1 , with density function 
f- , which can be derived from equation 
(4-14) since cN (z, 1). 
elz 
Prior distribution of z is N (, pol with density function fz. 
If joint distribution of z and 7 is written f- , then C, Z 
f-e Iz- fz = fe-, z 
and marginal distribution of 7 is 
f7, dz 
c 
z 
21 F7: - exp (z-ll )2 1 dz exp e 
jyxl-r 
2 27r 20 
Co 
exp -x (Z_z)2 + (x_ )2 
1 clz 21r 20 
2 
74 2+x 
]}dz 
2 ir exp -7 
{(x+ e) 
1- 
2z 
e+Y- -- 
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Compicting tho square 
=Z exp {4+X) + xe +7 21r 0 
( ex) 
,i 
32 x exp 
ex xv+x 
2ir 2 
[Z 
0 p( 
e 77 11-2ff 2 
exp 
ex g_ 110)21 
42 : 
Tr -e -+x 2 ý+x 
11 
which is a normal distribution with mean PO and variance -F +7. 
CO -2 
ý Ijo + Cx 
since exp {(ý+x) is the area 
flir 
2+x 
430 
under a normal distribution with mean 
Oil 
0+ 
ex 
and variance 0T; 0+x 
A3 Derivation of the marpinal clistribution of F-- 
Conditional distribution of c is N (z, l) and prior distribution 
I 
of z is N (V 0 It). 
Then in the first period, marginal distribution 
of c is 
fc Iz fýl dz 
Vz 
exp{ 
1. (c _ z)21 -A exp - -1 (z 
2 dz 2 27r 2 110) 
"ITI-r 
Using the same method employed in A2 
e xp -I{ T7r 
which is a normal distribution with mean vo and vaxiance 
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In the second period, maxginal distribution of c is 
22 fC=I fclz fz dz 
Vz 
where f2 is the posterior distribution of z z 
z 
x 2j1.1 2 Ox 12 (ý+x) (z-jr7) dz. f 
'(27 
exp - -1 (c-z) 
XIT exp -2c 
Again using the method employed in A2 
f2 exp -1{ 
U+X) (C-11 )2 
c7 7-7. T0 
which is again a normal distributi on with mean 110 and variance 
ý+X+l 
ý+x 
A4 Proof to Proposition 4.2 
Differentiate equation (4.22) w. r. t. xl , using 
(4.25) and noting 
CIM* )(ý )3/2 -=- (p -v- dx 10x1 TT7 17 
2 
co 
and 
f 
mf(mlO, l) dm = f(m*) 
M* 
2EU I d1m2 )2 f (m*) 1 212 
(Wxj) 
Then -= P-11 )- 2 7p- xx 
1)3 
0x dx 111 
(O+x V2 
11 
which has a negative and a positive component. When x1=0, the 
positive term approaches infinity, so that at low values of xj , EU 1 
is concave. As x1 increases the function becomes convex. 
0. E. D. 
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A5 Proof to Proposition 4.3 
We know from proposition 1 that 0>0 
dEU 1 (iv) If poý: p then e+p. >p so -, > OVx1. x1 
'U 
For (i) - (iii) v<p and the sign of 
dE, I 
will depend upon 0 dx I 
the absolute size of 0, the information component, i. e. will 
the positive 0 be sufficient to outweigh the negative p) 
(i) If 0 is small such that v+e<p then 
dEU I<0Vx 
0 dx 11 
(iii) If e is large such that v+e>p then 
dEU 1>01 but 
0 771- 
6 depends upon the value of x, So only at high values of x 
IEUý 
>0 dx 1 
dEU 
When x00=0 and so for sInall values of x, I= Ic 0 dx 1 
(ii) Bat at very high values of x, ,0=0, as can be seen 
from equalion. (4.24). 
In this case x0 
dEU 
<0 dx 1 
and xm 
dEU 
0 T dx 1 
dEU 
however there will be intermediate values of xI for which dx > 0. 
Whichever effect dominates depends upon the parameter values. 
Q. E. D. 
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A6 Proof to ProLosition 4.4 
Differentiate equation (4-21) w. r. t. ý, where EV2 is given by (4.24) 
dEu 1-1 ivi 2 
(x, + 2e) 2 f, (m*) 
de 1+i 
+ e) 
3 /2 
Q. E. D. 
C=: t=rr-- 
A7 Proof to Proposition 4.5 
Implicitly differentiate (4.22) using (4.25) 
dx 1 
do 
C12 EU 
dx 12 
I d2ýV 2- 
Tx -ld 
We assume that the second order conditions for an optimum x 
are satisfied so that d2 EU 1 
dx 
C12 EV2 M2 f (e) I. xj-2ý 
_ 
(P_110)2. ý 
. 
(xj+2ý) 
Then 77 
(x +3x Y2 ICIO 1 
2 
So 
2fl- 
>0 as x 
2>(P-po) 4 (X, + 3ex, + 2e )+ 2ex, 
de 1< 
A8 Proof to Proposition 4.6 
Implicitly differentiate equation (4.22) 
dxl 1+1 dEV 22 
dU 
0 d2EU 
1+i 7; 1 
TUO 
dx 12 
Differentiation (4.25) w. r. t. vo 
dEV 22m2 
(P - V. ) 
Y2 
'* z-e + x, ) .x dx d 11 ý 7p 
f 
1o 
E. D. 
r. ====: =:: g 
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Ag Proof to Proposition 
Implicitly differentiaAe equation (4.22) 
dx 1112 
dM 2EU 17 i 
!,,!, 
1 
2d 2'xl 
dX2 2 
Differentiating (4.25) w. r. t. M2 
2 
C'EV2 
f(M*) > 
dx 1 dM 2 2p 3/2 Yl 
) 
Q. E. D. 
A10 Proof to Proposition 4.8 
Implicitly differentiate equation (4-22) 
dx 
1-1(11d2 
ýV2 
dp 
d2EU 1+ 
77 dx 1 
dp' 
dx2 2 
]Differentiate (4.25) w. r, t. 
d2EV 
2m21ff (M*) M* CIM* 
dx 1 dp 4x, ) ý2 p2p 
dp 
2 f(M*) 
+ (p 7p* 0,0x 
( O+x Ih 
C12 EV 2 
dx 1-<0 
since p> 110 for internal solution. 
.-F. - 
D-. 
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All Proof -to Proposition 4.9_ 
Carrying out the maximisation procedure in (4-30), first order 
conditions yield: 
II 
dEU 11 dEV 2 
dy, l+i " dy, 
Differentiate (4-32) w. r. t. yj 
I 
dEV 2 (1+0 f(m)dm 
dy, 
f (M) dm 
0 
(Ti 
(,, l) ýý 
so 
Making the substitution f(m)dm f(m)dm 
410 M* 
.L 2 
dEU 
[Ij 
tx 
m Then dy, 04ý L, 
])f 
(m) dm 
M* 
(4xi)p- 
But for values of m in the range (m*, 
I 
x2 
p- < Vo + 
So 
dELJ 
dy, <0Y, Ix 0 
0. E. D. 
cäcýý 
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A12 Proof to Proposition 4.10 
Maximise equation (4-30) w. r. t. x, 
f 
1 dEV 2 
dEU 1+ T+-i dx 
dx 1 
Differentiate (4-32) w. r. t. x, 
dEV (i+i) (m-PX1) 2 
dx 
2 
2p 
10x, ) 
mf (m) dm. 3/ 2 
- (i+i) filo +( 1f (m) dm +pf (m) dm )2 
X1 
+00 2 
But 110 +mf (M)dm = 110 
-00 
ox 1 
YKF 
dEU (M-Pxl) M* 
+x 0-1 =f 
(m*) 
+ 11 -P 
Imf (m) dm 
dx 2p 3/2 00 1 (ý+xl) 1 
1, 
[ 
4+XlPi 
But for values of m in the range (- co, m*) 
x 
p> 11 +m 
0 
+X) 2L 
So , at x 
dEU M* x 
dx 0+ 110 + 
ZI) 
0mpf 
(m) dm < 
1f 
Go -( 
(ý+x 
I)w - 
<m 
Q. E. D, 
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A13 Proof to_Proposition 4.11 
Differentiate (4-38) using (4-39) and (4-40) wer. t. x 
I1 . 1. co dEU (M-Plxl) 1 
vo + mf (m)dm dx 2p 29 
M* 
2 
Pl 
lio+( "l\ f (m) dm -p f (m) dm p2 
f 
7) - 
m* 
.L (M-Pfl) 
12 
mf (m) dm 2p f7 P2 2 (ý+xj) /2 
M* 
I 
M* 2 
Pi 
+ 
(Xj 
m 
p 2] f 
(m) din 
P2 (ý+Xdli' 
As m* 110 +mf (m)dm 0 
co 
I 
(ý+Xl ) 
Then 
dEu 
dx vo - Pi 
So xm P1 
2. E. D-. 
- 
A14 Proof to Proposition 4.12 
Implicitly differentiate the F. O. C. ts in A13. 
2ý; dx d 
dp 
d2 
tI dx d 
2. 
2 ý6 
11 
P2 
dx 12 
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d 2M'l *t M- 2 pixi) 1 dm* 
M* dx dp 2p x M*f dp 122 (ý+xj)3/2 12 
f (M*) 
2 (ý+x )3 2p 21 
/2 ý! Tl) 
2 
p /XiN 
m 
P2 
f 
110 IT) . -, r f 
(m)dm 
M* 
[ 
(ý+Xj)w 
- 
Divide F. O. C. 's in A13 by p., and substitute for 
M-P xf (M*) 
2p 2 
C12 
,I 3ý M* 
Then 
Eý2* (m plxl) P2-llo 
f (M*) + 
uo 
- 
Pi 
f (m) dir d =1dp 
2- 
ý -2 0 'ý" - 
(k) 
pp 
-1 
P2 (O+xl), L 22 
M* 
Let 
f 
f(m)dm = F(m*) 
-CO 
(12 
t Eý2t vi-Plxl) 
0[ 
1+(V 3 
en >0 as li .(_ 
V2] 
dp 22 
3 
P2('VI-Plxl) 
/2 
> p, F(m*) + -, - 
(ýi- ) 
< (exl)-2 f(m*)1 
qo- Ee D. 
Chapter 
Learning with a C. E. S, Utility Function 
- 138 - 
1. Introduction 
in this chapter we follow the methodology of the previous chapter 
in examining the effect of learning on consumer behaviour* But we 
change the circumstances of the consumer in two ways 
a) The utility function is specified as belongine to the 
class of constant elasticities of substitution. 
b) 11he random variable is assumed to have a log-normal 
distribution* 
These two differences introduce important characteristics to the 
problem. Firstly a C. E. S. utility function is strictly concavet unlike. 
the previously considered linear one, which has implications for the risk 
attitudes- of the consumer. Secondly, the log--normal distribution is 
not sy=etric around its mean; so that the parameter supplied by the 
firm ji, is not used as the center of the distributione 
We can then ask the question: do the results of the last chaPtýr 
alter. as a consequence of these changes? 
We would not expect the introduction of risk aversion to greatly 
affect the main results from Chapter 4- In fact Grossman ýt al (1977) 
considered a general risk-averse utility function in proving their 
Theorem 1. It is worthwhile emphasising this result in the context of 
a concave utility function. The implication of learning on the. size 
of the decision variable in the first period is not that the consumer 
will alwaqs choose to purchase a "risky" new good, kbether the consumer 
buys the new good or not depends upon his attitudes towards risk, 
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What the result does say, is that if the consumer is able to learn about 
the uncertainty, he will purchase more than if that opportunity for learning 
does not exist* 
Consider a simple portfolio choice problem: the Investor must choose 
between a safe asset and a ris17 a. -set* Suppose firstly that the dis- 
tribution of the returns from the ris1V asset are Lmown; then the investor's 
preferences over risk and return will determine his holdings of the two 
assets. Compare this with the situation when the distribution of returns 
on the risky asset is adaptive. Then Grossman et al. and our results in 
Chapter 4 say that the investor uIll parchase more of the risky asset in 
the second case than the first. 
The general properties Of the 109--nOrmal distribution have been 
extensively discussed in Aitchison and Brown '41957)- if 0 such 
that log, cE and c is a random variable with a normal distribution 
22 
N(11# a-') then c has a lognbrmal distribution and Parameters 11 and cr, 
2 
The mean of this distribution is + 
ýT 
and a takes on only positive 
values (0 
f(c) 
a 
1 
mode e 
median = 
+ CF -2 mean 
mode Liedian meazi 0 
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The distribution is skewed; its mean lies to the right of both the 
mode and median* Thus the conammer knows that most observations from 
this distribution will lie to the left of the mean, WO Still SUPPOBe 
that the consumer's beliefs about the truth of the advertising message, 
are normally distributedt but the underlying distribution which the 
advertising message is purporting to inform the consumer about is skewede 
We might expect that the importance of this fact, is that it is more 
difficult for a consumer to verify the truth of an advertising statement, 
since he expects most of the observations to be concentrated below the 
mean., 
The Model 
Suppose that in each period the consumer faces ýhe following utility 
function: 
t 
ut S-A- - (5-1) 
yt Xt 
N(zt but z. is unknom with distribution , (pot 
00 
Eut 7' + 2r 
-Vt Xt 
In the first periocl I 
EU 
110+: 4 + 
Y, 77 
- 
But in the second period z- N( II* j- ) 
where lb 
ý +x ý +x 1 I 
+ 
So 72 = -a 
L-- JP- 
I 2r 
Y2 X2 
1ý2 e where e " O 
72 . x2 
1 -2 l& 
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max EU2 -S 
+-X (112 - P/2 - PxZP-) (5*2) 
Y2 x2 
First order conditions yield. 6 
0. 
-I dELT = CE 2. PY 
0 
dy 2 
.e dEU2 ý Oe px 22 0 
dx X2 
2e 
ax2 
'Y2 
2 
Pic 
e X2 = '72 (5-3) 
Substitute into budget emstraint X= pyy + pxx 
Y2 px * Y2 
py Fy- 
-- 
m (5-4) Y2 ý P-,, -1 py + IP2 Y 
substitute for Y. in (5*3) 
x (5-5) 2mpx+ (PY PX 
Substitute back into equation (5*2) 
Va 
fp, 
+ (pxpy 
/2e- 6/2 
-+ (Pyp. 
1/2 
ee 
2' .e 
2 Hýy 
lp3c 
e 
1 Ty +( as P. Py. ) 
1/2 0/2 
+ op. ý, +( CLOP. PY) 
/2 
e 
e/2 lep., 
+ Op. e, + 2ýa P. PY)1/2, (5.6) 
But 6 depends upon the random variable et thus to find the expected 
value of the indirect utility f=c4. ion in period 2 we need to integrate 
over the random variable* 
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EV, (aPy. + OPýý- 2(CfOpXPY' e- 7 2f Fluot +1 dZ* (5.6 
Fbllowing Theil (1971) 
+ te 2) - dp 17 exp po) a7c - -Cr-72m7r 
But - t-e -7 116 )2. -I. (7 - Ij .1 
(C 
- 0)2 + 202te 
.2 Crz .z CF2 
0+ t)7- + 21,0 t 
11 0+ a2t) 
2 
11 0t+ cr2t. 
7-- 
a2" .z 
2 
Thus e now becomes a random variable. with mean 11 0- cr 
7t and variance a. t 
and the area under a normal carve cams to 1* 
4P 
e-te 
t e (C 0+ d7( xp 
f--VO 
t+ (rx + 
rx I 2ý x, r 
Applying this result to the integration problem in (5,6): 
exp x r) +1+f ("Ej V 0, .1+I .) 
dF 
0 
27r-xj +01 2r rx rx I+01 
exp 
f-410 
++ Or 
and exp (110 ý+FxI r) + 
Arx 
1T 
7) rr 
+ f(el ) dF 
2(rxl +7 .I 
exp t 0- + (-"-x -ir+ 
4)+ 
20 
EquatiOn (5.6) can be written: 
lb + PO +v+1 (, Mp. +0 pxe p 2. Ev 2 : 2: r +2 (cl Op xy0 
4t (5-7) 
uhare I 'f '- 1/2 rx, + 
f (rx I+ 
f) 
Writing out the consumer's two period objective: 
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-p11 0+ 5 
n= EU 1--c: - 
ße 
,+E (5-8) x ir Y1 
il 77 
.v 
2(Y"l 
.) 
Seto mI= pyyl , px'l 
P. O. C, 
dE: LJ 
dy 
a Xp 
y2y 
.0 (5-9) 
1 1 
dEU 
++ 
p- 0 20 2r + dEV ýp 0 
dx x2 d: x 
- py (5-10) P0 
y2 6e 
+ + 20,2r 
+d EV2 px 
dx 
P, 
1 
A 
y 
py. 
110 +- + 2ý Zr 06 + UVý 
x2 dx V 
But from (ý. 9)1 a. 2 is the marginal utility of one unit of y,; and 
e- 
v0 +Io-+ i-r 
+ 
/Y1 
,s 
the marginal utility of x The marginal utility dE 2 
Ix 
1 
2ý 
- 
of XI is made up of the direct effect of the good on current utility and the 
indirect effect of the informational effect on expected utility next period* 
Then it. can be seen that (5-10) s. Vs that the ratio of marginal utilities 
should equal the ratio'of prices for an optimum. 
Substitute into budget constraint for y,: 
apjýjr 2 
A+ 
m+ 
0+ 2-r 
Le dEv +2 
x dx I 
I 
+V +4; 
and dEV2 13XD ye01 -M 
I 
-) 4M (rx +0 dx 
(5.11) 
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Thus equation (5-11) gives an implicit equation for the optimal value of x 
which maximises the present value of expected utility* 
We can now compare this value of x, j with the value obtained for the 
static caset where there is no opportunity for learning. 
Proposition 5-1 If the consumer's objective function is given by (5,, 8)t 
and if x0 is the value of the decision variable which 1 
maximises the objective in the non-edaptive caset and 
x* is the optimal decision rule in the adaptive case I 
then xX0 1 >1 
Proof In the nca-edaptive case the objective is: 
M-l, Vllr 
0=- 
(% - Oe 
0 211 1-r +% 'Ili 71 r, 111. - pXXI - pyylj 
PIOIC, dEU 
0 
1 
and cIEU 
0 
dx 
0 
Yielding x 
= ei - 
xp 
in 
0 
2,22 
71 
0++ 
se 21 2-r _ Ap =0 
m 
42- 44 4r 
p ýpx e x 
The value of x0 in (5-15) can be mbstituted into 1 
(5-12) 
(5-13) 
(5-14) 
1 
(5-15) 
- 11 +. i, + ,-1-, vo +v., + 1 dEU 1 =. ge su 
0. je . 
2-r +1 (0& ß Ppy, ) 
/2 
e. T' Irr . 
, 
7", z Z, 
4)2 -- 
px 
(Z) =1+ py(N -- PAT 
But from (5-13) and (5-14): 
- 11 +I+I 
so 
0 2f px cl 
-2 
(XO)2 P, (M - 
U) 
I Px'l 
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dEU 1 
dz 10x1 
"1 
p+ (pyp 
, 
a) 
1- Lo +v (21) +1 
I (map p) 
/26 2 4F 
>0 
Thus at X0, dEU is increasing in x, I and we would expect X* to lie further 
dx 
to the right 
i*eq Xx0 
Proposition 5.2 If the consumerts objective function is given by (5-8)p 
then there exists a unique pair of decision variables 
xI and y, which mozimise the objectiveo 
Comparative Statics 
Proposition 5.3 A consumer will have a higher level of expected utility, 
the less risky is the initial prior distribution of. the 
unknown parameter. Risky again being defined as a high 
initial variancet which is the inverse of the degree of 
precision* 
Expected utility increases as the consumerts initial degree of precision 
increases. 
Now consider the effect of a change in the initial degree of precision 
aa the optimal demand for the new good in the first period: 
ProPosition 5-4 x*l is mcnotonica: L3, y non-increasingg in ý 
Thus as the degree of confidence increasesp and hence the risk of a false 
mean falls, the consumer purchases less of the new Good, 
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This is because the higher is the dogreo of precision, the more 
confident the consumer is that the prior mean is the true mean, the less 
the value of information and consequently there is less need to sample and 
hence xI falls. Consumers demand more information about unfamiliar products* 
Consider the effect of a change in the initial advertising statement 
-gol on the demand for the new good in the first period 
Proposition 5.5, x1 is monotonically ncn-increasing in poe 
d2 ELT, 
Proof dx dx I CIP 0 
d1lo 
d2 EU 
2 
dt, 
We know from the second order conditions d2EU I1 '0 
dxý 
Prom (5-10) 
VIO +v+I ++ 
d2 EU, 0- 20 1 
12 
4r 
<0 
dx dpo x2 (rx + 
(5-16) 
1 
As po increases the optimal purchase of the new good falls. It can be 
seen that the effect of an increase in V. is non-increasing both on the first 
period consumption of xI and the indirect utility function for the second 
period. 
Proposition 5-5 appears counter intuitivet since we might expect that 
as the expected value of the random variable increasest reflecting an expected 
increase in product qualityg the demand for the good would also increasee 
Howevert this proposition shows that this is not the case, 
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Equation (5-16) is made up of two parts: the direct effect of a change 
in vo on current utility and an indirect effect through changing the informa- 
tional aspect in the next period. 
Consider firstly the direct effect* We know from equation (11) in 
Chapter 2 that the effect of a parameter chanp on the demand for a E; ood can 
be compared with the income and substitution effects of an implicit price 
change. 
If we write out equation (5-1) as a single period problem in its 
characteristics form: 
max Ua- 
Co Y7 
Soto 
- 
pyy +W00-M 
)10 +I 
where c FF' lix, ire and e 
24 
This yields the optimal demand for the characteristio 
m (5-17) 
ir + cy 
The effect of a change in the implicit price on the demand for the characteristi 
can be found by differentiating equation (5-17) 
de m .' 
fl: +, )'. 
dir 0 
-f 
---u , 
, Ire c »/ -py cý ß 
Substituting (5-18) into (2.11) gives 
dx m Px m 
x 
ol lpx XU -a +T 
du -U2 'p x YP3 
7 
o"o 
dx IZ0 as px: I+I pjc + 
dil 2 vleo 
I 
i. 1ý 
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.i 
i. e. 0< cc p -ýc y 
dx 1<0 
d1l 
Thus we can see that the reason for the inverse relationship between product 
quality and demand, is due to the second term in equation (2*11)* The 
structure of the utility function is -such that an increase in product quality 
means that the same level of utility can be achieved by purchasing less of the 
good, 
The indirect effect of a change in V on x*: the second term in equation 01 
(5-16) can be explained as follows, Differentiate (5-5) with respect to 
the message provided by the consumer's experience: 
'Ax27- IIxl r 
dZ rx 1+ W1 -11P 
ae X, y 
X 4+x, 2-r + 2px + F 1 
(p a)/2 
24ý+x, r 2r 
7pý e 
dx 2 But as 0 dx2 -* 0. If i-pa_ define 
/ 
dZ- as the message effectq. then 
: d7e 
the message effect is reduce d as U0 increases. Thus the higher the levol of 
UO, the more insensitive is the demand for the new good in the second period 
to the experience actually observed. But if commodity choices become 
independent of the information obta-imed, from samplingp then the consumer will 
not bother samplingr and x* is reduced* I 
Proposition 5.6 x* is monotonically non-increasing in r. I 
This pro position suggests that an increase in the underlying 
distribution generating the random variables more widely dispersed. 
The cons=er will have to take more observations in order to hold the 
same degree of confidence about the subjective mean of the distribution. 
I 
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observations; the optimal SaMP18 size increases* 
The table below and the figures illustrate these comparative statio 
results* There is an internal solution for all the parameter valuesp which 
makes sense with convex preferences* Comparing (ii) with (i)f ue see that 
an increase in 0, increases the demand for x1 40 This shows that an increased 
preference for the new good causes the consumer to purchase more* Row (iii) 
and figure 5iii illustrate proposition 5-5: an increase in ýbj reduces the 
demand for the new good. A reduction in the price of the new good not sur- 
prisingly increases the demand for it as shown in (iv)e Finally we consider 
changes in the variance. A reduction in the consumer's degree of confidence 
about the value of VO being the true value, increases the demand for x,. 
The reduction in f in (v-) also reduc es expected utility* This effect of 
on xI and EU I can be contrasted with propositions 4-4 and 
4-5- In the last 
row and figure (vi) an increase in the underlying degree of precision rt 
reduces the demand for the new good. Thus an increase in the underlying 
variancef increases the demand as shown in proposition 5.6. 
Table 5A 
M 110 x EU at -x 
1.0 160 200 165 1-0 1-0 1-0 48 -0.06867 
100 290 200 165 1-0 1-0 
. 
1-0 55 -0.10629 
(iii) 100 100 2*0 165 5-0 1-0 1-0 13 -0-01695 
(iv) 1.0 1.0 1.0 165 5-0 1-0 1-0 20 -0-01544 
(V) 1.0 1.0 2.0 165 1-0 1-0 0-1 77 -2-36939 
(vi) 100 1.0 2oO 165 1-0 10-0 1-0 44 -0-05482 
4 
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x1ol Figure 5v 
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conclusions 
'Ihis chapter has included a concave utility function and a likelihood 
function which is skewed. The previous chapter considered a linear utility 
function, and consequently for particular parameter values generated comer 
solutions such that the consumer purchased one good or the other. Here 
though, the introduction of convex preferences, means that the consumer 
always purchases a mixture of-the two Goods, As previously, the. opportunity 
for learning means that the consumer purchases more of the new good than if 
the ability to learn did not existo The importance of the distribution 
generating the random variables being skewed is evidenced by proposition 5.6: 
as the degree of skeuness increases the consumer purchases more of the new 
good; he has to sample more. The effect of an increase in the subjective 
degree of precision on the demand for the. good is exactly opposite for the 
case of the C. E. S. utility function and the linear one. 
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Appendices 
Proposition 5.2. Proof* 
d2 EU, 
-- 21. <0 
d2y3 
y1 11 
,o+I 
and d2 EU =- 2ae 
" 4) 2r 
+ 
0EV2 
dx 12x13 dx Iz 
+ /2' 
and dF EV2 , 
-1 
(aopp )0 [1 - 16(rx, 
- 32M )4 
dx 12 
p -2 
and 
JýU 
Id 
2EUI d2 since d* 0 
22 dy I dx I. dx I dyl dx 1 dy I 
- 11 0+1+I- it +v+I 
and 2 20 e 2P 2r +10 pxp. 
/2 0 
)e 'Z- 4. r. 
[1 
_ 16(rx, +. ý" -7 3 32,1 ý4 yx+ 
>0 
Now suppose there are two values of x, 9 ±1 and I- that maximise EU 
then there must be a local-minimiser somewhere between and I Then the 
oonditions for a minim= are dLU 0 and d 
2EU 0, 
dx dx 12 
But we have rho-wa above that d2EUI. -C 01 so that minimum can not exist 
dx 
and there is only one maximising val of X10 
Proposition 5.3 Proof, 
ýjj 0++ 
dzjl - 
2r 
9+ dUT, 5 
-x ra dý do 
tio +I+11 
'0 2r 
p )/2 
110 +v+ 
where. dEV 2 spxe +2 (cx 0 pý e dv,. 
20 
1 UT 
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where dv I Xý r2+ nc 
21 
402 (rx, + 
0 
9, dEU I 
ý' 
do 
Q. E. D. 
vwmlffi-mmý 
Proposition 5.4, Proof* 
dx d2 EU, 
dr =jdý 
d2 EU I 
dx2l 
Again, we knoxtrom the second order conditions that the denominator is 
negative. 
From (5-9) -110 +1 +1 
d2 EU = 
2r 
+d 1 
2W2 
dx I do _ 
20 
VO ++v2 
-where d2 EV 2= 
(ct opxpv 
2. 
e (rx + o) dy - 2(rx + 0). 
'T d 
I 1=4 
-4-RFx, - + o), 
1ý 110 +v+10 
=-( %Opxp v)2e04. 
fx2r2+ rýx +0+2 
.-II 
(rxl+t 
(rx 1 +0, 
)4 22 
4f 
2 d EU 10 dx 0 
dx I clo 
Tf 
9,, E. Do 
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Zropostion 5.6, Proof 
Differentiate equation (5-9) wort. r 
-110 +I+ 110 +v+ 
d2E1J =-08 
: Fo ffr' + (asp p )/2 0 
4r 
I T-' 
-- 
x V- 
-1 + 44 dx I dr 2x 1r2 4M 
T-rx-l 
(rx: + 0)2 I! Lv _ .1 2] _ 
2(rx I+ ý)x 1 -, dr 4r 
and dv 
1/2ýx 
;74 rx, -ýLOI 
So d2EU Og which means dx 
*< 00 
dx I dr dr 
Chapter 6 
Learning with a Non-Sym3me'tric Prior 
0 
- 158 -I 
1, Introduotion 
In this chapter we again consider the implications of the ability. 
to learn for consumer behaviourt but this time we concentrate on changing 
the structure of beliefs. We revert back to using a linear utility 
functiont but suppose thel, the consumer's beliefs about the value of the 
unkno-wn parameter are not sy=aetrically distributed about the value given 
by the advertising message. Instead it is assumed that the consumer 
believes that the advertising message states the most optimistic view of 
product qualityp and that the actual level of product quality is less 
than this stated value. In Chapter 5P we assumed the likelihood function 
was not symmetricy now we suppose the prior distribution is non-symmetrice 
Consumerts distrust of advertising accuracy is built into the subjective 
distribution, We are interested in how behaviour is affected as this 
distrust becomes more acute* 
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20 Derivation of the Posterior 
Consider a sceptical consumer with a linear utility function 
E ut - yt + E(e) xt 
, Ihe distribution of e is known by the consumer to be uniform with 
parameters (01 z), but the value of z is not known. 
E(e) = Jrc f(c) dc Ve 
where f(e) =1 04 Ez 
0 
otherwise 
E 'ut yi +Z Xt 
F 
The consumerts subjective beliefs about the prior distribution of z are 
given by f(z) -which is a form of the Inverse Pareto Distribution with 
parameters (ap b)* 
f(zJaq b) a+Iza for 0-; z< b 
ba + 
0 
otherwise 
f(z) 
0 
Diagram 6,, l 
z 
Lemma 6.1: To show that f(z) is a proper density function 
.rf 
(z) dz -I Yz 
b 
Proof: ff(z) dz I (a + 1) z dz 
0ba+1 
b 
a+a+ 
ba +a+0 
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ba+ 
a+a+ 
2. E. D. 
In fact the Inverse Pareto Distribution is a simple proportional trans), - 
formation of the beta distribution with parameters (a + 11 1)*/ 
We suppose that b is a parameter in the utility function supplied 
by the firm in the form of an advertising statement,, Consequently the 
consamer is sceptical aboat -the accuracy of b being the true value of 
the unknown parameter in the uniform distribution. The higher is b 
the higher is the mean of the uniform distribution* 
But although the consumer is dubious about the accuracy of the 
advertising statement, he still believes that the true value of z is 
somewhere in the vicinity of bt though to the left. Thus we arrive at 
the skewed distribution, Tlie other parameter a can again be thought 
of as a measure of the consumer's degree of confidence in the value of 
b representing the trae value of z; since low values of a mean that the 
distribution is more spread cut than a large value of a* 
As previously in a two period problem we need to derive the posterior 
distribution of the unknown par=eter z. 
Consider first the mean of the prior distribution* 
Lemma 6.2: The expected value of a random variable with an 
Inverse Pareto Distribution and parameters (at b) 
isb a+l (a 
+ 2) 
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b 
Proof E(Z) ma Ia+19 za +I ciz 0 ba +I 
i0e. + 12 
Q. E, D, 
Lemma 6.3: The posterior distribution of z is given by 
g(ZI -- 
(a -x+ 1) Za-x boc. z b 
ba-x+. l -b 
a-x+ 
0 
Proof : 
where b0= max(c, f*e**9 cx) 
With each unit of x that is consumed, the consumer observes the 
quantity of the characteristic : the consumer observes (c, *oe*o 
The distribution of each observation'given the parameter z is: 
f(cjlz) -1 i fo for ci at z 
otherwise 
since the consumer knows that each Ei comes from a uniform distribution 
(01 Z)* If each of the cI are independently and identically dist ributed, 
then the joint distribution can be written as: 
: r(el . 6446 tx [Z) = : r(ellz) 
f(CZIZ) 00000 f(Ejtiz) 
1. V Ei. gg z 
x z 
0 otherwise 
Bat if each Eiz then max c11; zf (Ci ..... clz) is the likelihood 
function of the samplet given the parameter z. Bayes, Theorem states: 
g(zl. ) f(c, *4D*ee c, 
lz) f(zial b) 
I" (a +z for 04z4b 
zx bý6 
+ and b 0' cV 
0. o g(z1.. ) «a++110 z2, 
,' bo 4z<b 
b 
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Making the posterior distribution into a proper distribution function 
(a -x+ 1) za ýxVz4b 
a-x+1a-x+ b. -b0 
Q. E. D. 
Lemma 6.4: To show that g(zl. ) is a proper density function 
b 
.r g(zi. 
) dz 
bo 
bax 
Proof: r (a -x+Z dz 
b0ba-x+1ba-x+ 
0 
b 
a-x+I. Zý a -M +I 
ba-x +1 -b a-x+l 
[ý-X+llb 
00 
Evaluating the definite integral 
a-x+ a-x +. b bo 
ba -x+1-b a-x+ (a:: x+ 1) 0 
QOEOD* '- 
g(zl - 
Diagram 6*2 
z 
Diagram 6.2 shows the shape of the derived posterior distribation. 
Lemma 7he posterior meaa of z is given by E(z) 
E(z) a-x+Ia-x+2_a-x+2 ,*b bn a-x+a-x+1a-x+2 b bZ 
b 
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b 
Proof E(Z) Iz 9(z) dz 
bo 
ba-x+ 
x+Iz dz 
a-x+1-a-x+ b b6 bo 
a-x+2a-x+2 a-x+Ieb bn 
a-x+2a-x+1a-x+I b b6 
Q. E. D. 
Zý 
The Model with a Linear Utility FlUnction 
Thus the objective 'faced by a c=s=er in a two period enviro=ent 
is 2 
max EU =z1, ýt + Et(z) ýit (6.1) 
Yl t'l 
It-I (I + i) 
b 1.1 2. 
] 
, where Et(z) is the expected value of the unknown parameter, and the 
time subscript indicates that the expectations operator varies over 
time. In the first period E, (z) is given by Lemma 6,2, In the second 
period the consumer uses the posterior mean derived in Lemma 6-5- 
But at the start of the first period the value of boy the maximum value 
of the observed levels of product quality consumed in the first period, 
is still unobserved, and is itself a random variable* 
Lemma 6.6: The conditional distribution of bo given the value z is 
xbX. 
I 
0 
x z 
Proof: The distribution of bo is recluired 
Fbo(o) m Pr[bo -C *+: Pi 
lej. 
<Of cý -; Oo*ooo cxI1 . 01 ý 
since if bo = max c, .... c then the largest C is less than 
only if all the c. 's are leas than I 
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0 
*0 xx 
F (0) -iE PX, bo 
if it is assumed that the (cloooo, cx) are independently and identically 
distributed* 
fb (0)' cl F« m '% , 
Wim -1t (0) 
0 bo(ß) 
dß 
Fbr a uniform clistribution 
f (b0) 
z 
b0Z 0) 
.7 
bo 04 bo 4z 
_Q. 
E. D. 
But Lemma 6,6, only gives the conditional distribution of boy which depends 
on the unknown parameter z. Ile need to obtain the unconditional dis- 
tributiono 
Lemma 6.7: The unconditional distribution of b0 is given by 
X a+ bo 
x+04 
bo, 4 b At- x+ 
X 
Proof: Theorem of Total Probabilities states 
b 
: r(b0) ff (bj z) f (z) dm 
0 
b 
006=jx 
JO -,. (. +, ) Z" dz 
0Zxba+1 
x f (bo) bo ý1 
vr- 
and the range of bo necessary to make it into a proper distribution is 
I 
ba-x+ (a+1 
Q. E. 
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The consumer maximises expected utility in the final period with respect 
to the purchases of the two goods x. and y.; but if we assume a linear. 
budget constraintl then the problem can be written as a function of one 
variable: 
ma--r EU -X- (692) 22%+ E2(Z) jr2 
22 
where E2 (z). is given by Lemma . 
6-5- 
First order conditions yield: 
cl(ELT2) p+ E2(2) 
dX2 2 
If 2p < E2(7, ) *00ý1,3*, 2 2m, Mp 
p 
If 2p > 
-%(Z) 
'-! ýX2 ý0 
Then the expected indirect utility function can be. written out as: 
ba-x+Ix (a+1 
FO 
EV2 =1 M2 f (bo), db 0' +. 
- 
M2 *E (z) f (bo) dbo 
(6-3) 
0 bo 7.22- 
where b* satisfied 2p - (a -x+I (b a-x+2-ba-x+ 
2) 
0 (a -x +2 
9- 
(ba -x+1-ba-x+I 
and f(bo) is given by Lemma 6.7. 
At the start of the first period the consumer faces the follmdng problem: 
mjx EU 1mx1- px 1+E, 
(z) x, +1% (6-4) 
1 
where E, (z) is given by Ioemma 6.21 and EV2 is given by eclaation 
First order conditions yiild 
d EIT p+b* (a + 1) +t-- dEV (6-5) 
dx 1r (a + 2) 1+i cix I 
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The consumer sets (6-5) equal to zero to obtain the optimal 
As previously the expressim will be complext and the 
solution can only be found numericallye In fact the expression 
this time is so complex that the comparative statics' results are 
only given for numerical values of the parameters* Table 6.1 gives 
the solutions to some comparative statics' exorcises* 
Table 6.1 3/ 
b EU at X* 
1-5 1*0 0.36 0-72 1-05 1.44749 
1-4 1.0 0.36 0-72 0-75 1-44244 
1.0 100 0-34 o. 68 0.7 1.36675 
(iv) 0.9 100 0*34 0.68 0.45 1#36191 
(V) 2,0 1.0 0.38 0-76 0*85 1-52095 
(vi) 2,0 1.05 0.38 0-76 1,80 1-563125 
(Vii) 2,0 100 0*3805 0-76 0-70 1-52038 
Row (i)t illustrated by figure 6(i)t shows that an internal 
solution exists* In a single period problemo from Lemma 6*2t 
for the given parameters, the expected value of the unknown 
variable is 0.359; so with a linear utility function and P-0.36t 
the consumer would not purchase any of the new good* Hovieverg 
-the positive value of information in this adaptive case means 
that one unit of xI contributes more to utility than just its 
direct effeetv and the consumer does purchase the new good. 
Row (ii)p and fieure 6(ii)t show the effect of a reduction in 
the'Parameter a* This controls the. beliefs of the conmi r 
- 167 - 
in that the value b provided by the firm is the true upper limit of 
the underlying uniform distribution* If a-0, then f(z) is a 
uniform distributiont and the consumer has no coafidence in b being 
the true valueo Fbr 0a<IIf (z) is concave ;a- 19 f (z) 
is linear; and for a> f(z) is convex* This is illustrated 
in diagram 6-3- 
: r(z) 
Diagr= 6-3 
a3 > Vý > al = 
b 
As a increasest the consumer places greater reliance on the value 
of b being the trae valueo Rows (ii), (iii) and (iv) show that an' 
increase in a increases-xTo Thus as the ocnsumer becomes more con- 
fident of the truthfulness of the advertising messaget he purchases 
mom of the new good, and further his expected utility increases. 
Row (vi), illustrated by figures 6(iii)t and row (vii)t illustrated 
by figure 6(iv)t in comparison with the parameter values in Row (V)t 
show that as expected : an increase in b increases x*- and LU and 
an increase in p reduces xf and EU 
) 
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Conclusion 
The results show that in line with Chapter 4t information 
aquisition rwans that '11, he decision variable in -the f irst period will 
have an internal solution, for the distributions ocnsidered here* In 
comparison to Chapter 41 an increase in the parameter a, which 
represents the consumer's beliefs about the accuracy of the 
advertising messaget increases the value of the decision variable 
md increases the value of expected utility* 
Notes 
1/ This is shown in Appendix 6.1 
2/ See Appendix 6.2 for the solution to b 
3/ The numerical results ax-o calculated for values of -the decision 
., is because variable between 0 and 2 in intervals of 0-05- This 
if am0 then the upper limit in equation (6-3) will be negative 
if the optimal value of xI exceeds unity, Thus x is constrained 
to take on values in the range (0*2)t and ocnoequently the income 
variable is scaled down accordingly* 
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A2pendix 6.1 
To show f(z) - (I + a) za is a transformation of the beta distribution* 
ba+1. I 
The general form of the beta distribution is 
f (X) .i. Mp -I (I - X)" -10 .4 XC. I B(pp q3 
where B(pp q) - r(p ) r(q) 
r1p + qy 
Let p-Ia, q-I 
B(l + a, 117 
and B(I + a, 1) = r(i + a) r(i) r(i + a) I 
r(z + a) (1 + a) r(l + a) I+a 
i. e. f(x) 0+ a) xa04x41 
Now if X-2 so 04z4b 
dx =I dz 
Then (I + a) X" ax = (I + a)--Z" dz 
ba+I 
which is the inverse Pareto distribution, 
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iLDponaix 6e2 
in order to solve the polynomial in (6.3) forb 8 we mcq make an 
approximation* 
We have: bax+2bax+2 0 2p (a x+ 21 (6,, 6) 
a-x+Ia-x+1 (a x+1 b bo- 
we approximate ba-x+i by expanding ba "x+i around the point, b, 00 
b a-4x+i:: L,. ba-jc+i + (a -x+ i)(bo - b) ba 
+i 
0 
+ (a -x+ i) (a -x+i- 1) (b 0- b)2 ba-x+1 
-2 
2 
Ih. k=o the substituion for ba ýx+2 an cl bax+I 
in (6-3). 
00 
b* az 2b (2p - b) +b 0 b(aý. - x+ 1) - 2p (a - x) 
I 
Chapter 
Multi-period Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter we wish to extend the results and implications 
Chapter 4 into a many period environment. Again we consider the 
introduction of a new product whose quality is unknown by the 
consumer. 
An extension of Chapter 4 would be to construct a forward- 
. 
looking optimal plan over many time periods. ; Given his current 
beliefs, the consumer works out the optimal purchases of the good 
over all future periods, knowing that his knowledge will accumulate 
as he progresses. However his particular plan only exists for 
one period, since the consumer having purchased the optimal first 
period quantity of the good, changes his beliefs, and constructs 
a new optimal plan. Of more interest is the value. of the consumerts 
actual purchases, in the first period of each revised optimal plan, 
Both the marketing and technological diffusion literatures 
(1). 
are 
concerned with the concept of a product life cycle, and observe 
that the shapes of such cycles have the general form of diagram 7-1. 
Sales 
Time 
Intro- arowth Maturity Decline 
duction 
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The cycle is characterised by four stages. Following the 
introduction stage, when sales increase only slowly, the cycle 
enters the growth phase where a rapid increase in sales occurs. 
The cycle is convex over this section. However the cycle turns 
concave and levels out into the mature stage, before sales 
eventually decline. The length of time a product remains in any 
one stage will depend upon the individual characteristics of 
the product, The reasons given for the convex and then concave 
shape of the cycle is normally in terms of the diffusion of - 
information between individuals. In the first period, one person 
buys the good and informs two other people of its advantages. 
In the second period these two consumers each tells two more, and 
t 
this process generates a convex curve. However, after a time 
2 
the economy runs out of uninformed people and the cycle flattens out. 
In this chapter, we provide an alternative explanation to the 
'stylized-factt of the shape of the product life-cycle, without 
making any assumptions about the diffusion of information. In 
fact we claim that even in a world of isolated individuals it is 
still possible to obtain a product life-cYcle like the one in the 
diagram. The results are generated by the consumer's desire to 
gain information and then how he acts once the information hass been 
received. We argue that learning affects consumer behaviour in 
two ways: firstly consumer behaviour is affected by the knowledge 
that the consumer has the ability to learn about unknown variables; 
secondly the accumulation of past knowledge affects the amount of 
information that the consumer has before him in the current period. 
Stoneman '(1981) investigates how the interaction of Bayesian learning 
-'176 - 
with an uncertain environment produces a sigmoid diffusion curve. 
He considers the problem of. a firm deciding-at each point in time 
the proportion of a new technology to adopt. He assumes "that the 
firm acts in a myopic manner", that is, does not look ahead to see 
that current decisions affect future parameters, Farther he does 
not consider the'case of a firm rejecting the new technologyq on 
the basis of his experience showing that it fails to perform. 
He is able to generate a sigmoid diffusion curve for the individual 
firm, essentially by the process of the variance of returns being 
reduced through time. But the curve that is generated, is really 
the optimal plan of the firm conditional on all the information 
available in the current period. It is a series of optimal single 
period problems which the firm computes in the present, given the 
expected value of the observations that he expects to observe in 
the future. In this chapter we emphazise the importance of current 
decisions being made with reference to future utility. - The 
consumer leans over time whether the product is good or bad. This 
in general does not produce a sigmoid curve for the individual but 
when behaviour is aggregated over individuals, it does for both 
products that in the long run are adopted, and those that axe rejected. 
In the next section of this chapter we look at a general 
solution to the optimal plan. In Section 3 we see how the solution 
to the optimal plan is modified by actual consumption patterns over 
time, in the light of information received. In the fourth section 
we look at the trend in demand elasticities along the life cycle, 
In Section 5, we aggregate the results of Section 3. 
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2. A General Solution to the Optimal Plan? 
We can distinguish between two types of demand profiles: 
the consumer's planned profile which is worked out at the onset of 
the problem, and his actual consumption profile which shows his 
actual purchases of the good as he moves along in time and updates 
his expectations, 
In the first case, the knowledge that he is able to learn 
about the unkno-wn parameters in the problem for use in future 
periods, affects the consumer's current decisions, In the second 
case, the consumer's experience in the past affects his current 
decisions, 
To solve the first problem, we set up a dynamic programing 
framework and the solution is found by backward induction. This 
was done in Chapter 4, for a two period environment, but now let 
the number of time periods, t, be t ll .... T. Then the 
problem in (4-9) can be restated as 
1 
max ElJt = Eut + I+-, EVt+j 
, It 
The consumer solves his optimal plan, by choosing the optimal 
decision variable in the final period, xT This optimal value 
will depend upon the purchases of the new good in the previous period 
and his experience from the previoiI6 period. 
(, 
T-l' 'T-1) 
-lT8- 
The consumer obtains the indirect function from these optimal 
values, and weights this maximum value function for every possible 
value of the random variable 'T-1. The consumer steps back one 
period, and solves his decision problem in T-1, taking account of 
the effect of XT-1 on the expected maxim= value function in the 
final period. This backward induction process is carried on back 
to t=1. At each stage, the optimal decision variable is 
specified as a function of the previous consumpt. ion le-Tel. Having 
solved the problem for x*, the consumer will have a planned optimal 1 
consumption pattern, conditional upon all the information available 
at t=1. 
We wish to examine the optimal consumption plan of the consumer. 
Firstly we ask the question: is it possible to obtain an optimal 
consumption plan with a linear utility function? The short answer 
is, no. The solution is difficult because at each stage, the 
consumer needs to solve a maximisation problem and obtain an optimal 
solution to the decision variable. In practice it is not possible 
to obtain an analytical solution to this problem, simply because the 
utility function other than in the final period is extremely 
complex. And as we move further back to period 1, the utility 
function becomes progressively more complex. The problem can be 
solved numerically but the algorithm required to compute the backward 
induction process from t=T to t=1 will be large. In chapter 4 
we obtained numerical solutions for x in a two period model. IrX 
aT period model the numerical solution to xT_ 1 would be substituted 
back into the utility function and the expected indirect utility 
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function could be computed for EVT-1 by integrating over the 
observations from T-2. This numerical process could be carried 
back to t=1. Alternatively a simple three period optimal plan 
can be solved by making the approximations outlined in Section 4. 
This allows us to obtain analytical solutions for both x* and x* 32 
which can then be used to solve the first period problem 
numerically. 
Actual Consumption Patterns 
The previous section considered the derivation of 
a consumer's optimal planned consumption profile* But there is- 
no reason why the consumer should necessarily stick to this plan 
as he moves along. His optimal consumption plan will vary at 
each point in time. Thus at the beginning of the first period, 
having worked out his optimal plan, the consumer purchases the 
optimal amount of the new good in the first period. Having 
carried out this purchasing decision, the consumer observes the 
results and updates the parameters accordingly. I 
With. his set of updated parameters he moves into the'6econcl 
phase of his consumption plan. He then purchases the optimal 
amount of the new good, observes the realisation of the random 
variablet updates the parameters, and moves into the third period. 
He carries out this process for t= 11 ... T. At each period he 
has an optimal consumption plan, though he only actually purchases 
the initial optimal value from any particular plan. By looking 
at this stream of initial purchases from each plan, we will see how 
the consumer actually behaves. To calculate his actual behaviour, 
we need to make an assumption about the experience that the 
consumer observes; and in order to simplify the problem we need to 
reduce the length of the opt. imal plan. Suppose that, although we 
allow the consumer to make decisions over a number of time periods, 
- iso - 
in each period he is only allowed to look forward one period. 
That is, the optimal plan consists of optimal decision variablesp 
given current information over only two periods. In the current 
period, the consumer knows that he will be making decisions over 
a number of periods in the future, but he only considers the impact 
of learning and the value of information on utility in the next period, 
To obtain the optimal plan the consumer maximises the fle: xible 
budget constraint of the linear utility function discussed in 
Chapter 4- His optimal plan changes over time as new information 
becomes available. How does this new information affect the 
optimal plan? Suppose the consumer has solved the optimal two- 
period plan in equation (7-1) for t=1, and purchased a quantity 
of the new good x, e He then observes the realis. ation of the 
random variable el * We impose a time subscript on this 
experience, to show it is the observed sample statistic from the.,, 
T first period. Suppose- cI= Vo Then the consumer updates 
his subjective beliefs to obtain a new estimate of the mean, that - 
he will use as his prior in the next decision problem. 
+ n) xi 
X1 + 
t7.2ý 
02 1 
+x* I 
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where x, denotes the quantity of the Optimal purohazos of the new 
good in the first period, 
Armed with these new beliefs in (7.2), the consumer moves into the 
second period and faces the following problem: ' 
max EU x+I EV 2 1+i 3 (7-3) 
x2 
where EV 3 is the expected maximum value function 
for the third 
period. It is computed by assuming that the consumer only looks one 
period ahead, and at the beginning of the second period acts as if the 
third period is the final period. 
C2 
EV f (7c Cc dc 3 2-- (1 + XT Cyl PX21 2)a7c2 + 'p! 2ý '2) 2 
C2 
where 112 
1+ 2X2 
I+ X2 
and cN it 2r+ 12 
and P, and 0, are defined by equation(7-2). 
The income variable in (7-4) is different from the income 
variable specified earlier, Previously income was given to the 
consumer at the beginning of the problem, and the consumer, 'in 
the fle3: ible budget case was allowed to spread this income over 
(7-4) 
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two or three periods, We still wish to refain the flexible nature , 
of the budget oonstraint, but do not wish to make it too flexible. 
For example if consumption today affects the budget tnt periods 
hence, where n is a large number, then the solution to the 
problem is difficult; since we have to then specify an In' period 
budget constraint. Instead we suppose that the consumer receives 
a fixed income stream MI every period I butis allowed to 
allocate this income over the current period and the next period, 
Bat of course at any time the consumer not only has income M bat 
also accumulated savings from the previous periods. The budget 
constraint can be written aB 
Yt+i + Plt+l =m t+l + 
(1+r)' jMt + Bt - (yt + pxt) (7-5) 
t-1 
and Bt 
I (m 
T- Pxd 
(1+r) t-T 
T- 1 
We are making a similar assumption with respect to the length 
of the budget constraint as we did in respect of the optimal plan. 
There, the consumer was allowed to look only one peri od ahead even 
though he was aware that there were many periods in front of him. 
Here again, the consumer recognises tha. t savings today can be used 
tomorrow, but not that savings today can be used further ahead, 
even though the consumer observes that today's income includes 
accumulated savings over many past time periods. If income streams 
are constant: Mt=M t+1 =M t+i = M, then let 
++- + 
B) (7.6) 
and the budget constraint can be written 
Yt+l - (1+r)' ( Sf - pxt )- pxt+l (7-7) 
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The consumer now maximises (7-3) and obtains an optimal value for 
x21 which consequently represents his actual purchar-os of the new pod 
in the second period. The consumer will again observe the realisation 
of his experience, this time from the second period. Suppose again, 
c2 t. 'Oo - 11 
132 1, lei + 
(110 
01+ 'k*2 
Substituting from (7i, 2): 
2 
132 '-- 'ob - T' xt 
t=l 
2 
(7-8) 
+I Xt 
and ý>2 "01 "» x2= -0 
+i Xt 
.t t=l 
The consumer now moves into the third yeriod armed with his new beliefs: 
(ý12 
1 02) This continual updating process, adapting the optimal pl. - 
in each period, gives the consumer's actual purchases in each period: 
xI, x2 xix We wish to observe this profile. 
In general at any point in time T, the consumer will be looking 
ahead one period into T+1. He must choose a value oý xr to 
maximise his expected utility over the two periods, T and T+1j 
given the updated values of the parameters, which he has been learning 
aboiLt over the last t-II oes T1 periods. Again, the rate 
of interest and the rate'of discount are set equal to one. The 
consumers problem is: 
184- 
max EU., = vr_lx T+ 
EV 
-r+l 
(7-9) 
x 
(M-px 
T 
where EV -r+l 
px T+-p 
{(V. -P) r(M)CIM 
M* 
(i-PX Xr 
) 
-. j2.1 li 0- 
(22*) 
p+2 (X T+0+ 
a7 Z 2ir 
in n f. 10+nw and m* + T-i +++ 
and po 
and 12 Xt 
t=l .. 
It can be seen that over time, as the consumer works out a new 
two period optimal plan, his prior beliefs for each successive plan 
have changed due*to updating the mean and an increased degree of 
precision. By imposing initial valuei on the parameters po, 01 M and p, 
and specifying the discrepancy between the consumerts initial beliefs 
and his experience n, we can solve equation (7 *'9) numeric ally for 
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each time period t- lp ese t, to obtain the time profile of 
optimal purchasee, 
We now carry out a series of comparative statics exercises 
to see the effect of changing the parameter values on the pattern 
of purchases* The most important parameters values are the 
relative values of ', V Ip and The difference between V 00 
and p reflects the difference between initial expectations of 
product quality and price. The value of p0 represents the 
long run expectation of product quality, based on the consumerts 
experience* For a linear utility function, whether the consumer 
adopts the new product or not in the long run depends upon whether 
VO - T, >P The long run equilibrium demand, is either to 
purchase only the new good or to purchase none of it, In examining 
the effect of parameter values on the solution to the model, we are 
interested in the speed of adjustment to the final equilibrium* 
The tables and figures below show the effects of parameter changes. 
In table 7-1 we compare the effect of a difference in initial 
expectations on the pattern of purchases. It can be seen that 
row (i) has U0 ý" p, and row (ii) has V04p, which with a linear 
utility function in a temporally independent environment would result 
in the consumer spending all his budget on the new good in (i) and 
none in (ii). In this case though, the small difference does not 
affect the pattern of purchases. This is illustrated in figures 
7-(i) and 7-(ii). Comparing row (ii) with (iii), the greater is 
long run expectations of product quality, the quicker the consumer 
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Table 7-1 
max time to reach 
110 p X1 steady state 
0.51 0.5 1.0 -0*01 10 26 19 
0.49 0.5 1.0 -0-03 10 26 22 
0-49 0.5 1.0 -0*012 10 22 22 
adjusts to his long run position. Figure 7-(iii) shows a more 
gradu-: al movement. It can be seen from the figures that long run 
equilibrium exhibits a series of blips; these occur because of 
the discrete nature of the decision variables xt is only allowed 
to take on integer values. Of more concern are the much larger 
blips that occur when p< 11 0- 71 
These are illustrated in 
figures iv - vi and table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 
max time to reach 
Vo p .0 TI M i*1 steady state 
(iv) 0-49 0-5 0-01 0.001 10 20 20 
(V) 0-48 0-5 0-01 0-001 10 18 12 
(vi) 0-47 0-5 0-01 0.001 10 16 10 
These oscillations are due to income effects as a result of 
-the flexible budget constraint. It was shown to be optimal not to 
consume any of the old good, since the consumer can always delay 
this decision. The result is that the consumer accumulates savings 
over time, and if he purchases none of the old good either, then all 
20: - 
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his income is saved. The consumer becomes very rich. He is so 
rich that he is prepared to sample once again, even though he is 
extremely confident that product quality is less than the-price. 
But because he does not ýnow this for certain, it is worthwhile him 
sampling again. This explains why the oscillations get further 
apart through time, since to keep on sampling, he must keep accumulating 
more and more income. Also the diagrams show that as the difference 
in quality and price diverge, these oscillations occur less frequently. 
We can also see that the initial sampling period decreasesp as the 
difference between p and 110 increases. In order to overcome 
the problem of these oscillations appearing in the remaining 
comparative static exercises, we impose the restriction that if 
ever xt = 1, and t>1, then xt = IVT, T=tl ... T 
Table 7.3 
110 p 
max 
30ý 
time to reach 
steady state 
(Vii) 0-51 0-5 1.0 0,02 10 19 21 
(Viii) 0.49 0-5 1.0 0.0 10 19 21 
(ix) 0-49 0-5 1.0 -0-005 10 20 39 
The first two rows in table 7.3 show the same long run 
expectation of product quality as 0-49. Bat the former has. a higher 
initial expectation. This difference does not have a great impact 
on the profile of the purchaser. Both cases in figures vii and viii 
look very similar, Case ix shows the profile of a good whose initial 
and long run quality expectations are less than the price, but whose 
long run expectations are less pessimistic than the initial ones. 
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Again the consumer ends up not purchasing the good, but takes 
a long time to reach the long run equilibri=. 
Table 7-4 
max time to reach 
vo pM4 steady state 
0-49 0-5 0*01 0.01 10,18 13 
(li) 0.49 0.5 0-01 0-1 10 10 5 
Both case (x) and (xi) have 11 0' <p and 110-n<po 
In 
the long run the consumer buys neither, but he initially buys more 
of case (x) and takes longer to decide that its actual quality is 
less than its price. In both table 7.4 and (viii) and (ix) from 
7.3, although initial expectations are less than price, and this is 
confirmed by his experience, the consumer continues to 
increase his purchases of the good. This can be explained by 
proposition 4-5, which states that as the degree of precision 
increases, at low levels of precision the optimal quantity of I e-14 
purchases increase. As the consumer accumulates past purchases, 
this acts as an increase in the initial degree of precision. 
Table 7-5 
max time to reach 
110 p TI M steady state 
(Xii) 0-52 o-5 1.0 0.03 10 19 21 
(Xiii) 0.52 0.5 1.0 0*01 10 24 
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Table 7-5 has the initial quality exýectation greater than 
price, but long run expectations fall in both cases, In the 
former they fall below price and in the latter they stay above it. 
4- Elasticities along the Life Cale 
The life cycle shows the profile of optimum demands for the 
good. Each point on the cycle is taken from an associated demand 
curve in each time period. In this section we look at the shape 
of these implicit demand curves, and how they chýnge over time* 
Consider the linear utility function and -the flexible budget 
constraint in Chapter 4. From equation (4-32), we observe that 
if p-v0 is small, and ý is small, then m* 0 This implies: 
2 
co 
1 and f(m)dm 1 
M* 
Differentiating equation (4-30) w*r. t. x1 using (4-32) and 
proposition 4-9 : 
dELJ 
I+r 
(M-PXJ 
+. 
+i v. mf 
(m) dm 
0 i4-i 2p (0+ xl)3/ 
TX 
2' X1 
x 
M* 
Ur 
lio 
mf (m)dm +p 1+i f (m)dm 
(7-10) 
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Setting this expression equal to zero and making use of the 
approximations, we can simplify (7-10): 
(1,1--PX1) 
.4. = (x, + 4) 2p x1 
+0 2p (7.11) 
Solving the quadratic and imposing the restriction that 
x1 >0 : 
I 9ý M (1+r) 
This value of x* can be substituting into (4- 30) to obtain the 
indirect utility function V, 
dx 
Elasticity of demand X is def ined as 
1 
dx dp *x* 
and from (7-12) we obtain ý dp 
111 
dx 1 m(i+r) 
rp -p2 
X= 
P[902 
- 4ýM(Ur) 
2 -", Or 
+ 8f M(l+r) -30 (9 0+8. t M(l+r) 
p 
9e + jý M(l+r)- 
(7-13) 
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We are interested in how this elasticity changes over time. if 
we make the further assumption that 0, that is, that the 
experience the consumer observes is exactly what he expected, then 
the only parameter that changes over time is the degree of precision 
which is affected by cumulated purchases. Thus the movement of 
dx 
elasticity along the time profile is summaxised by 41 
1- 
Proposition 7- If elasticity is measured by equation (7-13), then 
over the life cycle elasticity increases (more negative). 
Proof Differentiate equation (7-13) w. r. t. o 
d2L .6o2 M(I+i)f 
6 8o +8M (1+r) 
2+ 2o M (1+r 
do -pp 
denominator (7-13) 
Bat [denominator 7.131 
2>0, 
and it can easily be shown that the 
numerator of the above expression is alvayý negative 
ad <0: elasticity becomes more negative do 
E, D. 
So tha; t along the life cycle the demand for the prod-act becomes more 
elastic. The intuition behind this result is that in the early 
periods, information gain is high, and the consumer has an inelastic 
demand for sampling purposes* However over time, information 
acquisition means that the marginal value of information declines. 
Thus the consumer no longer demands the good for sampling reasons, 
and conseqaently the demand becomes more sensitive to price changes. 
.L iue Consumption Patterns 
The previous section considered the pattern of an individual 
consumer's purchases once he waz aware that the new good existed. Let 
us suppose that all the consumers in the economy are identical but that 
they become aware of the existence of -this new Good at different points 
in time, Specifically, in each period a different constuaer buys the 
good for the first time. If all consumera are the sarne, ex-cept for 
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this knowledge of the existence of the new product, then the time 
profile of purchases for each individual consumer will be identical; 
but each profile will start one period latev. 
The agCregate time profile will be the summation of the 
individualst purchases. At any point in time the aggreeate purchases 
of the new good will be made up of consumers at different points on 
their individual time profiles. Consumers will be at different 
points on the learning process* 
I 
What will be the shape of the aggregate time profile? Suppose 
that the continual two period optimal plan of the previous section 
results in purchases of the new good being a linear function of the 
time period, up to the point where the budget is exhausted by 
purchases of the new good. If the product is of a high quality relative 
to its price, so that as a result of the consumerts experiencet the 
long run equilibrium is to spend all his budget on the new good, ýhen 
limit X t 
t-q 
xt 
M 
p 
A 
time I Ap ,- 
198 
In the diagram, ABG is the time profile of purchazes for an 
individual who purchases the good for the first time in t0 
CDG is the time profile of an identical individual who becomes aware 
of the good one period later. Each new 6onsumer who enters the 
market will have a similar purchasing profile, To find the aggregate 
profile, we sum the individual profiles vertically. 
If we write the first individualts profile as: 
xa+ bt 0t :5 
M. 
Xt>t p 
The profile for the second individual will be: 
(a - b) + bt 1 :5t :5t+1 
XMt>t+I P 
and total sales at t1 are 
x1= 2a +b 
The third consumer has profile: 
x (a - 22b) + bt 2t :5T+2 
M 
Xt>t+2 
and total sales at t=2 are 
X2 3a + 3b. 
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For the fourth consumer: 
x (a - 3b) + bt 
M 
XF 
+3 
+3 
i 
and total sales at t=3 is 
X3 =* 4a + 6b 
If this process continues, total sales will increase over time 
according to 
X= (t + 1) + b(t 
2+ t) o :5t :5 
This function is obviously convex in t After the point "t has 
been reached the first consumer has exhausted his budget constraint. 
He settles into his long run steady state spending all his money pn 
the new good. Successive consumers also exhaust their budget 
constraint. After point 7 haý been reached, the aggregate profilo-ir. 
(t 1) a+ b(*F 
2+ Tt) +(t- *E) 7<t 
which is linear in t It is linear because as one new 
consumer enters -the market, another one tretirest from experimenting 
and settles into. a, steady state. 
The amount of time taken for a consumer to reach his budget 
constraint defines his steady state purchases of the good. 
a IýTt 
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Define time t' as the time when the last consumer enters the 
market, then by time t+ tt , all consumers and hence the market 
will be Then the steady state market purchases 
will be 
+ 1) 
After point tv has been reached market purchases still 
increase as existing participants move towards their equilibrium, 
but at a decreasingrate. The equation for the aggregate time profile 
becomes 
a(tt + 1) + 15 IT (tt (tt (-tt 
> t, 
It can be seen that the aggregate purchases are concave in. 
_t 
These equations hold for a linear individual time trend, 1)ut we 
would also expect them to display the same shape for any steeply concave 
functions. 
We now return to the consumer's decision problem ir. equation (7-193 
and suppose that at each point in time an additional consumer enters 
the market and all consumers are faced with this decision problem. 
figs. xiv and xv are the aggregate versions of .: 
'L andix, where the number 
of consumers who enter the market, t, = 25- Both diagrams exhibit 
the desired shape. They are convex in the early time periods and 
concave later. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the pattern 
of actual purchases by the consumer over time. We have looked 
at both the individual and aggregate profiles, and have shown that 
the aggregate patterns exhibit the desired sigmoid shapes in the 
early periods; both when the good is adopted, and when it is not. 
Thus we can offer an alternative rationale as to the shape of the 
diffusion curve. Instead of explaining it in terms of communication 
of information between individuals we have argued that individual 
consumer behaviour alone is sufficient to generate its shape. The 
knowledge that he is able to update his subjective beliefs about 
an unknown parameter, affects the cbnsumer's consumption plan. His 
optimal plan at any point in time is also influenced by his actual 
experience from the previous periods, It is the combination of his 
ability to learn and the effect of past learning that generates the 
required time paths. 
The results are obviously dependent upon the form of the utility 
function and the parameter values chosen. However provided that for 
an individual consumer, optimal purchases increase fairly quickly 
over time for a short period at least, then at an aggregate level, 
the curves in figures ýciv and xv will be observed, 
It has been assumed throughout this chapter that the behaviour 
of the firm is relatively passive. The producer of the new good makes 
an initial advertising statement v which is received by individual 
consumers at different points in time. Thereafter the producer does 
not take any further part in the process. Given this passive role of 
the supply side the sigmoid curve is generated by the aggregated 
consumers' desires to learn about the quality of the new good. 
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Notes 
1. '*For example, see Baker (1975), Davies (1979), Midgeley(1977) 
and Gort and Klepper (1982). 
2. Davies (1979) suggests an alternative model of diffusion. 
In a study of 22 process innovations he finds that the shape of 
the diffusion curve can be explained by differences in firms' 
characteristics: size, expectations, attitude to risk and type 
of innovation. Our model suggested here would fit into Davies' 
more general statement, where consumer differences are due to the 
point in time at which they become aware of the new product. 
Chapter 
Value of Information 
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1. Introduction 
In the last chapter we showed how a consumer adjusts his 
optimal consumption plans over time in the light of new information, 
knowing that he is able to gain additional information for use in 
the future. It was shown in Chapter 4 that the use of a Bayesian 
learning process implied an optimal sample size, which enabled 
the consumer to le arn about an unknown parameter, in the most 
efficient way. ent-. -we-m4%an-. aa_q .s *bl 
__alc 
! jkly 
I 
However, this efficient gathering and updating of information 
assumes that the process is costless. The computational 
complexities of estimating an optimal consumption pattern, suggests 
that there will be costs incurred if only in terms of the consumerts 
time needed to solve them. 
Hey (1981) argues that e7aluating utility in every state of,, 
nature is no trivial task; when the cost computation of the 
optimal strategy is taken into account "the optimality of the 
optimal strategy is no longer self evident". 
' 
Hey suggests two alternative strategies for a consumer acting 
4 
in an environment with imperfect information: suboptimal search, 
where the searcher searches optim y with respect to a simpiified 
abstraction of the problem and reasonable search, where the consumer 
searches according to some ad hoc process. 
In this chapter we ask: Is there a more efficient learning 
mechanism? In answering this question we will not attempt to 
fcostt the computational difficulties but will look at some simpler 
decision rules and see'by how much the consumer loses out by 
following these less complex methods. Numerical estimates of the 
- 206 - 
costs of search have been carried out by various authors: 
Stigler (1961), 'Gastwirth (1976) and Hey (1981). These studies 
have the feature that they consider the expected cost of search, 
It may be that the consumer is interested in other moments of the 
distribution of search costs, 
2. Alternative Learning Ifechanisms 
Consider a different learning process. The consumer updates 
his beliefs according to Bayesian rules, but does not bother to 
look ahead in calculating his optimal purchasing decision, The 
consumer maximises single period utility every period, using 
a linear utility function. 
if jit 
if pt <p -). 't+l 
But if every 't+1 is zero, the consumer will never purchase, 
the new good again, and his information set will never changee In 
this case it will always be henceforth optimal to purchase the old 
good. To surmount this degenerate problem, it is assumed that the 
consumer always purchases one unit of the new good, whatever the 
expected level of product quality. No matter how bad a product 
the consumer thinks the new good is, he still experiments with one 
unit every period. So in the case where p>Vt: Xt+1 =1 
and Yt+i =X-P. 
lpl- 
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The consumer observes the actual level 
-of 
product quality 
from the goods or good he has bought and updates his beliefs 
according to equations (4-'15) and (4-16). The general solution 
to this discrete difference equation is 
t 
Vt 0+IxT7T 
T=l 
t 
+ yx 
T 
T--- I 
In the case of a good of which the consumer only purchases one 
unit per period: 
t, 
Ut vo +IiT 
T=1 
+t 
where c is the observation on one unit of the good in each 
period, 
Another type of learning process is where the posterior mean 
is given by an adaptive process. That is, the difference between 
the posterior mean and what was actually observed is a linear function 
of what was expected to be observed and what was observed, 
t+l 
40 
V li y+ Y) 
7 
t+l tt 
The solution is 
t 
ut -v0Yt+ (i Y) 
7T (8.2) 
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This adaptive function does not depend upon the amount of the 
good consumed. The weighting given to the initial beliefs relative- 
to experience is determined by an exogenous parameter y, 
3- Comparison of the Learning Processes 
We will now compare the value of the three learning processes 
in terms of opportunity costs of utility foregone. fGiven a fixed 
budget constraint, the consumer can only consume one good at the 
expense of another. Thus the cost of purchasing one good can be 
considered as the opportunity cost of not consuming the other good, 
Different learning processes will imply different optimal behaviour. 
patterns, we will now compare these patterns, and see if the 
consumer is 'better or worse off using one process instead of another. 
The opportunity cost of imperfect information can be measured 
as we saw in Chapter 3, by the difference between the utility level 
that could be obtained with perfect information and the utility 
level that is obtained, due to making decisions with less than full 
knowledge, These opportunity costs will occur in each period, 
Over time as the consumer acquires further information these 
opportunity costs will diminish; but we can compare learning 
processes in terms of the sum of opportunity costs of utility in 
each period, 
For a linear utility function the consumer will purchase one 
good or the other depending upon the average quality relative to the 
price, Let z be the true mean of the- underlying normal 
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distribution, Then if z>p, the consumer should purchase 
the new good. If his actual decision is to purchase x of the 
new good and yj 
. 
of the old good, then his expected utility is 
M-pX I +zx, *. Thup the expected utility loss EUT, is. givenby: 
= 
zm 
- 
*{ M-PX + zz 1 EUL '11 
= 
= (8-3) 
Thus every additional unit of y, purchased, the consumer can buy 
Ith less x and can be expected to lose z-p units of utility. p1 
By summing over T periods the expected utility loss LI is given 
by 
tT 
T] 
L= (z - p) 
I Xt (8-4) 
Alternatively if p>z then the consumer should spend all his 
budget each period bn the old good, which would yield a utility 
level of M By purchasing (x,, yl) the consumer can be 
expected to lose 
EUL =X- (M - pxj + zx, 
= (8-5) 
Summing over T time periods: 
T 
Ixt (8.6) 
t=l 
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These loss functions are estimated numerically* As in the 
previous chapter we need to make some kind of assumption about 
the observations actually being generated from a normal distribution 
with specified mean*and variance. It is necessary to generate 
random numbers since part of the advantage of the Bayesian process 
over the adaptive is the notion of an optimal sample size, enabling 
new information to be professed efficiently. Hence we might 
expect the adaptive process to be more sensitive to random 
fluctuations, whereas both the Bayesian processes should quickly 
settle into long run equilibrium*_ 
Utility Loss and Risk 
The utility loss from any process will depend upon the 
observations that are taken by the consumer. These observations 
are stochastic since they are generated by a random variable. 
Consequently the utility loss from a particular process will itself 
be a random variable, with an associated probability density function. 
We can construct the sampling distribution by looking at a series - 
of utility losses from any one process. If the utility loss from 
process i. is L, then consumer preferences over the opportunity 
costs of learning can be represented by a'utility function 
2 
or 3. 
Utility is non-increasing in the loss function, The consumer 
will choose the learning processes with the lowest expected utility 
loss, If the consumer is risk neutral then he will be concerned 
with only the mean utility loss, and will adopt the learning process 
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with the lowest mean utility lose. However, if the consumer is 
risk averse he will be concerned with higher order moments of the 
distributions* There is nothing inconsistent in supposing that 
the consumer is risk averse with respect to utility losses from the 
leaxning processes, but risk neutral with respect to his choices 
between the new and old goods (in fact this risk neutral utility 
function was used to calculate the opportunity costs of each process). 
We suppose that the consumer has a utility tree; 
3 
some branches 
of the tree may be risk neutral, others risk averse, The consumer 
makes decisions in stages: he first decides which learning process 
to adopt and then chooses uhich goods to buy, given his optimal 
learning processe 
We are interested here, in comparing the. frequency distributions 
of the actual utility losses from each process, in order to 
determine which process the consumer will choose. Tobin (1958) 
suggests that a consumer"s preferences for risky distributions can 
be summarised by the means and variances. Borch (1969) and Feldstein 
(1969) show that the means and variances are only sufficient for 
a statement about risk preferences if the distributions are normal 
or the utility function is quadratic. Thus if we wish to compare 
the distributions of utility losses for different processes in 
terms of only means and variances, the sampling distributions must 
be normal, or we must be prepared to assume that the utility function 
is quadratic, Samuelson (1970) argues thaý the utility function 
need not be so restricted, provided the frequency distributions are 
compact. However the sampling distributions generated by the 
learning processes here, do not seem to satisfy Samuelsonts definition 
of compactness, 
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A more general approach to preferences between risky 
distributions is stochastic dominance, developed independently 
by Hadar and Russell(1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969). In comparing 
two distributions, the criteria for first order stochastic dominance 
is that the cumulative distributions never cross, If the cumulative 
distribution of utility losses from following process i is P, (L) 
and the cumulative distribution from process j is Gi (L), then 
process i is stochastically dominant over j, for the set of 
all non-increasing loss functions, if 
'G i 
(L) '. Fi (L) V'L 
and Gi (Lk)< F, (Lk) for some Lk. 
The criteria for second order stochastic dominance is that 
the accumulated area under the cumulative distribution of i is 
greater than the accumulated area under j If utility is 
5 
non-increasing in the loss function at =- increasing rate, then 
i dominates j if 
Lk 
Fi (L)- Gi (L) dL ýt 0VL 
and Gi (L) / Fi(L) for some Lk. 
Although stochastic dominance is a very powerful and general 
result, there may be times when the criteria is not satisfied. In 
which caze it is necessary to Go back to comparing distributions in 
terms of preferences for the moments. Scott and Horvath (1980) 
show that the preference direction depends whether the moment is an 
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odd moment or an even moment. For non-increasing utility-funotions, 
the preference direction is negative for positive values of every 
odd central moment and negative for every even centraI moment* 
We will now apply these criteria to the numerically estimated 
loss functions. 
Numerical ResultS4 
We quantify the expected utility losses, by evaluating the 
learning processes numerically. In the terminology of Hey (1981) 
we might call the learning procesd examined in Chapter 4, optimal 
search; the myopic Bayesian learning process outlined in Section 
8.2, sub-optimal search; and the adaptive process reasonable search, 
The main differences between these three processes is that under 
optimal search the consumer is aware of his learning capacity; under 
sub-optimal search, his abilit y to learn also depenhs upon the 
quantity of the new good purchased, though in this case the consumer 
fails to recognise it. Under reasonable search the ability to 
learn is exogenous. The computational effort in these three 
processes, declines from optimal to sub-optimal to reasonable* 
Parameter values are specified, and then the expected uti-lity loss 
is calculated for each process over an environment with 80 time 
periods. Each time this calculation is carried out we will obtain 
a number for the utility loss from each process, By carrying the 
calculation a number of times we will be able to build up a sampling 
frequency distribution of the utility losses from each process. 
In order to build a sampling distribution which is representative 
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of the population distribution, the utility loss is calculated 
500 times for each process. The 500 observations are then divided 
into classes a-ad a discrete frequency distribution is obtainede 
Table 8.1 
Utility Losses 
110 P01Ymz S*00 R. 0. 
M 15-5 5 0-01 0-9 200 4-5 59.5 625-0 59. 5 
(ii) 15-5 5 0.01 0.1 200 4.5 59.5 397.5 59. 5 
I 
Table 8.1 illustrates the case of an initial high Vo , but - 
where z<p. The result is that both the optimal and sub-optimal 
processes have the same pattern of purchases, shown in figure 8(i); 
the consumer initially purchases the new goodp but on the basis of 
his experience immediately reaches the conclusion that z4p 
and only purchases one unit of the good from then on. However in 
the adaptive case, the consumer continues to purchase the new good 
for a number of periods, making the utility loss relatively high 
(Figure 8(ii)). A decrease in the parameter y reduces the utility 
loss for the adaptive process, as it takes less time for the 
consumer to adjust to his experience, We can look at the distribution 
of utility losses from a series of runs of the three processes* 
Because of the extreme values of the parameters: a high p0, which 
always results in the consumer buying the good initially, and 
a relatively low z in the long run the consumer does not buy 
the good. The two Bayesian processes always result in the same 
profile of purchases and hence the same utility loss, It is only 
the adaptive process that exhibits a sampling distribution, This 
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frequency distribution is shown in Figure 8(iii). The second 
order stochastic dominance results are given in Table 8.2, The 
entry in the matrix shows which process is dominant. n. d. means 
no dominance. 
Table 8.2 
Process Sub-optimal Reasonable Optimal 
Sub-optimal 
Reasonable Sub-optimal 
Optimal n. d. Optimal 
Table 8-3 shows the means, variance and degree of skewness of the 
utility losses for the three processes. 'Given the second order 
dominance of optimal and sub-optimal learning over reasonable, 
and the no dominance result optimal and sub-optimal, due to their 
distributions being single points, there is little point stating 
the moments. However this is done to illustrate their irrelevance. 
Table 8.3 
Me an Variance Skewness 
Sub--optimal 
Reasonable 
Optimal 
59-5 
416.35 
59-5 
0.0 
3053-4 
0*0 
000 
33411-4 
000 
Although ths sub-optimal and optimal process yield the same 
opportunity loss, we might expect that the computational cost of 
the sub-optimal is cheapest. Hence the sub-optimal process is best. 
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Table 8-4 
Utility Loss 
110 pmz SOOS R. 0* 
15.5 5.0 0-01 0.9 2-00 4.9 11.9 257.6 15.3 
(iv) 15.5 5.0 0-01 0,1 200 4.9 31.4 132.8 16.1 
Table 8-4 again compares the difference in utility losses from 
having different values for -Y z has been increased to 4.91 130 
that it is now only slightly less than p The effect of this 
small difference in p-z, is that random samples may occasionally 
produce the result that the sample mean is greater than p 
Figures 8(v) and 8(vi) illustrate the parameters in row (iii). 'ýFigures 
8(vii), 8(viii) and 8(ix) illustrate row (iv). It can 
be seen that with y=0.9 , the consumer takes a long time to 
adjust to his experience. Bat in both cases, as the consumer 
approaches his steady state expectation he is subject to a great,. 
deal of variability due- to the closeness of p and z The two 
Bayesian processes do not suffer from this variability since they, 
take account of accumulated experience directly, which reduces the 
impact of sudden o'bser7ations in the current period. In comparing 
the two Bavesian processes, the optimal processes in Figures 8(vi) 
and 8(ix) exhibit internal zolutions to the optimal x* in some t 
time periods, This contrasts with the all or nothing optimal 
values in the sub-optimal cases (Figures 8(iv) and 8(vii), and is 
due to the ability of the consumer to look ahead in the optimal 
case, which as shown in Chapter 4, alters the linearity of* the 
utility function. 
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The frequency distributions for the utility losses for the 
parameter values in row (iii), are illustrated in Figures 8(x), 
8(-xi) and 8(xii). The second order dominance results are given 
in Table 8.5. 
Table 8-5 
Process Sub-optimal Reasonable Optimal 
Sub-optimal 
Reasonable Sub-optimal 
Optimal Sub-optimal Optimal 
It can be seen that given the parameters in row (iii) the 
consumer will be best off following the myopic Bayesian processo 
The reason that this sub-optimal process is better than the optimal 
one is that in both cases the consumer quickly learns that product 
quality is less than price, but in the optimal case, the consume: r-lis 
tempted to verify thisly sampling optimally. Ex post it can be 
seen that he -would be wiser not to sample. 
Table 8.6 
Vo PYMz Utility Loss 
4-5 5-0 0-01 0-9 200 4.9.15.8 82ol 48-0 
Table 8.6 considers the case where z<p and also 'P <p 
Thus the consumer starts off with low expectations of quality, and 
though these expectations increase they are still less than price 
in the long run, Examples of the profiles of purchases for the 
three processes are illustrated in Figures 8(iiii), 8(xiv) and 
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8(xv). These profiles yield the utility losses in Table 8.6 
The calculation is computed 500 times to obtain sampling frequency 
distributions of utility losses for each process and the 
distributions are shown in Figures 8(xvi) and-8(xviii). The 
stochastic dominance results are given in Table 8-7- 
Table 8-7 
Process Sub-optimal Reasonable Optimal 
Sub-optimal 
Reasonable Sub-optimal 
Optimal n. d. Optimal 
It can be seen that although the reasonable process is inferior 
to the two Bayesian ones, we are unable to state which Bayesian 
one is preferred. In order to compare the two Bayesian processes 
we must have information about -the consumer's preferences for the 
moments of the distribution. The first three moments are given 
in Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8 
Me an Variance Skewness 
Sub-optimal 15-722 82.37 2293.1 
Reasonable 135-577 225-37 327.3 
Optimal 15-969 68.65 1418-5 
It can be seen that although the sub-optimal process had a lower 
mean, it has a higher variance and a higher degree of skewness. 
It is not always the case that the reasonable process is 
inferior to the other two. Consider the parameter values in 
Table 8.9. 
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Table 8.9 
110 z 
(V) 0.2- 0-5 0.01 0.9 20 0*4 
0.2 0.5 0.01 0.9 20 0.6 
Row (v) has z<p, and row (vi) z>p The stochastic 
dominance results for each set of parameters is given in Table 8,10 
and the values of the first three moments in Table 8.11. 
Table 8.10 
z 0-4 z=0.6 
SOOO R. 0. S909 R. 0. 
Sub-optimal 
Reasonable Sub-optimal n. d. 
Optimal n. d. Optimal - Optimal n. d. 
Table 8.11 
z= 0*4 -z=o. 6 
Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness 
Sub--optimal 16-51 103-7 4879.2 68.89 9895.4 1037,283.3 
Reasonable 120.02 2544-1 3362.1 45-19 1173.4 74t535-8 
Optimal , 
15.61 61.3 1091.2 54-46 8351-1 1,428-116-5 
When z= 04, we obtain the tnormall result that the reasonable 
process is stochastically dominated with respect to the second order 
by the two other processes. Of these two, the optimal process, 
though not dominant, has a lower mean, variance and degree of 
ske-wness. However., when z-o. 6 , though not stochastically 
dominant, the reasonable process has the lowest mean, variance and 
skewness. 
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The reasonable process also turns out to be the best when 
11 0>p and z>p. 
Consider the parameter values in Table 8,12, 
Table 8.12 
V0pymz 
1.5 0-5 0*01 0.9 20.0 o. 6 
The second order stochastic dominance criteria in Table 8.13 
shows that the reasonable process is dominant*, and the optimal 
process is dominant over the sub-optimal, 
Table 8.13 
Sub-optimal Reasonable Optimal 
Sub-optimal 
Reasonable Reasonable 
Optimal Optimal Reasonable 
Table 8-14 gives the first three moments of the utility loss 
distributions to illustrate the orders of magnitude of the parameter 
values in Table 8,12 
Table 8-14 
Me an V. -). riance Ske-wness 
Sub-optimal 60-41 10,200.7 1,585,627. o 
Reasonable 0.36 5.3 105-0 
Optimal 42.87 8,444.7 11604,774.9 
- 2ZI 
The reason for the dominance of the reasonable process is that 
when both initial expectations and the actual value of product 
quality are greater than price, under the adaptive learning mechanism 
the consumer starts buying the new good and continues to do so 
since the actual quality is greater than price. Because of the 
large value of y, the consumer adapts very slowly to new 
information. The consumer approaches the true value of z from 
above, and therefore the weighting given to random low observations 
is offset by the higher initial beliefs. In both the Bayesian 
processes, the consumer is more likely to be influenced by random 
low values* 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we have looked at the costs of following 
alternative learning processes, in terms of the opportunity costs 
of utility forgone to the consumer. The three learning processes 
compared were taken to represent optimal, sub-optimal and reasonable 
6 
behaviour. All three could be consistent with rationality once an 
allowance is made for the computational costs of each process. 
The calculations were evaluated ex poste, that is, we compared the 
utility losses from each process after the event. We found that 
no one process always dominated the other two, the best process 
depended on the parameter values of the underlying utility function, 
the budget constraint and the true value of the unknown parameter. 
Of course, ex ante, the consumer does not know the value of the 
unknown parameter, and is unable to tell which process will turn 
out to be 'optimal'. The consumer must choose a process to 
maximise his expected utility, which will involve specifying his 
attitude to risk. 
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Notes 
1. Hey (1981), P-55- 
2. In terms of the value of information discussed in 
Chapter 
f(u(z7xz) - U(Z, X)). 
.0 
We are stating that consumers have a set of preferences 
over the loss functions. 
For a discussion of the utility tree and -the separability 
of preferences, see Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980). 
The computer programme used to generate these results 
is given in the Appendix to this chapter. The stochastic 
dominance results in this section are all for second order 
stochastic dominance. 
It is necessary to assume that the utility function is convex 
in-losses, that is the marginal disutility from a small loss 
I 
is greater than the marginal disutility of a large loss. This is 
necessary in order to obtain an unambiguous second order 
stochastic dominance result. 
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Notes (continued) 
In effect each of the learning processes represents 
optimal behaviour given the computational costs. if 
costs are zero, then the ottimal strategy is indeed "optimal", 
but for costs greater than zero either of the other two 
processes may be "optimal", ie the best. 
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Appendix 
PROGRAM AHCPRG 
C COMPOSE WITH ANCICUB NETLIV,: ROUTIN. rARAM & CGS00O: USEFUL. DATAD 
IMPLICIT REAL*a(A-H, O-Z) 
REAL*4 BINF61(700), BINS2(700), BINS3(700), VBEGPVEND 
INTEC-ER LINE(ZO) 
LOGICAL*l OK 
DATA MINBliMINB2rMlNB3/3*9939.0/, MAXBIPMA>, 'Cý2, MAXB3/3* 
-3099.0/ 
DATA Sl, S2, S3, S4, S5, SG, S7rS8/O*0.0/ 
DATA t-IME-IN/701)/, DINSI, BINSý1, BINS3/2100*0.0/, NITER/100/ 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
C GET RUN PARAMETERS, DISPLAY THEM, AND INITIALISE RANDOM NUMBER 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
CALL PARAM(LINEPOK) 
IF(. NOT. OK)STOP 
WRITE(08,6800)1-INE 
READ(09rf3910)U-)rP, VrD, Z, FM 
8800 FORMAT(2OA4) 
8810 FORMAT(2(FG. 3, IX), Z(FS. 3rlX)PF5. lrlX, FB. 3) 
WRITE(GrG000)U0pP, V, DyZyFM 
6000 FORMAT(IOPARAMTERS (UO, P, V, D, Z, FM): 1,4(FG. 3rlX)rF5. lr 
1 IXFFG. 3) 
CALL G05CCF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
C FOR 100 ITERATIONS PRODUCES VALUES FOR "ELOSS" 1,2 &3 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
WRITE(GYG010) 
G010 FORMAT('OITERATION: ELOSS I ELOSS 2 ELOSS 3'/) 
C 
DO 500 LOOP=1, NITER 
XP=0.0 
SUM=0.0 
DO 100 J=1,00 
UT=(UO*t)+XP)/(V+SUM) 
IF(P. GT. UT)L=l 
IF(P. LT. UT)L=IFIX(SNGL(Z/P)) 
XSUM=0.0 
DO 105 M=1, L 
X=005DDF(FM, O. ID 01) 
>,, SUM=XSUM+, "% 
iss CONTINUE 
XBAR='fI'SUM/L 
XP=XBAR*L+)(P 
SUM=SUM+L 
100 CONTINUE 
IF(P. GT. FM)ELOSSI=(P-FM)*SUti 
IF(P. LT. FM)ELOSS1=(FM-P)-*(80.0*Z/P-SUM) 
CALL PUTBIN(ELOSSIPBINSI, LIMBIN, MINBi, MAXB1) 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ALL=0.0 
XBAR=0.0 
DO 200 IO=1,80 
IF(IO. EQ. 1)UT=U0 
1F(IO. GT. 1)UT=UT*D+(I-D)*XCAR 
IF(P. GT. UT)K=1 
IF(P. LT. UT)K=IFIX(SNGL(ZhP)) 
XSUM=o. o 
DO 205 N=1. K 
X=C, 05DDF(FM, O. lD 01) 
XSuM=XSUM+Xl 
2135 CONTINUE 
XBARýXSUM/K 
ALL=ALL4. K 
-00 CONT I NUC 
IF(P. C. iT. FM)ELOSI-)2=(P-FM)*ALL 
IF(P. LT. FM)ELOSC2=(FM--P)*(13k). O*-'/P-ALL) 
CALL PUTOlt4(ELOSS2, BINSZ, LIMBIN, tlIND2, ýIA>ý'B2) 
C --------------------------------- --------------------------------- 
SUMIM=0.0 
Xp =0.0 
XBAR=0.0 
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.4 
DO 3oo JO=1,00 
RMAX=-9099.9 
IF(JO. E(2.1)UT=UO 
IF(JO. GT. I)UT=(UT*ýIT+ý, 'SUM)/(VT+IPTR) 
IF(JO. EG. I)VT=IJ 
IF(JO. GT. I)t)T=VT+IPTR 
IPTR=O 
DO 400 1=1,40 
W=(P-UT)*DOORT( W+SUM I M)/ I )*DSLIRT(V+ I +SUIl I M) 
Y=Sl5ACF(W, IFAIL) 
RP=0.5*W, **2 
IF(RP. GT. 150.0)RP=150.0 
A=2.710-10*-NRP 
B=(Z/P)*DSORT(I/(V+SUMIM))/DSGr%T(I+kf+. ', 'UIIIM) 
C= (-, C-/P)* (UT-P) 
G=Z+(UT-P)*I+Z+C*Y+B*0.3989424/A 
IF(G. GT. RMAX)IPTR=I 
IF(lPTR. EG. I)RMAX=G 
400 CONTINUE 
XSUM=0.0 
DO 385 LO=1, IPTR 
X=GO5DDF(FM, O. ID 01) 
XSUM=XSUM+X 
385 CONTINUE 
XBAR=XSUM/IPTR 
)(P=XBAR*IPTR+XP 
SUMIM=SUMIM+IPTR 
300 CONTINUE 
IF(P. GT. FM)ELOSS3=(P-FM)*SUMIM 
IF(P. LT. FM)ELOS93=(FM-P)*((30.0*Z/P-SUMTM) 
CALL PUTSIN(ELOS&3, BINS3rLlMBIN, MINBO, MAXB3) 
C ----------------------------------------------------- 
WRITE(6,6020) LOOP, ELOSSI, ELOSS2, ELOSS3 
Gozo FORMAT(' 'Y17, --X, 3FlC). 2) SI=SI+ELOSS1 
S2=92+ELOSS2 
S3=S3+ELOSS3 
S4=S4+ELOSSI**2 
S5=SS+ELOSS2**2 
SG=SG+ELOSS3**Z 
S7=S7+ELOSS1**3 
SS=SB+ELDSSZ**3 
SD=SD+ELOSS3**3 
500 CONTINUE 
C --------------------------------------------------------------- 
C CALCULATE AND PRINT RESULTS I. - 
C --------------------------------------------------------------- 
CALL HGRAM(BINS1, LIMSIN, MINBI, MAXBI) 
CALL HGRAM(BINSý", LIMBIN, MINS2, MAý', L'. Z) 
CALL HGRAM(8INS3, LIMBIN, MIN83, MAXB3) 
CALL PRODIN(NITERvBINSI, LIIlBIN) 
CALL PROBIN(NITER, BINS2pLIMBIN) 
CALL PROBIN(NITER, 5llNS3, -LIMBIN) 
C CALL PRIBIN('BIN1'YBINSIPLIMBIN) 
C CALL PRIBIN('BIN2', 6INS2rLIM3IN) 
C CALL PRIBIN('-OTN3', 2. INS3r LI Me. IN) 
CALL DTFBTN('1-2 ', BINSIrR. ING2, LIrf3lN) 
CALL DIFBIN('2-3 'rBINS""pBINS, 3rLIMBIN) 
CALL DTFBIN('3-1 'rBINS3rBINSI#LIMBIN) 
Xl=SI/NITER 
X2=S2/NITER 
X3=S3/NITER 
VI=S4/NITER-XI*Xl 
VZ=SE, '. /NITER-, 1<2*X2 
V3=SG/NITER-X3*X3 
SKI=S7/NITER-3*XI*VI-Xl**3 
SK 2 =SO/ N'. lTER- -3*X 2 *V 2- X:! **3 
SK3=SS/NITER-3*X3*V3-X3**3 
WRITE(G, G040) 
WRITE(G, G050) Xl, ', <2, X3#ýll, VZ, V. ')PSKlPSK2,13K3 
CALL EXIT(l) 
STOP 
G040 FORMAT('ORESULTS: ELOSS I ELOSS 2 
6050 FGRMAT('0 X 'r3FI4.4/'O. V lr3FI4.4/'O 
E-- ND 
ELOSS 3 
SK 3r- 14 4 
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-tjr. ý-muTINr Pli'll: IJ ( VA IL If .R3, I! M*, I, MI Ntý 1N, INl 
I 1AINt II L_t, VOLLII. " TC (IN INIi Ut AND -. A 1; 11 A'-ý 1% 
f, TO I NCi, '! III NT r Lli'Mk NI b Ol- " U, I N',, 7 ", -1 1 tX IN" ANO "! %, A; ý[ý 1 14 " ARF , e 1! -If` MINIMUM AýND MXýIýIUM VAL IJCý; OF 714,11 SU01,1, IPT. ' "ý 11,117" Is 
C T-it DI, ", W ION, Oý '! ý : V, ". " it I N,, Plit I,. I ll [ 10-Al. .4*, " III 
1'. At-:. 0M, 0 11-1 SF kt'AL -tI. "MINfAIN" AND , mx, tkiN,, muoT vt 
C I., l I!! Aý_ I L; ý_ )! a qu, 19 .0 Ai4l) - 9ý11,19 . t) R1_41l't: f1 V(. I. AN 1) BI N9 
C TO . 1, ý. A-RiS. 
C RA, PURNI. I) ( SrDPtj ) 02-JUN- 133 
REAL-0 kPAL IJF 
RFAL-0 B. N', (LIMIT) 
IVAL - 11INT(ýAýJE)4 I 
If ( IVAL. GT LIMIT) IVAL - LIMIT 
BI Nt; ( IVAL )-VI N5 (I VAL +I. 4) 
IF IVAL. LT. MIN-' 1 14 )MINBIN-IVAL 
IF I VAý . (IT . MA, Fk ,N? MAX8 IN- I VAL 
REI URN 
END 
SUBROUTINE PRCBIN(NOBS, BINS. LIMIT) 
C PROCESSES A LOADED "BINS" (DIMENSION "LIMIT") TO GIVE 
C CUMIJLA', Ik'E VALUCS OYER CLASSES "MINSIN" To "MAXBIN" GIVEN 
C "NOSS" OCSFPk, AII0lS. 
C RAY BURNLEY (SSDPU) 02-JUN-83 
REAL414 SIN-(LIMIT) 
CUMVAL - 0.0 
CNTRIB - 0.0 
OBS - FLOAT(NORS) 
DO 110 I-I, L1MIT 
IF(BINS(I). NE. 0.0) CNTRIB CNTRIB + (SINS(I) CC$) 
BINS(I) CNTR113 + CUMVAL 
CUMVAL BINS(I) 
110 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE DIFOIN(LABEL, BINSA, BINSB. LIMIT) 
C GENERATES DIFFFRENCES BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF "BINSA" AND "BINSEI" 
C (BOTH DIMENSIONED TO "LIMIT"). "DIF11 IS RETURNED EQUAL TO 
C'ZERD IF THE SIGN OF THE DIFFERENCE CHANCES THROUGH THE BINS 
C ARRAYS; OTHERWISE "DIF" IS 
C THE AVERAGE DIFFERENCE; -VE SIGN INDICATES "A" > "B". 
C PAY BURNLEY (SSOPU) 02-JUN-83 
REAL*B DIF, kRK, SJM 
REAL*4 BlNSA(LIMIT), BINSB(LIMIT) 
IBIN -0 
100 IBIN = ISIN +I 
IF(ISIN. GT. LIMIT) GOTO 900 
IF(BINSA(ISIN). EJ. O. O. AND. SINSO(ISIN). EG. 0.0) GOTO 100 
DIF - BINSA(IBIN) - BINSB(IBIN) 
SUM - DIF 
NOB -I 
IF(IBIN. EG. LIMIT) RETURN 
DO 140 i. iarN. LIMIT 
WRK = BINSA(I) - BINSB(I) 
IF(WRK) 110,140.120 
110 IF(DIF) 130,900,200 
120 IF(DIF) 200. C, )0,130 
130 SUM - SUM + WRK 
NOB - NOB +1 
140 CONTINUE- 
DIF - SUM / FLOAT(NOB) 
IF(NO8. EG. 1)DIF-SS99099.3 
GOTO 300 
C---- SIGN CHANGES SET "DIF" TO ZERO 
200 DIF - 0.0 
C---- REPORT RESULT 
300 WRITE(6,61. )00) LASEL, DIF 
RETURN 
6000 FORMAT('O DIFFERENCING ( ', A4, ' AVERACE... ', FIO. 3, 
&1 (0.0 INDPCATES SIGN CHANIX) 'I 
C---- PROBLEMS 
Soo WRITE(S, GSOO) LAEEL, IBIN, I 
RETURN 
6900 FORMAT('O DIFFERENCING ( ', A4, ' ): ERRO13'. 215) 
END 
SUBROUTINE PRIBIN(LABEL, SIN, LIMT) 
REAL*4 8114(LIMIT, 
WRITE(B. 6000) LALEL, LIMIT 
WRJTE(6,6010) (B: N(J), J-I, LIMIT) 
RETUPN 
6000 FOPMAT('O PRIN71NG ( ', A4. ' ): I TO', r4) 
6010 FORMATW ', 15FB. 3) 
END 
SUBROUTINE HORAM(RINS. 1-IMIT. M: NBIN, MAXBlrJI 
REAL*4 
IF (M I Ne IN. CO. MA Xlý'IWIKTURN 
COLL PLOI TL 
CALL DEYRAP(IS6. f), 100.0, O) 
NCOý. Cýr'AXP. IN-M, 'NUIN, I 
CAL:. HlfCý4A(Blt, r, (41NBIN), KICOLr,, O. I. O, VIICri. V[: ND) 
CAl. '_ PLV1':; D 
r: ý- T U: ýN 
CND 
*-*END 
Chapter 
Conclusions. 
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In conclusion what can be said about the effect of 
advertising and learning on consumer behaviour? We have built 
a neoclassical model of consumer -behaviour which allows 
advertising to be incorporated as an information generating 
mechanism. The consumer is unsure of the parameter values of 
a new product and advertising messages provide the consumer with 
an initial set of beliefs about the unknown elements. The 
consumer recognises these messages may be biased. Over time the 
consumer acquires unbiased information by learning about the new 
good through experiencing it, The importance of the initial 
advertising message as a component of current beliefs declines 
over time relative to the impact of experience* 
We argued in Chapter 2 that although advertising that affects 
the consumeris preference ordering) raises difficulties in making 
welfare comparisons, these difficulties may be overcome by 
redefining -the objectives of preferences. The problem must be 
redefined so that the new preference ordering is independent of 
the advertising messages, Advertising affects the consumer only 
through the implicit budget constraint, In this way, changes in 
advertising can be compared with changes in prices, and the 
effects on welfare are easy to compute. 
In Chapter 3 -we argued that advertising is an information 
generating mechanism which like all information has an expected 
value. Whether the consumer reeks farther knowledge depends 
upon the expected value of the advertising messagel relative to 
* 22 34 - 
the cost of the information, Advertising has an actual value 
in terms of the maximised level of utility obtained from 
following advertising' s. advice less the utility obtained in- the 
absence of advertising, We argued that the purpose of advertising 
is to provide the consumer with prior beliefs about the value of 
an unknown parameter in the'utility function, However, advertising 
is information supplied by the person selling the product who has 
an incentive to exaggerate its qualities, The consumer recognises 
this bias, and in building his set of beliefs, takes account of the 
inherent deception elements in a series of advertising messages. 
Having constructed his initial beliefs, the consumer realises that 
he is able to gain further unbiased information by actually sampling 
the good. 
The implications for behaviour of the consumeiis ability to, 
learn about the unknown parameter from his own experience was 
expanded in Chapters 4,5 and 6. The differences between these 
chapters related to the different assumptions ma&. about the 
environment, In Chapter 4 we considered the case where the 
consumer had a linear utility function, normally distributed prior 
beliefs, and the underlying random variable has a normal distributione 
The important result from'this chapter, repeated in the next, two 
chapters, was that the opportunity for learning, in terms of 
updating his beliefs about unknown parameters does affect consumer 
behaviour. If the information enabling him to carry out the 
updating procedure is a function of the amount of the good consumedp 
then the consumer will purchase more of the good than if the 
opportunity for learning did not exist. 
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This conclusion was shown to be reversed for the case of 
a two period 'budget constraint and a strong preference for 
consumption in the first period. Finally in Chapter 4, we 
considered the implications of sampling on the efficiency of the 
household technology, and showed that a single period "ineffioient" 
solution could exist. Of course this solution is optimal over 
two periods. 
In Chapter 5 we considered the case of a constant elasticity 
of substitution utility function where the underlying random 
t 
variable has a log normal distribution., This enabled us to see 
the effect of risk aversion on the probleme The result, not 
unexpectedly, was that as previously the consumer purchases a greater 
quantity of the decision variable in the first period, enabling 
him to learn optimally about his environment. 
In Chapter 6 we considered the case of a nonsymmetric prior, 
taken to represent the consumeiis inherent suspicions as to the 
truth of an advertising statement. We derived the posterior 
distribution for this prior and a random sample from a uniform 
distribution. As previously, the consumer purchases a larger 
quantity of the new good due to sampling. 
The increased purchases of the decision variable in the first 
period in an adaptive environment can be contrasted with the non- 
adaptive two period models of Sandmo (1970) and Modigliani and 
Dreze (1972), where, provided certain conditions are satisfied the 
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presence of uncertainty in the second period leads to a lower 
optimal value of the decision variable in -the first period, The 
risk averse consumer tsaves' for the possibility of a run of bad 
luck next period. With adaptive distributions these conclusions 
are reversed. 
If producers realise that on the introduction of a new good, 
consumers are purchasing more than they might 'be expected to in the 
long ran, producers have an incentive to keep on introducing new 
goods forcing consumers to experiment. Of course, over time 
consumers will learn that they are not sampling from a stationary 
distribution. The problems that we have considered in this thesis 
is that the underlying distribution of the random variable remains 
stationary, This is not to say that consumer behaviour is not 
affected when the environment is adaptive and non-atationary, only 
that this thesis has not considered this problem. 
In Chapter 7, we extended the model developed in Chapter 
to a many period environment, We were conoerned with examining 
the movement over time of the optimum demand for a new good, given 
that the consumer had been learning about it, and further would be 
able to learn more about it in the future. The major conclusion 
of that chapter was that, for the assumed observations that the 
consumer made, the profile of purchases increased over time such 
that when aggregated over a number of consumers, it produced 
a sigmoid diffusion curve. The shape of this curve fits with the 
expirical evidence on the diffusion of new products, Perhaps, more 
- 237 - 
importantly, the chapter also provided a testable hypothesis on the 
k 
shape 
of the demand functiorPalong the life cycle. The hypothesia is 
that as the consixner's desire to sample the good declines over 
the life cycle, the elasticity of demand for the new Good increases, 
This is because early on in the life of a product, consumers wish 
to learn about its qualities and are less concerned with the price. 
Over time, having learnt about the products characteristics the 
consumer becomes more price conscious. 
Finally in Chapter 8, we contrasted three different learning 
processes in terms of the speed of acquiring complete information. 
The three processes represented optimal, sub-optimal and reasonable 
search, with the computational costs of each process declining 
from the first to the last. We compared the distribution of 
utility losses for each process in terms of a stochastio 
dominance 
criteria, since the utility loss is a random variable depending 
upon the observations actually taken. Ex poste we were able 
to 
say which process was best, and we found that this 
depended upon 
the range of parameter values. 
process. 
There was no one global optimal 
The work examined in this thesis could be extended in two directions. 
We found that over time the consumer puts greater weight on his experience 
as the degree of confidence in his posterior beliefs increase. However, 
we assumed that the initial degree of confidence was given and remained 
fixed. Suppose instead that j changes over time, perhaps according to 
an adaptive process given by the idfference between V0 and Then we 
can envisage the situation in which the overall posterior degree of 
confidence falls; implying the paradoxical result that false advertising 
causes the consumer to sample, and hence purchase, more of the good. 
- 238 - 
This would be one extension. A second improvement 
would be to incorporate the effect of a series of advertising 
statements into the model, of both the firm itself and also 
a rival, This would also allow us to consider the role of the rate 
of forgetfulness of advertising messages. How these ideas could 
be implemented was suggested in Chapter 3, and this could prove 
a fruitful avenue for farther research. 
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